"Cogs in the Corporate Machine" - More on the Plight of Corporate Physicians

We discussed last week some of the perils of the latest trend towards the corporatization of medicine, practicing physicians becoming employees of hospital systems, including for-profit corporate systems.  A recent article in Medscape Business of Medicine included a striking anecdote about the life of a corporate physician.

Controlling Referrals by Contractual Provision
It started with the revelation that some employed physicians may sign contracts that obligate them to refer patients within the corporate system, even if that is not in their best interests:

Victoria Rentel, a family physician in Columbus, Ohio, joined a hospital-owned group several years ago. At first, nearly everything went fine. There were a few glitches: she'd occasionally order tests or consults at competing facilities, either for patient convenience or because of health plan coverage. When the hospital's administrators found out, they told her it was a violation of her contract; but that didn't stop her because she knew the hospital never enforced this provision.

A Non-Compete Clause, Even for a Laid-Off Physician

It also included the observation that corporate physicians may be abruptly laid off. Worse, being laid off means having to leave town, because apparently even laid-off physicians are still obligated by non-compete clauses in their contracts:

Then, out of the blue, she was informed that the hospital was going to close her practice within 45 days. She knew this wasn't her fault; the recession had hit the hospital hard, and it was laying off nearly half of the primary care doctors in her group. Still, it was a hard pill to swallow.

Making matters worse, her contract's noncompete clause prohibited her from going to work for any of the other healthcare systems in town. To avoid legal sanctions, she joined the student health service at Ohio State University.

Signing Contracts Without Understanding Them
The article's introduction emphasized the problem of physicians signing onerous contracts, perhaps without fully understanding them or without getting adequate legal advice:

Many other physicians -- especially those who, like Rentel, were previously in private practice -- complain about their jobs. In some cases, it's because physicians rushed into the arms of a hospital without looking carefully at their contracts or asking the right questions during their job interviews.

Cogs in the Corporate Machine

The introduction ended ominously:

Ultimately, the loss of control over their own professional lives is what irks employed doctors the most if they used to be in private practice. But some doctors also get the sinking feeling that they've become cogs in the corporate machine.

'The reality is that when you work for a hospital system, you're a service line,' says Rentel. 'And because primary care reimbursement is relatively low, you're a service line that feeds more lucrative service lines.'

Oddly enough, after that striking beginning, the article peters off into a discussion of some "gripes of employed physicians," which either soft-pedaled or failed to include the issues listed above.

The specific issues, and the general response of physicians to their role as corporate wage slaves deserve further consideration.

Signing Bad Contracts

First, the notion that physicians frequently sign contracts, particularly such important contracts as their own employment agreements, without reading them, without clearly understanding them, and without obtaining competent legal counsel is very disturbing.   A physician who signs a contract without reading it, understanding it, and getting competent legal advice about it is at best naive to the point of foolishness. 

My late father, an attorney, done told me to "never sign a contract you haven't read and understood."  Contracts are - surprise - enforceable legal documents that may involve surrendering important rights.  One should never sign a contract without being satisfied that its benefits outweigh its harms.

It could be that physicians who so blithely sign contracts are exhibiting learned helplessness.  Maybe they feel somehow pressured to apparently voluntarily agree to doing something that ultimately will harm them.  I am not sure that simply declaring on a blog that we will have to unlearn our helplessness if we are ever to save medicine and health care will do much to solve what may be a fairly deep problem.  But we must do so.

In addition, contracts are valid if entered into voluntarily.  It may be that some physicians truly sign contracts under duress.  Those contracts may not be valid, and could be challenged if they were so signed (again, if physicians are willing to unlearn their helplessness enough to get the counsel of a competent attorney.)

Stopping "Leakage" Possibly Unethically, Maybe Illegally?

The physician in the example above apparently had a contract provision which was violated simply by referring patients to competing facilities.  This appears to be an extreme way for a hospital to deal with the problem of "leakage," that is, the financial problem to the hospital caused when patients are referred outside the system.  Note that we discussed (here and here) the example of a for-profit hospital system with a large number of physician employees pushed to choke off "leakage" of patient referrals outside the system.

