Generic Leadership Fine for EHR Implementation in High Acuity, High Risk Areas Such as an Emergency Department?

At my Feb. 16, 2012 post "Hospitals and Doctors Use Health IT at Their Own Risk - Even if 'Certified'" I established that buyers and users of EHR systems do so at their own risk with regard to implementation problems or outright defects resulting in patient harm.

As I've also written at my April 2011 post "FDA Decides Regulating Implantable Defibrillator Medical Devices a Political Hot Potato; Demurs", FDA has admitted health IT is a medical device that they shy away from regulating because it's politically expedient not to do so. (The area is a "hot potato" per the Director of FDA's CDRH, the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, so FDA stays away.)

Yet FDA knows of the stakes. As I observed at my Aug. 2010 post "Internal FDA memorandum of Feb. 23, 2010 to Jeffrey Shuren on HIT risks" and elsewhere, patient harm is occurring due to these devices and FDA is aware. Due to admitted impediments to information diffusion, however, even FDA, IOM, The Joint Commission (due to a "dearth of data" as in their 2008 Sentinel Events Alert On Healthcare IT) and others do not know the true magnitude of the problem.

From the FDA internal memo at the preceding FDA memorandum link:

Limitations of the MAUDE [Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience database] search and final subset of Medical Device Reports (MDRs) include the following:

1. Not all H-IT safety issue MDRs can be captured due to limitations of reporting practices including

... (a) Vast number of H-IT systems that interface with multiple medical devices currently assigned to multiple procodes making it difficult to identify specific procodes for H-IT safety issues;
... (b) Procode assignments are also affected by the ability of the reporter/contractor to correctly identify the event as a H-IT safety issue;
... (c) Correct identification by the reporter of the suspect device brand name is challenged by difficulties discerning the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.

2. Due to incomplete information in the MDRs, it is difficult to unduplicate similar reports, potentially resulting in a higher number of reports than actual events.

3. Reported death and injury events may only be associated with the reported device but not necessarily attributed to the device.

4 Correct identification by the reporter of the manufacturer name is convoluted by the inability to discern the manufacturer of the actual H-IT system versus the device it supports.

5 The volume of MDR reporting to MAUDE may be impacted by a lack of understanding the reportability of H-IT safety issues and enforcement of such reporting.

... The results of this data review suggest significant clinical implications and public safety issues surrounding Health Information Technology. The most commonly reported H-IT safety issues included wrong patient/wrong data, medication administration issues, clinical data loss/miscalculation, and unforeseen software design issues; all of which have varying impact on the patient’s clinical care and outcome, which included 6 death and 43 injuries. The absence of mandatory reporting enforcement of H-IT safety issues limits the number of relevant MDRs and impedes a more comprehensive understanding of the actual problems and implications.

Finally, as I pointed out in my Dec. 2009 post "ONC Defines a Taxonomy of Robust Healthcare IT Leadership", the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT at HHS (ONC) had published the following with regard to the qualification of those who could "lead the successful deployment and use of health IT to achieve transformational improvement in the quality, safety, outcomes, and thus in the value, of health services in the United States":

Clinician/Public Health Leader: By combining formal clinical or public health training with training in health IT, individuals in this role will be able to lead the successful deployment and use of health IT to achieve transformational improvement in the quality, safety, outcomes, and thus in the value, of health services in the United States. In the health care provider settings, this role may be currently expressed through job titles such as Chief Medical Information Officer (CMIO), Chief Nursing Informatics Officer (CNIO). In public health agencies, this role may be currently expressed through job titles such as Chief Information or Chief Informatics Officer. Training appropriate to this role will require at least one year of study leading to a university-issued certificate or master’s degree in health informatics or health IT, as a complement to the individual’s prior clinical or public health academic training. For this role, the entering trainees may be physicians or other clinical professionals (e.g. advanced-practice nurses, physician assistants) or hold a master’s or doctoral degree(s) in public health or related health field. Individuals could also enter this training while enrolled in programs leading directly to degrees qualifying them to practice as physicians or other clinical professionals, or to master’s or doctoral degrees in public health or related fields (such as epidemiology). Thus, individuals could be supported for training if they already hold or if they are currently enrolled in courses of study leading to physician, other clinical professional, or public-health professional degrees.

Here, though, is a more typical reality in today's hospitals, the background of an EHR deployment leader in one of the most risk-prone and difficult environments in healthcare, the Emergency Department (ED) in a large hospital of which I am aware:

Clinical Systems Analyst

January 2004 – Present

Project manager for implementation of an ED EHR [vendor name redacted]
Responsible for all aspects of implementation including build and process design, report build, testing, training, and go-live support.
Extensive knowledge ADT processes, HL7, and CPOE.
Manage software patches and upgrades.
Experience in HTML, SQL and SAP.

Financial Systems Analyst
November 2001 – January 2004

Project Team Lead for implementation of Patient Accounting system.
Responsible for system development and system build, training, testing, and reporting.

Education

[Regional university in the lower 50% of US News rankings in the region, name redacted]
B.S., Management Information Systems
2000 – 2003

[Name redacted] Community College

Associates Degree, Business Administration

So, ED physicians (with many years of doctoral and post-doctoral training and experience, boards testing their competence, etc.) may be placing the lives of patients and their careers in the hands of:

• An experimental medical device,
  
• unregulated by anyone,
  
• in a field whose qualifications for leadership are unregulated by anyone,
  
• devices known to be risky,
  
• but without anyone knowing the magnitude of that risk,
  
• whose implementation is led by a generic 'clinical' systems analyst "responsible for all aspects of implementation" with a Bachelor's degree in MIS from a second-tier institution, an Associates degree from a community college, and no medical or Medical Informatics education or experience whatsoever.