Although leakage may pose financial problems for hospitals, fighting leakage may lead to ethical problems.  Physicians are supposed to decide how to manage patients, and specifically to decide where to refer patients in the patients' interests, not just to keep money flowing to the health care system. "Leakage reduction" may possibly threaten physicians' first commandment, to make decisions to maximize benefits and minimize harms to individual patients, before all other considerations.

Worse, in the example cited in the Medscape paper, the leakage reduction was apparently implemented not by just trying to persuade doctors to keep patients within the system, but by a contract provision that somehow forbade referrals out of the system.  That may have not only been unethical, but it could have been illegal.  

The "Stark Law" (Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter XVIII, Part E, Section 1395 of the US Code) generally prohibits basing referral decisions on payments.  Full-time employed physicians are exempt from some of its provisions, but only if the physicians' "amount of remuneration under employment" "is not determined in a manner that takes into account (directly or indirectly) the volume or value of any referrals by the referring physician."  Therefore, were the contract referred to above to have forbidden outside referrals on pain of termination or reduction in remuneration, it could potentially violate this law. 

There have been rumors that physicians have been pushed to sign contracts that could so violate the Stark Law, but the published example above makes this a real possibility.

Physicians ought not to sign contracts that seem to limit referrals under penalty of pay reduction or termination, which may be both unethical and illegal.  Any physician presented with or who has signed such a contract ought to consult a competent attorney.

If hospitals and hospital systems are trying to force physicians to make referrals based on the hospitals' financial advantage instead of in the best interests of patients, that is reprehensible.  If these organizations are trying to do so via contractual provisions, this deserves investigation, including investigation by the relevant law enforcement agencies. 

Don't Be a Corporate Cog

This article underscores my previously expressed fears about how making physicians into corporate employees may remove the last barriers preventing patients from becoming corporate financial cannon fodder.  Physicians' most central professional value is to put patients' interests first.  Practicing physicians who practice as corporate employees are at risk of being pressured, or even threatened under the cover of contract enforcement to put their corporate employers' revenues ahead of patients' interests. 

Physicians should not let their patients, and their own values be so threatened.  Physicians who have inadvertently, foolishly, or under duress signed contracts that could threaten their professionalism and their patients' welfare need to do the right thing and challenge these contracts, or else there will soon be nothing left of the medical profession, and no one left to ethically care for patients. 

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The Rise of the Corporate Physician - the End of the (Health Care) World As We Know It?

In discussing how concentration and abuse of power threatens health care professionals' values and professionalism, we have discussed how ostensibly academic institutions value faculty more for their earning power than their academic abilities.  We have discussed how financial relationships between physicians and drug, biotechnology, device and other companies risk abuse of entrusted power.  But up to now, I have been comforted by the hope that physicians in small independent practices who do not have such conflicts of interest are trying to uphold their professional values, even as they were buffeted by the perverse incentives imposed by managed care organizations/ health insurance companies and government insurance (e.g., US Medicare whose payments are controlled by the RUC).

However, a recent article in SmartMoney suggests that the end of the independent physician is nigh:

Remember the solo family doctor? In places like Springfield, it has become increasingly likely that she's collecting a paycheck from a large regional hospital—and practicing medicine according to the hospital's strict playbook. The experience in Springfield is just a needle prick compared with what's going on nationwide. At least one in six doctors—more than 150,000 nationwide—now works as an employee of a hospital system. And with about half of recent medical school graduates deciding to work for hospitals and many established doctors looking to unload their practices amid the tough economic climate, what was a trickle of change has turned into a torrent. Jim Pizzo, a Chicago-area hospital consultant, says the blistering pace of these mergers is leading some colleagues to joke that there are two types of physicians today: 'Those employed by hospitals and those about to be.'

So we are seeing physicians who practiced solo or in physician-lead, physician-run group practices becoming employees of large health care organizations. And here on Health Care Renewal, we know how most large health care organizations are run.