Further, that project lead jumped from financial systems analyst to 'clinical' analyst/leader of an ED EHR implementation.

One should also ask

• Who was the hiring manager who hired such a person and put them in the role?
• On what credentials and experience was the decision based?
  
• What were the hiring manager's own credentials?
  

I leave it to the reader to decide if this is an appropriate arrangement, and if they would place their trust in an ED whose activities center around a cybernetic system implemented in this manner.

-- SS

Feb. 17, 2012 Addendum:

At least in this case the person has degrees.

Per several prominent healthcare IT recruiters in the past in the article "Who's Growing CIO's" in the journal Healthcare Informatics, as mentioned at my Sept. 2009 post "Correcting historical information from the recruiter component of the Health IT Ecosystem", the School of Hard Knocks was plenty good for health IT leadership roles:

I don't think a degree gets you anything," says healthcare recruiter Lion Goodman, president of the Goodman Group in San Rafael, California about CIO's and other healthcare MIS staffers. Healthcare MIS recruiter Betsy Hersher of Hersher Associates, Northbrook, Illinois, agreed, stating "There's nothing like the school of hard knocks." In seeking out CIO talent, recruiter Lion Goodman "doesn't think clinical experience yields [hospital] IT people who have broad enough perspective. Physicians in particular make poor choices for CIOs. They don't think of the business issues at hand because they're consumed with patient care issues," according to Goodman.

-- SS

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Elephants We Can Notice But Cannot Name

We have often discussed the anechoic effect, how cases involving or discussions of the topics we address on Health Care Renewal, the concentration and abuse of power in health care, fail to produce any responses, or echoes. 

Last month, an article with the provocative title, "Elephants in Academic Medicine," by Souba et al addressed the anechoic effect, but was unable to discuss what people in academic medicine cannot discuss.(1)

"Organizational Silence"

In summary, the authors surveyed chairs of departments of medicine and surgery at all accredited US medical schools to ask about the "elephants in their living rooms." By this they meant the problems which people are unwilling to discuss at their medical schools.  Their goal was to assess "organizational silence" in academic medicine, as they discussed in their introduction:

Morrison and Milliken popularized the term 'organizational silence,' which refers to the collective-level phenomenon of doing or saying very little about the problems facing an organization. Organizational silence derives both from people's fears of negative feedback and from a set of behavioral cues adopted by supervisors that lead to structures, procedures, and processes that discourage speaking up. Two common structural features of organizations that foster organizational silence are centralized decision making and a lack of formal feedback mechanisms.

Some organizations face an apparent dilemma in which employees know the truth about specific problems within the organization yet dare not speak that truth to their superiors. A key factor that fosters the creation of a climate of organizational silence is senior leaders' fears of receiving criticism, especially from subordinates. The unwritten message from the top is 'No bad or unpleasant news.' Fearing retaliation or the label 'not a team player' if they speak their minds, subordinates become silent; even if they do speak up, they may discover that their feedback is disregarded. A culture of silence becomes ingrained.

Methods

The investigators sought to learn from these academic leaders:

(1) What are the major elephants in your AHC [academic health center]? (2) What do you believe to be the most prevalent reasons people do not speak up? and (3) What are the consequences of remaining silent?

The survey response rate was 55%. The major elephants, in the order that they were ranked by the participants, were
- misalignment between goals and available resources
- ignoring information that clearly indicates a performance problem
- unwillingness to give up on a failed strategy
- unwillingness to speak up about inequities (e.g., pay, space, favoritism, special deals)
- failure to deal with disruptive behavior

The wording of these items were chosen by the investigators. The survey allowed for respondents to write in additional items, but the paper did not discuss any such responses. Its discussion of the results did not further define the nature of any elephants.

In addition, survey results suggested that more open discussion is unlikely to be in the offing.

- The majority of respondents thought that the elephants were someone else's problem:

Both chairs of surgery and of medicine believed that elephants are more commonly ignored by deans and hospital leaders than by other department chairs or themselves. Surgery chairs were more likely to say that hospital leaders ignore elephants, whereas medicine chairs were more likely to say that deans disregard elephants.

- The majority thought that other leaders did not encourage discussion of elephants:

Only 52 of the chairs (37%) said that elephants are usually discussed in an appropriate venue, whereas 87 (63%) said that elephants are discussed in less constructive venues or not discussed at all. Less than a quarter of the chairs (32; 23%) reported that the top leaders at their institutions actually encourage people to call out and deal with elephants. More commonly, the chairs (77; 55%) reported that the top leaders of their institutions say they want people to be frank about elephants, but their actions or nonverbal cues indicate otherwise. A higher percentage of medicine chairs than of surgery chairs (16 of 53 [30%] versus 16 of 86 [19%]), said that top leaders pretend that elephants do not exist.

- An important minority did not think the elephants were a problem at all:

nearly a fifth (26 of 139; 19%) agreed that, indeed, some issues are best left undiscussed.

- While the majority favored discussing elephants, they did not think it would be easy to do so:

two-thirds (92 of 137; 67%) felt that creating a culture in which elephants are openly discussed would be very or moderately difficult.

Their and Our Discussion

It was particularly striking that an article about elephants in the living room did not more fully describe what sorts of elephants they were. The descriptions of elephants above, taken verbatim from the survey instrument, were vague. They were not clarified in the discussion section of the article.

Particularly lacking were the sort of nasty elephants described by Pololi et al in a qualitative study of barriers to the advancement of primary care faculty.(2) As we summarized in our letter,(3) these elephants included academic leaders who put revenues ahead of patient care, teaching, and research; and who allegedly used deception for personal gain. Also lacking were nasty elephants we have discussed on Health Care Renewal. We have discussed examples of self-interested, conflicted, and corrupt leadership of health care organizations, including academic medical institutions.

I am glad that Souba et al brought up the topic of elephants in academic medicine's living room. However, I am disappointed that these elephants were never clearly identified. It seems that while we are getting to the point of being able to say there are things we cannot say, we are not yet at the point of saying what those things are. The strength of the anechoic effect is demonstrated by cases in which we cannot talk about what we cannot talk about.

Souba et al concluded:

We believe that AHCs are designed, often subconsciously, to keep the range of conversation limited to a few voices, usually the voices of those in power. The powerful silence the voices of others because they consider others' views to be either contrary to the status quo or of limited value.

We would add that those in power often may value the status quo not merely because of philosophical conservatism, but because maintaining the status quo supports their self interest. In particular, it has become increasingly lucrative to be in a leadership position in a health care organization, even in a non-profit academic institution. Executive compensation at these institutions has been rising inexorably, driven by increasing institutional relationships with corporate health care. Individuals in leadership positions in academic medicine frequently have their own, increasingly lucrative financial relationships with the health care industry. (A study by Campbell et al showed that the majority of department chairs, like those who answered the survey above, have such relationships.[4]) Ever increasing hunger for institutional and personal revenue may lead to a variety of practices that are hostile to the academic and professional mission.  Discussing any of these aspects of the status quo may offend and threaten those who are profiting from it. 

However, as long as we cannot even talk about such problems, the problems will only get worse.

References


1. Souba W, Way D, Lucey C, Sedmak D, Notestine M. Acad Medicine 2011; 86: 1492-1499.  Link here.
2. Pololi L, Kern DE, Carr P, Conrad P, Knight S. The culture of academic medicine: faculty perceptions of the lack of alignment between individual and institutional values. J Gen Intern Med 2009; 24: 1289-95. Link here.
3. Poses RM, Smith WR. Faculty values. J Gen Intern Med 2010; 25: 646. Link here.
4.  Campbell EG, Weissman JS, Ehringhaus S et al. Institutional academic-industry relationships. JAMA 2007; 298: 1779-1786, link here.]

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US Presidential Candidates' Financial Relationships with Health Care Organizations

As the leadership of the large field of Republican candidates for the US Presidency shifts, different candidates come in for increased media scrutiny.  Recently, reporting about former Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum focused on his financial relationships with a health care organization. Senator Santorum, however, is only the candidate with ties to health care organizations to come into the spotlight most recently.  We will review the report on Santorum, and then summarize the publicly known relationships of the other candidates.

Republican Former Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum and Universal Health Services

The relationship was first revealed by Bloomberg,

Santorum’s greatest financial gain came from $395,414 in director fees and stock options he listed in a recent financial disclosure.

The fees and options came from King of Prussia-based Universal Health Services Inc., a publicly traded health-care management company....

Senator Santorum started on his board service in 2006. He resigned in June, 2011, when he started his campaign for the presidency.

Note that while Santorum served on the board, the company was accused of ethical missteps:

The Justice Department accused the company in a 2010 lawsuit of submitting fraudulent reimbursement claims under the Medicaid health-care program for the poor. The government said the company falsely claimed to have provided inpatient psychiatric services to children at a detention facility in Marion, Virginia. Pantaleoni said the case has been settled.

The company has also risked losing certification to receive Medicare reimbursement for medical centers that it owns.

According to a release on the UHS website, the Rancho Springs Medical Center and Inland Valley Regional Medical Center in Riverside County regained their certification in November after the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services threatened to terminate their provider agreement in June 2010. The state of California had also threatened to revoke the group’s hospital license.

It wasn’t the first time UHS risked losing certification for one of its facilities. In late September 2008, CMS terminated participation in Medicare for the Two Rivers Psychiatric Hospital in Kansas City. It’s a decision that led to a court appeal and settlement requiring Two Rivers to retain an outside monitor for six months.

Thus, Senator Santorum was on the board of a for-profit hospital corporation until just before he became a presidential candidate. While he was on the board, the company allegedly committed unethical actions.

Republican Former Georgia Congressman Newton Leroy "Newt" Gingrich and the Center for Health Transformation and its Numerous Corporate Sponsors

A few weeks ago, we posted about Congressman Gingrich's operation of a health care consulting firm, the Center for Health Transformation. It had relationships with a long list of major health care organizations, including Allscripts, the American Hospital Association, AstraZeneca, Blue Cross Blue Shield, GE Healthcare, Gundersen Lutheran Health System, Johnson and Johnson, Pfizer, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers' of America, Siemens, and WellPoint. At a minimum, the Center helped some of these organizations try to influence health care policy to favor their vested interests in the guise of promoting health policy solutions.

The juxtaposition of the stories about Senator Santorum's and Congressman Gingrich's financial ties to health care organizations suggested we review whether other current candidates also had such ties. Some quick searching revealed that some others did. We will review the other current major candidates below, starting with the other Republicans, in alphabetical order.