This appears to be an unintended consequence of our recent US health care "reform" law:

But hospital executives also believe that buying doctors' practices could yield a big payday, thanks to a different provision in the health care law. The law will encourage doctors and hospitals to share some payments when treating each patient; as collaborative teams, they could earn bonuses for holding down costs and meeting quality markers. 'The real question for everyone is how that pie—that money—is going to get split up,' Goertz says; hospitals think they'll have the upper hand if they employ the doctors that they're sharing their banana crème with. And that's touched off a flurry of mergers everywhere—from Seattle to Roanoke, Va.

The name of these supposedly collaborative organizations, which are turning out to simply be hospital systems which have purchased physicians' practices and now employ physicians, is "accountable care organizations," which now appears ironic at least.

The article detailed some of the adverse effects to be expected when accountable care organizations become hospital systems with employed physicians providing patient care.

Increased Costs with Decreased Care

Ruth Taylor, a 44-year-old woman in Bozeman, Mont., started seeing Robert Hathaway as her doctor during college, and she stuck with him through everything from routine blood tests to a kidney transplant. Taylor, a professional nurse with warm blue eyes, describes Hathaway as a 'classic small-town doctor' who knew all his patients by name and socialized with them at local basketball games; he was accessible and thorough—even catching a health problem of hers that other doctors had missed. But after Hathaway sold his practice to the local hospital, Taylor says, things began to sour. She was more likely to be assigned to see the physician assistant rather than Hathaway himself. And when she went in for a comprehensive physical (also run by the assistant) in late 2008, she was charged $360, more than double what she'd paid for a workup in previous years.

Imposition of Dysfunctional Health Care Information Technology

On this blog, Dr Scot Silverstein frequently posts about how poorly designed and implemented commercial health care information technology may have harms that outweigh any benefits, and how these systems are rarely objectively evaluated. Employed physicians are likely to be required by their new executive overlords to use commercial health care IT that benefits the managers and their strategies, but may not benefit patient care:

Last spring Hospital Sisters tried to shift all of its Springfield medical offices to electronic medical records simultaneously. But there wasn't enough tech support to deal with all the problems physicians ran into on day one, and wait times spiked at the system's walk-in locations. Nenaber, a soft-spoken 64-year-old with wire-rim glasses, sounds acquiescent about the situation. 'We're getting the hang of these things,' he says slowly, sitting at his desk overlooking a gas station and a strip-mall parking lot. But his practice is still waiting for its electronic payoff

Increasing Prices by Providing Care in the Hospital

Now that the acquisition spree is in full swing, some experts worry that price increases could become the dominant narrative for patients. When hospitals run medical practices, federal law allows them to add substantial 'facility fees' to patients' bills to cover overhead expenses. The new bosses also often rip equipment like X-ray machines and MRIs out of the physician's office, preferring to have patients get those tests from radiologists at the hospital. That, too, can cost patients. A consumer with a high-deductible Aetna plan, for instance, would pay up to $1,400 for an MRI of her back at the University Medical Center at Princeton, N.J., according to data that the insurer makes available to its members. The same scan would cost about a third as much at nearby Radiology Affiliates of New Jersey, a nonhospital facility. Based on a review of insurance databases and state regulatory records, that's a fairly typical price gap

Increasing Prices by Market Domination

Price increases also have the potential to bleed outward—affecting not only the patients of the absorbed doctor, but also the cost of health care citywide. That's because when hospitals sit down at the bargaining table with insurers, they're almost always able to negotiate higher payment rates for their big groups of doctors than a lone physician with little bargaining power

Despite the usual spin provided by the would-be monopolists:

Fast-growing hospital systems, including Hospital Sisters and Bozeman Deaconess, say that their growth will eventually make care more efficient and bring costs back down, since they'll be able to cut back on unnecessary care and duplicate tests

I am sure that the 19th century robber barons made the same pitch about increasing efficiency. Of course, the efficiency mainly benefits the insider managers.