Republican Former Utah Governor Jonathan Huntsman Jr

I could not find any publicly reported relevant relationships.

Republican Texas Congressman Dr Ronald E Paul

Dr Paul is a physician, an obstetrics-gynecology specialist. According to Wikipedia, he apparently practiced until his current stint in the Congress began in 1996. I could not find any publicly reported relevant relationships.

Republican Texas Governor James Richard "Rick" Perry and Merck

In September, 2011, Governor Perry's prominence in the campaign caused a reconsideration of his relationship to Merck. As MSNBC reported,

On the campaign trail, Perry had recently apologized for the executive order-which would have made Texas the first state in the country to mandate that all teenage girls, starting with 12-year-old sixth graders, be vaccinated with Gardasil.

Gardisil is made by Merck. Then candidate Representative Michele Bachmann noted that Governor Perry had received campaign contributions from Merck. As the Los Angeles Times reported,

In fact, Merck PAC — the company’s Washington, D.C.-based political action committee — has given Perry $28,500 since 2001, according to Texas Ethics Commission filings.

The bulk of that money came before 2007, when the governor signed an executive order mandating all sixth-grade girls in the state to receive the Gardasil vaccine against HPV.

However, Governor Perry had another tie to Merck, as noted by MSNBC,

Perry's order came after the drug company that manufactured the vaccine hired Mike Toomey, his former chief of staff, as one of the firm's top lobbyists in Austin.

Toomey, who is now running the main 'super pac' backing Perry's candidacy, was retained by pharmaceutical giant Merck & Co., maker of the Gardasil vaccine, which is designed to prevent the human papillomavirus, or HPV, an infection linked to cervical cancer in women.

His hiring was part of an aggressive lobbying push in Texas by the drug company, which also donated $16,000 to Perry's gubernatorial campaigns in the two and a half years prior to the executive order. Merck paid Toomey between $260,000 and $535,000 in lobbying fees between 2005 and 2010, according to state lobbying records.

Although Perry's GOP foes never brought up the connection during the debate, Democratic political operatives and a public watchdog group said Thursday his association with Merck is likely to be emerge as a prime example of Perry's 'crony capitalism,' should he win the GOP nomination.

Although there were no reports that Governor Perry personally financially benefited from a relationship with Merck, the company paid substantial amounts to his campaign and to an organization he ran, and to his former chief of staff. There seems to be at least a reason to think that these relationships had something to do with a decision he made that lead to increased sales of a Merck product, and which he now regrets.

Republican Former Massachusetts Governor Willard Mitt Romney and Bain Capital and Numerous Health Care Corporations

Today's Wall Street Journal summarized the investments made by Bain Capital, a venture capital and private equity firm lead by Governor Romney,

The Wall Street Journal, aiming for a comprehensive assessment, examined 77 businesses Bain invested in while Mr. Romney led the firm from its 1984 start until early 1999, to see how they fared during Bain's involvement and shortly afterward.

Among the findings: 22% either filed for bankruptcy reorganization or closed their doors by the end of the eighth year after Bain first invested, sometimes with substantial job losses. An additional 8% ran into so much trouble that all of the money Bain invested was lost.

Of the 10 firms that produced the biggest returns for Bain, four were involved in health care, PhysioControl, Waters, Dade, and Wesley Jessen VisionCare. Dade, a medical diagnostics company, went bankrupt in 2002.

Furthermore, in 2007, the Boston Globe (via the Deseret News) reported on Governor Romney's private equity career, including his involvement with a company that had its ethical challenge,

Bain Capital's 1989 purchase of Damon Corp., a Needham medical testing firm that later pleaded guilty to defrauding the federal government of $25 million and paid a record $119 million fine.

Romney sat on Damon's board. During Romney's tenure, Damon executives submitted bills to the government for millions of unnecessary blood tests. Romney and other board members were never implicated.

More than a decade later, when Romney was in pursuit of the Massachusetts governorship, his Democratic opponent Shannon O'Brien accused him of lax oversight at Damon and failing to report the fraud.

Romney replied that he had helped uncover the illegal activity at Damon, asking the board's lawyers to investigate. As a result, he said, the board took 'corrective action' before selling the company in 1993 to Corning Inc.

But court records suggest that the Damon executives' scheme continued throughout Bain's ownership, and prosecutors credited Corning, not Romney, with cleaning up the situation. Bain, meanwhile, tripled its investment.

Romney personally reaped $473,000.

Thus, Governor Romney was on the board of a device company, albeit many years prior to when he became a presidential candidate. While he was on the board, the company allegedly committed unethical actions.

Democratic President Barack Obama, Michelle Obama, and the University of Chicago Medical Center

The issue of then Democratic Senator Barack Obama's wife's role at the Medical Center was first discussed in 2008, with some follow up in 2009. As the Washington Post reported in 2008,

Shortly after Barack Obama joined the U.S. Senate in 2005, the medical center promoted Michelle Obama to vice president of community and external relations, and more than doubled her salary. She is now on leave from the $317,000-a-year post, in which she sought to bridge the gap between the wealthy institution and its poorer neighbors. The hospital declined to discuss the budget for her program or her input into budgetary decisions.

She was particularly involved in one program that became controversial,

A few years ago, executives at the prestigious University of Chicago Medical Center were concerned that an increasing number of patients were arriving at their emergency room with what the executives considered to be non-urgent complaints. The visits were costly to the hospital, and many of the patients, coming from the surrounding South Side neighborhood, were poor and uninsured.

Michelle Obama, an executive at the medical center, launched an innovative program to steer the patients to existing neighborhood clinics to deal with their health needs.

That effort, in time, inspired a broader program the hospital now calls its Urban Health Initiative.

The Post noted,

The medical center markets its initiative as an effort to improve patient health for the poor and at the same time free its resources for emergencies and complicated procedures. The Urban Health Initiative also could save the hospital substantial amounts of money, by removing the nonpaying poor patients from its emergency room.

However, after Senator Obama became President, his wife became the First Lady and quit her job at the medical center, the program became even more controversial. In March, 2009, the Chicago Weekly reported on the extensions of the Urban Health Initiative

or UHI, which has garnered a lot of criticism recently, such as accusations that it comes 'dangerously close' to the illegal practice of 'patient dumping.' Additionally, the emergency room structure that it will leave in its wake will likely result in a decline in the quality of care provided to Medicaid, Medicare, and uninsured patients.

Ultimately, the Wall Street Journal reported that:

More than 190 doctors at the University of Chicago Medical Center signed a letter to trustees protesting plans to reduce the number of beds available to emergency patients as 'unnecessarily risky' and a threat to patient safety.

At that time, this admission appeared,

Dr. Madara, the hospital's chief executive, said in an interview last week that the hospital is seeking to admit more patients to its 'programs of distinction' such as oncology and advanced surgery, and treat fewer in the ER, and that these moves will mean more privately insured patients at the hospital.

Note that "programs of distinction" may also mean programs that provide the most revenue. Ultimately, the Chicago Tribune reported that the plan was halted by the university president, and a few months later, Dr Madara, the CEO resigned (again per the Tribune).

Thus, while he was a Senator, current President Obama's wife earned a substantial salary from a non-profit academic medical center and hospital system. A program she ran was then and later alleged to have compromised patient safety and perhaps acted unethically.

Summary

We have frequently discussed how large health care organizations seek to influence discussions of health policy to further their vested interests. At times, they have organized stealth health policy advocacy initiatives to comprehensively push their aims. For example, we discussed how commercial health insurance companies have tried, often succesfully, to influence health policy as recounted by former CIGNA public relations leader Wendell Potter in his book Deadly Spin.

It appears that the more one looks, the more one finds evidence of the web of influence of large health care organizations. Pulling together a variety of journalistic efforts over more than three years, it now appears that the majority of the current credible contenders for the presidency of the US have or had financial relationships with health care organizations.

Often these relationships appear significant enough to be called conflicts of interest were the people who had them communicating about health policy in a venue that requires conflict of interest disclosure, like a major medical journal. One candidate until very recently was on the board of directors of a for-profit hospital corporation, and hence had a fiduciary duty to that company and its stock-holders. One candidate until very recently ran a health care consulting company whose clients included major drug, device, and insurance companies. One candidate previously was on the board of a medical device company. One candidate's spouse previously was a top executive of a academic medical center and hospital system.

While the current candidates may now now be writing articles for medical or health care policy journals, by virtue of their candidacies they now receive enormous attention. Anything they say about health care policy is likely to be influential. Yet there is reason to be concerned that many of their views on health policy were influenced by their financial relationships. In particular, would a candidate who at one time got a major part of his or his family's livelihood from a big health care organization be likely to strongly challenge the status quo that allowed that organization to prosper?

In my humble opinion, there needs to be complete reconsideration of how health care policy is made. In particular, we must define how much of the discussion is driven by vested economic interests, and make sure such interests and their relationship to those in the discussion becomes clear. It is just as important for health policy analysts, pundits, and decision-makers to disclose in detail their conflicts of interest as it is for clinical researchers and educators. Maybe the Institute of Medicine would be willing to take up this issue as they took up conflicts of interest affecting research and education.

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The Corporate Psychopaths Theory of Health Care Dysfunction

A new article in the Journal of Business Ethics suggested that the global financial crisis, or great recession, was primarily due to a fundamental flaw in the leadership of financial organizations, one that has important implications for health care organizations. 

The article, Boddy CR. The corporate psychopaths theory of the global financial crisis.  J Bus Ethics 2011; 102: 255-259 is here.  Its premise was:

The Corporate Psychopaths Theory of the Global Financial Crisis is that Corporate Psychopaths, rising to key senior positions within modern financial corporations, where they are able to influence the moral climate of the whole organisation and yield considerable power, have largely caused the crisis.

Note that in 2004 we first posted about the possibility that a proportion of corporate managers, including those in health care, could be psychopaths, raised then by two experts on psychopathy, Paul Babiak and Robert Hare. In 2006, they published Snakes in Suits, about the dangers of psychopaths as executives and managers (see post here). However, the issue got scant attention in those days of letting the good times roll.

Defining Corporate Psychopaths

Boddy described psychopaths as:

the 1% of people who have no conscience or empathy and who do not care for anyone other than themselves. Some psychopaths are violent and end up in jail, others forge careers in corporations. The latter group who forge successful corporate careers is called Corporate Psychopaths.

Corporate Psychopaths as Leaders

Such people do not make good leaders:

Although they may look smooth, charming, sophisticated, and successful, Corporate Psychopaths should theoretically be almost wholly destructive to the organizations that they work for. The probable mal-effects of the presence of psychopaths in the workplace have been hypothesized about in recent times by a number of leading experts and commentators on psychopathy.