By the way, of course, the hospital systems own public relations machines and lobbyists are now busy attacking any restrictions on such concentrations of power, while the hospital managers figure out how to game the system to increase their market domination before the regulators notice:

As more patients face such disruptions, regulators are taking notice. In October, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Health and Human Services met with doctors, insurers and other health officials to discuss the referral and pricing problems that could arise from 'accountable-care organizations'— those new groups of hospitals and doctors that will share financial incentives. The Federal Trade Commission will offer guidelines on what's permissible by midyear. But hospitals are already lobbying for accountable-care groups to be exempt from antitrust and antifraud rules, even as they scoop up more and more medical practices. Under current regulations, officials in Washington must green-light all mergers involving companies valued at more than $63 million. But by buying up tiny medical practices one at a time, critics say, hospitals stay below the threshold and avoid getting much attention. And by the time regulators settle on more-formal legal guidelines, those mergers may be hard to undo, says Cory Capps, a Washington economist specializing in health care antitrust issues.

Excess and Unnecessary Utilization via "Leakage Control"

With big hospital systems now owning physician practices, and practicing physicians directly answering to executives, the push will be on to maximize use of the most lucrative services. Once the hospital systems have made employees out of the physicians, it is easy to pressure their own employed physicians to refer patients to the hospital units that can bill most lucratively:

By their own admission, most hospitals are eager to keep patient referrals under the same corporate umbrella, to save on costs and share medical records but also to boost revenue. The hospitals say they wouldn't force an internist, for example, to refer a patient with heart problems to their own cardiologists, but critics say there's certainly financial pressure. Under a little-noticed regulation that took effect in 2007, hospitals are allowed to pay doctors less if they don't do enough internal referrals.

Doctors in Bozeman and Springfield who granted interviews said they didn't feel pressure to be 'team players' with referrals. But some of those who've left large health systems tell a different story, including Mark Callenberger, an orthopedist in Merritt Island, Fla. Callenberger says that the hospital group where he used to work urged him to direct more patients to the MRI machine owned by the hospital. The doctor preferred a more advanced machine at a private practice that he says offered clearer pictures. But after he ignored the recommendations, Callenberger says, the hospital told his office manager to schedule patients at the hospital's MRI anyway, leaving him to perform surgery using 'crummy images.' (The hospital declined to comment on Callenberger's case but says its doctors can use whatever facilities they choose.) Patients may never know about these power struggles, because doctors aren't required to disclose how they choose specialists. And while patients who ask can always see a specialist outside the network, in practice few are likely to challenge their doctors' judgment, says Bruce A. Johnson, a Denver health care lawyer. 'Face it, when we're really sick,' says Johnson, 'if the doctor tells us to jump off a roof, we'll probably consider doing it.'

Note that we discussed (here and here) the example of a for-profit hospital system with a large number of physician employees pushed to choke off "leakage" of patient referrals outside the system.

Summary

The overarching problem is that employed physicians now must answer to managers and executives who may put financial goals, and their own enrichment, ahead of physicians' values, and specifically will choose increased revenue over providing the best possible care to individual patients:

. Executives here are also hoping to push the needle further—standardizing everything from how long patients wait on hold to the ease of parking at the doctor's office (valets, luxury-restaurant style, are one solution under consideration).

Still, Mikell acknowledges, 'doctors don't want follow-the-directions, cookbook medicine.' And for many physicians, the idea of following new rules triggers a much larger unease at giving up their independence—a feeling of loss, both for the businesses they built and for their patients. Back in Bozeman, Blair Erb, the sole cardiologist in town, is a picture of resignation as he prepares to sign a contract with Deaconess. 'I feel defeated,' Erb says, looking around at the office furniture he and his wife, Liz, chose from a catalog years ago. The weathered ranchers and bundled-up women that come through his door mostly express disbelief when they hear that this frank-talking Tennessee native will sell his practice. His staffers say they're not looking forward to the questions the hospital's medical records system will soon prompt them to ask patients. (Do you wear a bike helmet regularly? Do you have a smoke detector?) 'We'll try to retain as much professional independence as possible,' Erb says, gazing at the hospital building, whose bulk he can see through his window. 'But the fact of the matter is, we'll have a new master.'

So I for one do not welcome our new executive overlords.