Researchers report that such malevolent leaders are callously disregarding of the needs and wishes of others, prepared to lie, bully and cheat and to disregard or cause harm to the welfare of others. Corporate Psychopaths are also poorly organized managers who adversely affect productivity and have a negative impact on many different areas of organizational effectiveness.

How Corporate Psychopaths Could Have Become Prevalent
Despite the dangers posed by such leadership, corporate psychopaths may rise quickly in management:

Psychologists have argued that Corporate Psychopaths within organizations may be singled out for rapid promotion because of their polish, charm, and cool decisiveness. Expert  ccommentators on the rise of Corporate Psychopaths within modern corporations have also hypothesized that they are more likely to be found at the top of current organisations than at the bottom.

The nature of current corporate culture may facilitate the rise of corporate psychopaths:

These Corporate Psychopaths are charming individuals who have been able to enter modern corporations and other organisations and rise quickly and relatively unnoticed within them because of the relatively chaotic nature of the modern corporation. This corporate nature is characterized by rapid change, constant renewal and quite a rapid turnover of key personnel. These changing conditions make Corporate Psychopaths hard to spot because constant movement makes their behaviour invisible and combined with their extroverted personal charisma and charm, this makes them appear normal and even to be ideal leaders.

The destabilization of modern corporations likely lead to the ascendancy of the corporate psychopath:

However, once corporate takeovers and mergers started to become commonplace and the resultant corporate changes started to accelerate, exacerbated by both globalisation and a rapidly changing technological environment, then corporate stability began to disintegrate. Jobs for life disappeared and not surprisingly employees’ commitment to their employers also lessened accordingly. Job switching first became acceptable and then even became common and employees increasingly found themselves working for unfamiliar organisations and with other people that they did not really know very well.

Rapid movements in key personnel between corporations compared to the relatively slower movements in organisational productivity and success made it increasingly difficult to identify corporate success with any particular manager. Failures were not noticed until too late and the offending managers had already moved on to better positions elsewhere. Successes could equally be claimed by those who had nothing to do with them. Success could thus be claimed by those with the loudest voice, the most influence and the best political skills. Corporate Psychopaths have these skills in abundance and use them with ruthless and calculated efficiency. In this way, the whole corporate and employment environment changed from one that would hold the Corporate Psychopath in check to one where they could flourish and advance relatively unopposed.

The Harms Caused by Corporate Psychopaths as Executives

Thus, Boddy hypothesized the rise of management by corporate psychopaths lead directly to the global financial crisis or great recession:

As evidence of this, senior level remuneration and reward started to increase more and more rapidly and beyond all proportion to shop floor incomes and a culture of greed unfettered by conscience developed. 

Corporate Psychopaths are ideally situated to prey on such an environment and corporate fraud, financial misrepresentation, greed and misbehaviour went through the roof, bringing down huge companies and culminating in the Global Financial Crisis that we are now in.

Writing in 2005, this author commentating on Corporate Psychopaths predicted that the rise of Corporate Psychopaths was a recipe for corporate and societal disaster. This disaster has now happened and is still happening.

What Could be Next

Worse, if this hypothesis is true, as long as it is not addressed, things will get worse:

The very same Corporate Psychopaths, who probably caused the crisis by their self-seeking greed and avarice, are now advising governments on how to get out of the crisis. That this involves paying themselves vast bonuses in the midst of financial hardship for many millions of others, is symptomatic of the problem. Further, if the Corporate Psychopaths Theory of the Global Financial Crisis is correct then we are now far from the end of the crisis. Indeed, it is only the end of the beginning.

Some Agreement

The plausible theory that corporate psychopaths ascending to top management positions in finance caused the global financial crisis has been noticed by a few prominent financial pundits. Writing in Bloomberg, William D Cohan agreed with Boddy's suggestion that "anyone who makes decisions that affect significant numbers of other people, concerning issues of corporate social responsibility or toxic waste, for example, or concerning mass financial markets or mass employment, should be screened to make sure that they are, at the very least, not psychopaths and at most are actually people who care about others."

Brian Besham, writing in the Independent, suggested that Richard Fuld, former CEO of Lehman Brothers, whose bankruptcy kicked off public awareness of the global financial collapse, saying he wanted to eat the hearts of those selling his company's stock short (see this post), was a "terrifying" example of corporate executive psychopathy. Worse, Besham noted that he had discovered an case of an investment bank which "psychometric testing to recruit social psychopaths because their characteristics exactly suited them to senior corporate finance roles."  It may be that corporate psychopaths are actively recruiting their fellows.

Implications for Health Care

This is chilling. It also unfortunately is highly relevant to health care. As we noted, most recently here, leaders of big finance firms, including those whose failures were most spectacular, now often sit on boards of trustees of hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools, and their parent universities. Thus, the likelihood that a good proportion of the stewardship of our most prominent not-for-profit health care organizations may be in the hands of psychopaths is not negligible.