We have posted about numerous examples of health care organizational leaders who put their own enrichment ahead of the mission. Now even ostensibly non-profit hospital systems are increasingly competing against for-profit systems. We have seen, as noted above, an example of a for-profit system that seems to betting everything on a business strategy to reduce "leakage" of patient referrals.  We can expect that non-profit hospital systems will have to act more like for-profit systems, and the perverse financial incentives given the managers of all hospital systems will lead to pressure on physicians to forgo their responsibilities to provide the best care to individual patients in favor of actions that will bring in the most money in the shortest time.

We seem to be witnessing the rise of the corporate physician, the rise of a physician who must first answer to managers who never committed to putting patient care first, who may have no sympathy for physicians' core values, who may receive huge incentives to maximize short-term revenue no matter what. Such a rise of corporate physicians would be unprecedented in the US, and I believe in any developed country.

The rise of the corporate physician would require patients to put their trust in corporations, rather than individual doctors, in the era of the global financial collapse, in the new gilded age.

We may be seeing the end of health care world as we know it. The upcoming brave new world of health care may be worse that we can imagine.

What is to be done? - I rarely have ventured into specific policy suggestions, but I think that the consequences of the well-intended "accountable care organization" blunder may be so severe that I must so venture now. We must derail the movement towards "accountable care organizations." Any movement to make organizations more accountable cannot do so by making most professionals into employees answering to the sorts of ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted or even corrupt leaders that we have been writing about for more than six years on Health Care Renewal.  We need to make it impossible for for-profit companies to employ physicians to take care of patients.  Maybe we need to think about making it impossible for for-profit companies to provide patient care at all, and for for-profit companies to sell health insurance.  Meanwhile, we need to ensure the accountability, integrity, transparency, and honesty of leaders of health care organizations.

If we do not reverse the current trends, anyone who wants good health care may have to look for it somewhere other than in the US.

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The New Steward Health Care: Will Superbowl Ads and "Leakage Reduction" Keep the Ship Afloat, or Will a "Greater Fool" Be Left Trying to Bail it Out?

Some recent publications raise interesting questions about the leadership of a regional health care organization which now seems to have intentions of going national. 

A Superbowl Ad for Steward Health Care

The millions watching the Superbowl, maybe the biggest single US sports event, expect to be dazzled by the new, extremely expensive advertisements to be aired during the television coverage of the event.  The Boston Globe reported that the glitzy offerings by Volkswagen and Budweiser will have an odd companion, at least in the Boston area:

The local television audience for Super Bowl XLV on Sunday will get the usual array of high-impact commercials, from the suds of Budweiser to the sedans of Kia Motors. But amid all the elaborate productions, one quieter spot might stand out — an ad for Steward Health Care System, the Boston company formed to oversee the six Caritas Christi hospitals.

During the 30-second commercial, Massachusetts residents talk about the importance of quality health care, as the camera roams through Brighton and Dorchester — the homes of St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center and Carney Hospital.

There was no such marketing campaign for the hospitals before November, when they were bought by New York private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management. The ad will be broadcast only on WFXT-TV (Channel 25), not nationally.

Officials at Steward said they were looking to introduce the health care service company to customers who may have never heard of Steward. The campaign also further demonstrates a different marketing approach for the regional hospital network as it transitions to a for-profit health care player.

Why would a hospital system advertise during the Superbowl?

Brian Carty, chief executive marketing officer at Steward, said that’s the aim: make a debut during the Super Bowl to reach a large swath of local consumers.

'You can only launch a brand once, and we wanted to launch it in the biggest way we could,' said Carty.

It certainly is curious, particularly when the brand is only new in the most superficial sense. As noted above, Steward Health Care System is the new name given the former Caritas Christi, a regional Massachusetts health care system that was formerly non-profit and run by the Catholic Church, but was recently bought out by Cerberus Capital Management, a private equity company.

We discussed concerns about whether a private equity group would put its short-term financial gain ahead of the patient care mission if given the chance to run a hospital system in a series of posts in spring, 2010.

A CEO with a Short-Term Focus

Things get curiouser and curiouser. The Boston Globe also just published a lengthy report on former Caritas Christi, now Steward Health Care CEO Ralph De La Torre, which emphasized, perhaps unintentionally, his chronic focus on short-term gain.

[Friend and mentor Dr David] Torchiana has been fielding questions from lots of colleagues wondering what de la Torre might to next. 'My view of Ralph,' he tells them, 'is that he's aggressive and unpredictable.'

Forced Out His BIDMC Chief
Dr de la Torre trained as a cardiovascular thoracic surgeon who apparently was a very highly regarded surgeon. But then, the article described how Dr de la Torre forced out his clinical and academic leader at the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center:

He stayed at Boston Medical for only a year, jumping to Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center for a better opportunity. Dr. Frank Sellke, Beth Israel’s relatively young interim chief of cardiothoracic surgery, saw great things in him.

But then,

After a couple of years, Sellke, who officially became chief in 2001, started hearing chatter that de la Torre was gunning for his job. He didn’t take it seriously. Traditionally, to be a chief at a Harvard-affiliated hospital like Beth Israel, you needed heavy research and teaching credentials, which de la Torre did not have. 'When I heard Ralph was trying to undo me, I thought it was joke,' Sellke says. 'It turns out the joke was on me.'

In 2004, de la Torre greatly expanded his reach when hospital officials named him chief of cardiac surgery, a section within the division of cardiothoracic surgery. Two years later, he gained freer reign over cardiac care after the hospital removed Sellke as chief of the division. Sellke – who stresses that he is happy now as a chief at Brown Medical School and remains one of the country’s best-funded cardiac researchers – says that although he respects de la Torre’s talents, he lost respect for him as a person. 'He has a take-no-prisoners approach. If he interrupts or destroys someone else’s career, that doesn’t bother him in the least.'

Developed CardioVascular Institute, then Left
After this little coup d'etat, Dr de la Torre hatched a plan to integrate cardiovascular care at the BIDMC, but then flew the coop after it did not work out as planned:

Instead, he hatched a plan to revolutionize cardiac care at Beth Israel. Traditionally, cardiac surgeons, vascular surgeons, and cardiologists operated in their own silos, even though they were all treating related cardiovascular diseases. De la Torre proposed the CardioVascular Institute, or CVI, as a way to break down those silos and centralize care by creating a 'hospital within a hospital.'

But,

The CVI officially opened in 2007, with de la Torre as president and CEO. He continued his work as a surgeon, maintaining the salary of more than $1.3 million that he had earned the previous year.

Pomposelli says de la Torre’s enormous talent, intellect, and drive helped the CVI succeed in many ways, notably in removing waste from hospital operations and in building strong networks of affiliated physicians. De la Torre wined and dined community cardiologists around the region, persuading them to become affiliates and refer patients to Beth Israel for care.

But Pomposelli concedes that the CVI fell short in other ways. The silos were harder to break down than they thought, especially since “we didn’t pay enough attention to academics and research.” Also the “enhanced revenues” to physicians turned out to be far less than promised, leading to resentment. Pomposelli, who remains the chief of vascular surgery at Beth Israel, stresses that the CVI still exists, but in a much less ambitious form. 'Ralph’s a builder. He loves the deal, loves creating new things,' Pomposelli says. 'I don’t think he loves managing things as much. Running the CVI turned out to be tedious and difficult.'

And de la Torre was out the door before this idea turned out to be less than what he touted:

In 2008, just a year after seeing his brainchild become a reality, de la Torre told Pomposelli he would be leaving to run the ailing Caritas hospital network.

Left Republican Party, Became Democrat

After assuming control of Caritas, Dr de la Torre seemed to abandon his previous political affilisations.

As recently as 2007, he was a registered Republican.

De la Torre (pronounced DEL-a-TOR-ree) says that, like many children of Cuban immigrants, he has long identified with the conservative Republican outlook on foreign policy, though he is a social liberal. Sometime after he moved to Newton, he switched his registration to independent. Regardless, he stresses that he was not politically active until recently, when he became motivated to fund Democratic candidates because of that party’s commitment to overhauling health care.

Then, the instant Democrat contributed substantially to the campaign of Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley, who had to approve the take-over by Cerberus of Caritas:

she was the guest of honor at a ... fund-raiser held at the de la Torre home the previous fall when she was running for US Senate.