Furthermore, health care organizations have become as unstable and chaotic, in the way these terms were used by Boddy, as finance firms. This would suggest that their current nature would make it as easy for psychopaths to rise to positions of power in them as they may have in financial firms. In health care we certainly have seen the consequences he suggested were due to psychopathic managers, including

- intimidation (per Boddy, corporate psychopaths are "prepared to lie, bully and cheat and to disregard or cause harm to the welfare of others");
- self-interest ("pursuit of self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement") leading to outrageous executive compensation ("senior level remuneration and reward started to increase more and more rapidly and beyond all proportion to shop floor incomes")
- fraud and other crime ("corporate fraud, financial misrepresentation, greed and misbehaviour went through the roof,... ")

So as we noted in 2006, "a high prevalence of psychopathic managers could explain the prevalence of mismanagement, conflicts of interest, and corruption in the leadership of health care organizations that we have often discussed on Health Care Renewal."

Boddy's first suggestion to deal with the problem in finance was:

Measures exist to identify Corporate Psychopaths. Perhaps it is time to use them.

However, it is as hard to imagine top health care leaders willingly and honestly submitting to the use of instruments designed to identify psychopaths as it is to imagine finance leaders doing so. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine how corporate psychopaths in positions of leadership would ruthlessly deploy their legions of public relations personnel and lawyers to quash any challenge should the notion that they are so dominant gain any credibility.

However, if there is any significant prevalence of corporate psychopaths among the leaders of health care, woe will be unto us until we identify and remove them.

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They Think We are "Imbeciles," and They Run Health Care Organizations

Arrogance seems to fuel many of the problems with health care leadership that we discuss, particularly hostility to the mission, often driven by self-interest; a sense of entitlement to lavish compensation out of proportion to any measure of performance; and a lack of accountability shading into impunity.  Some recent stories hint at some of the origins of such arrogance. 

The Occupy Wall Street movement drew attention to the plight of the poor and middle class, who had lost income, retirement benefits, jobs, houses, and access to health care while the richest, especially corporate executives, got richer.  The less fortunate's anger was not directed indiscriminately at the successful or the rich, but those who got wealthy by gaming the system, or flaunting the rules that lesser mortals had to obey.  Perhaps not surprisingly, some of those most vulnerable to such criticism have responded with contempt. 

Anonymous or Indirect Defenses of the One Percent

The initial defense of the plutocrats came from some of their political supporters, who denounced their "demonization" (see this opinion piece by Barbara Ehrenreich in September, 2011) or decried the rise of "mob rule" (see this by Paul Krugman in October).  Then several articles documented the anonymous complaints of finance insiders about:

a bunch of whiny people who are lazy and incompetent and have nothing to do with their time

from a Reuters article in October.

a ragtag group looking for sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll

from a NY Times article in October.

The Plutocrats Strike Back

However, increasingly those in the one percent are willing to be open. In late December a Bloomberg article documented the sentiments of a number of finance and other corporate leaders.

- Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase, complained:

Acting like everyone who's been successful is bad and because you're rich you're bad, I don't understand it.

- Bernard Marcus, founder of Home Depot:

Who gives a crap about some imbecile? Are you kidding me?

- John A Allison IV, Chairman of BB&T:

'Instead of an attack on the 1 percent, let’s call it an attack on the very productive,' Allison said. 'This attack is destructive.'

- Stephen Schwarzman, CEO of the Blackstone Group:

'You have to have skin in the game,' said Schwarzman, 64. 'I’m not saying how much people should do. But we should all be part of the system.'

- John Paulson, President of hedge fund Paulson & Co:

has also said the rich benefit society.

'The top 1 percent of New Yorkers pay over 40 percent of all income taxes,...'

- Tom Galisano, founder of Paychex Inc:

If I hear a politician use the term ‘paying your fair share’ one more time, I’m going to vomit

- Ken Langone, founder of Home Depot:

I am a fat cat, I’m not ashamed

Considering how Paul Krugman explained the generation of the global financial collapse by

people who got rich by peddling complex financial schemes that, far from delivering clear benefits to the American people, helped push us into a crisis whose aftereffects continue to blight the lives of tens of millions of their fellow citizens.

Yet they have paid no price. Their institutions were bailed out by taxpayers, with few strings attached. They continue to benefit from explicit and implicit federal guarantees — basically, they’re still in a game of heads they win, tails taxpayers lose. And they benefit from tax loopholes that in many cases have people with multimillion-dollar incomes paying lower rates than middle-class families.

Thus the responses by the very rich above only represent some or more arrogance.

The Plutocrats as Health Care Leaders

One wonders how much this arrogance carried over into health care. We have noted previously how the leadership of finance has increasingly overlapped the leadership of health care, and how top executives increasingly seem to identify more with each other than with their employees, customers, or other stakeholders. Therefore, it should be no surprise that all but one of the group above also had or have leadership roles in health care organizations.

- Jamie Dimon is on the board of trustees of the New York University Langone Medical Center. 

- Bernard Marcus formerly served as the chair of the board of the CDC Foundation.

- John A Allison IV is a member of the board of visitors of Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center, per his BB&T Corp official biography.

- Stephen Schwarzman's Blackstone Group includes the Blackstone Healthcare Group, which invests in various health care corporations (as of 2010, Nycomed, Gerresheimer, Stiefel Laboratories, and Catalant per this press release), and all of whose members serve on one or more boards of directors of health care corporations (per the press  release, Arthur Higgins serves on the boards of Zimmer, Eco Labs, and Resverlogix Corp; Lodewijk J R de Vink serves on the board of Roche; Doug Rogers serves on the boards of Codevax, Charles River Laboratories, and Computerized Medical Systems.)

- John Paulson is on the board of trustees of New York University,

- Kenneth G Langone, is vice chair again of the board of trustees of New York University, and chair of the board of trustees of the NYU Langone Medical Center.