Some state Republicans complained that Coakley should not have been signing off on a deal being advanced by a major campaign donor, although they could produce no evidence that her office’s review was anything but thorough and deliberative.

And he hosted a better noticed fundraiser that that included a visit by President Obama,

Just before 5 p.m. on a Saturday in mid-October, a Cadillac limousine climbed the curvy driveway outside the Newton home belonging to Dr. Ralph de la Torre and his wife, Wing. Inside, the 75 guests were anxiously awaiting the main attraction while staying busy wondering how long the de la Torres’ adorable 2-year-old twin sons would be able to keep their neckties attached and their dress shoes on. Swell parties like this are not uncommon in the West Newton Hill neighborhood, which is dotted with multimillion-dollar houses like the de la Torres’ place. Still, this gathering stood out for two reasons. First, just about every person attending had paid $15,000 a pop to be there. Second, the guest of honor was none other than President Obama.

Abandoned Surgery and His Medical License

More strikingly Dr de la Torre also effectively abandoned the profession which had earlier brought him so much recognition:

After a decade of training to become a cardiac surgeon and endless effort to become one of the best in the business, de la Torre decided to walk away from surgery. He’d been in practice for only about nine years.

De la Torre says it’s impossible to be a great heart surgeon working only part time. He even took the drastic step of letting his medical license expire, his way of refusing to look back. 'Burn the boats on the beach, baby!' he says.

Saving Caritas: "Leakage Reduction"
So what set of boats would he burn to promote Steward Health Care? When he took over Caritas, he was able to improve its finances, but only up to a point,

The hospitals in the chain – flagship St. Elizabeth’s in Brighton, the Carney in Dorchester, Holy Family in Methuen, Good Samaritan in Brockton, St. Anne’s in Fall River, and Norwood Hospital – were all hurting. Worse, the system was weighed down by debt and underfunded pensions. De la Torre moved quickly to cut costs, improve efficiency, and negotiate increased reimbursement rates paid to Caritas hospitals by Blue Cross and other insurers. His actions helped turn around Caritas’s finances, going from a $20 million loss in 2008 to a $30 million operating income in 2009. But the debt, pension liabilities, and lack of access to capital combined to become an albatross on the chain. As of March 2009, Caritas had only 40 days’ cash on hand, according to Mark Rich, the CFO, who took to keeping extra-large bottles of Tums on his desk.

His solution was the private equity take-over:

In classic de la Torre style, the deal promised something for each of the stakeholders. The archdiocese, which administered the Caritas pension fund, would see support for the fund to the tune of $295 million as well as a continued commitment that the hospitals would follow Catholic doctrine and not perform abortions or sterilizations. The SEIU would get job preservation and a stronger beachhead in Boston from which to try to expand its organizing efforts into the city’s big-name hospitals. The communities would see their local hospitals stay alive, even getting spruced up rather than stripped for parts. And Cerberus would get a dynamic leader who could offer them both a laboratory for testing the post-health care-overhaul national market and a sort of cloak of righteousness, given the hospitals’ history of working with the poor.

But how would Cerberus make money on its investment? The explanation in the article raises more questions than it answers:

As he sees it, through investment in information technology and bricks-and-mortar hospitals, he will be able to offer a highly integrated 'accountable care organization' that gives patients quality care, close to home, thereby keeping costs down. The key is insisting that patients get all but the most complex care from their community hospital, rather than seeking treatment for pneumonia or a broken arm at a big shop like Mass. General.

Left unsaid, though, is who could effectively "insist" that patients get all their care within the system?

The notion that such insistence is the key also appeared in other reports on the Cerberus take-over of Caritas. For example, on October 14, 2010, the Boston Globe reported on Dr de la Torre's responses to the Massachusetts Public Health Council in a hearing on whether the take-over should be approved:

De la Torre said his aim was to stop the 'leakage' of patients from communities served by Caritas hospitals to academic medical centers in Boston.

'The business plan, the strategy, or whatever you want to call it, is all about keeping care locally,' he said. 'If we improve the facilities, improve the infrastructure, make it so that our very own patients want to stay in our hospitals, that’s the business plan.'

The same notion appeared in a post in local television station WPRI's news blog about the possible take-over by Steward of another local hospital

Private equity investors did not buy Caritas and turn it into a for-profit medical complex for the purpose of standing still. Caritas executives say they want to improve business by reducing 'leakage' — patients leaving its suburban medical settings to be treated in Boston teaching hospitals.

In fact, a little Google searching revealed that Caritas Christi Network Services had been pushing "leakage reduction" in its own newsletter in the Fall, 2009 issue:

Our job now is to focus performance on two critical success factors:
reducing leakage and improving quality.

So,

Leakage Reduction: Keep the Care in Caritas

Network-wide Referral Management

Our first initiative to help reduce leakage is to implement a network wide referral management
program.

Furthermore,

Region Specific Leakage Action Plans

Each of the Hospital and IPA presidents will collaborate to develop region specific action plans to reduce leakage. Together they will develop goals, identify reporting needs, and establish processes to achieve leakage targets. The participation and support of each physician IPA member will be important to the success of this initiative.

You and Your Patient

Your support in keeping the care you provide within the Caritas system and in participating in the care management initiatives is critical to the system’s success.

Note that Caritas Christi Network Services is apparently the subsidiary of Caritas Christi, now Steward Health Care, that employs physicians:

Caritas Christi Network Services (CCNS) is the second largest physician network in Massachusetts. Established in 2001, CCNS is responsible for the implementation and successful execution of managed care contracts, providing physicians with medical management services (referral and care management), quality improvement programs, data analysis, information systems and financial expertise.

But here is where it gets really tricky. It is one thing to aim to improve hospital services and accessibility in the hopes of attracting more patients. It is another thing to push physicians to refer patients to specific facilities for economic reasons, because physicians are supposed to make decisions for individual patients, including decisions about where to refer, based on the particular patient's needs and preferences.

So there are major questions about both the effectiveness and the ethics of "leakage reduction" based on applying leverage to physicians.

Summary: Will Someone End Up the "Greater Fool?"
Meanwhile, Paul Levy, the soon to be former CEO of BIDMC, who has not been afraid to say what he thinks on his blog, now called Not Running a Hospital, suggested that Cerberus, and by implication, Dr de la Torre, are not in this for the long haul. He first introduced the "greater fool" theory of business management,

It seems that there is no end to the number of people with cash who will be intoxicated by a good story line, even when there is little substance to back it up. All of these stories depend on the capital markets to bolster the price of investments, counting on the 'greater fool' theory: There is always someone who will take on a bad investment at just the wrong time, providing a good return to those who are lucky enough to escape before the crash.

Then he raised the concern:

Those seeking to regulate the behavior and financial decisions of for-profit hospitals will find that their post hoc authority will likely be insufficient to protect the public interest from a depletion of plant and equipment and from a plan that is mainly meant to burnish the pre-tax and pre-depreciation short-term earnings of the firm so that it is ready for the initial public offering or resale to another private equity firm.

So the question is whether Superbowl advertisements and "leakage reduction" management can really make the new Steward Health Care a lasting success? And if not, will Cerberus Capital Management hang around just long enough to buff the system up for the next buyer?

And if that happens, Levy noted:

Who gets hurt if these deals go bust when the next generation of owners takes over and discovers that creating the margin to generate the expected return is very hard in the hospital world? Well, that very last set of investors, the 'greater fools.' But, as we have seen in the examples above, the hurt goes much further. Hospitals, though, are in a special category. Investors may come and go, but the community depends on its local hospital to provide high quality service. It is the residents of the community who are left holding the bag if the hospital corporation reaches the conclusion that ownership is not financially viable.

As we said before,.... Deals that turn not-for-profit hospital systems into privately held for-profit systems ought to be scrutinized with extreme skepticism. Furthermore, once such deals are made, the results ought to be watched extremely closely to make sure they do not put private gain ahead of individuals' and the public's health. For-profit hospitals have generally not lived up to the promises they made to provide quality, accessible health care at a cheaper price.  It is yet to be seen whether private equity running for-profit hospital systems (and physicians networks) will do any better.

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