I submit that linking their sentiments above to their leadership roles in health care should be highly disconcerting.  Do we want people running medical centers who are proud to be "fat cats?"  Do we want people running medical centers who do not understand why people who have lost income, retirement funds, jobs or their homes might be upset?  Do we want people running health care corporations who do not think the poor and middle-class have any skin in the economic game?   Do we want people running health care foundations who think that those who complain about the current economic situation are "imbeciles?"

Summary

The problems of health care increasingly seem to be a part of the larger problems with the global political economy.  The problems we have been discussing that affect health care leadership seem to have come out of the culture of what now many are calling the larger plutocracy. 

So it now seems that true health care reform will require a larger reform of the political economy.  However, we still need leaders who understand the health care context, uphold health care professionals' values, and put patients first.  We do not need leaders who are ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted, or corrupt.  We need governance that is accountable, honest, transparent, ethical, and again puts patients first. 

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What the Pfizer (V)? - Few Consequences of a Long History of Bad Behavior

The recent in-depth investigation by Fortune reporters of 10 years of dysfunctional leadership at Pfizer, the "world's largest research-based pharmaceutical company," raised many issues about leadership and governance in health care (see our post here).  In a series of posts, we then discussed lack of transparency in Pfizer's communication about management performance here, how bad management was rewarded with outsize compensation here, and how a board of directors dominated by members of the "CEOs union," with a number of apparent conflicts of interests and multiple ties to the financial firms that brought us the "great recession," seemed happy to continually reward poor executive performance here.

The Latest Settlement

A recent article also serves as a reminder that Pfizer's dysfunctional leadership and stewardship coincided with an amazing series of ethical missteps.  Just the latest legal settlement by Pfizer appeared in the Washington Post (from the AP).

The drugmaker Pfizer Inc. has agreed to pay the government $14.5 million to settle charges it illegally marketed its drug for a condition called overactive bladder.

The settlement disclosed Friday resolves the last of 10 whistleblower lawsuits, dating back to 2003, that claimed Pfizer marketed a number of its prescription medicines for unapproved uses. Pfizer agreed to pay $2.3 billion in September 2009 to settle both criminal charges and civil claims in many of those cases. The rest were dismissed.

In the final case, Pfizer was accused of marketing overactive bladder drug Detrol for men with enlarged prostates and related conditions including bladder obstruction. The drug wasn’t approved for those uses.

As usual,

New York-based Pfizer, the world’s biggest drugmaker by revenue, said in a statement it denies all allegations of wrongdoing and that the 'settlement allows Pfizer to avoid the cost and distraction of litigation.'

Maybe the company will stay out of trouble for a little while. Its statement noted,

the company has put 'numerous controls and oversight mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with state and federal laws,' including a corporate compliance committee.

A History of Misbehavior

Based on recent history, it seems unlikely that the company will be able to stay out of trouble.  This settlement is just the latest chapter in a long story of misbehavior.

Pfizer paid a $2.3 billion settlement in 2009 of civil and criminal allegations and a Pfizer subsidiary entered a guilty plea to charges it violated federal law regarding its marketing of Bextra (see post here).  Pfizer was involved in three other major cases from then to early 2010, including two involving settlements of fraud charges, and one in which a jury found the company guilty of violating the RICO (racketeer-influenced corrupt organization) statute (see post here).  The company was listed as one of the pharmaceutical "big four" companies in terms of defrauding the government (see post here).  Pfizer's Pharmacia subsidiary settled allegations that it inflated drugs costs paid by New York in early 2011 (see post here).   In March, 2011, a settlement was announced in a long-running class action case which involved allegations that another Pfizer subsidiary had exposed many people to asbestos (see this story in Bloomberg).

And going back a little further, from the Philadelphia Inquirer,

Repeat Offender: Previous Pfizer Settlements

April 2007: Pfizer agreed to pay $34.7 million in fines to settle Department of Justice allegations that it improperly promoted the human growth hormone product Genotropin. The drugmaker's Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. subsidiary pleaded guilty to offering a kickback to a pharmacy-benefits manager to sell more of the drug.

May 2004: Pfizer agreed to pay $430 million to settle DOJ claims involving the off-label promotion of the epilepsy drug Neurontin by subsidiary Warner-Lambert. The promotions included flying doctors to lavish resorts and paying them hefty speakers' fees to tout the drug. The company said the activity took place years before it bought Warner-Lambert in 2000.

October 2002: Pfizer and subsidiaries Warner-Lambert and Parke-Davis agreed to pay $49 million to settle allegations that the company fraudulently avoided paying fully rebates owed to the state and federal governments under the national Medicaid Rebate program for the cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor.

By my count, Pfizer made nine separate settlements from 2002 to 2011.  Some other bad behavior by Pfizer that did not necessarily result in legal action can be found under our label "Pfizer."

Summary

Looking at a summary of this bad behavior, it seems remarkable that no individual in a leadership position at Pfizer has suffered any obvious negative consequence of these events, that Pfizer's whole leadership has not been forced to reorganize, maybe even that the company is still in business.

Naively, one might ask why trust a company with such a track record? Why is there not so much mistrust of this organization that it could no longer continue business as usual?

Yet, while as noted in previous posts, Pfizer has not had the best financial results, and has gone through several CEOs, the company has made no fundamental changes in its leadership or governance despite this sorry history.

Perhaps one reason for the lack of response to these events is that they have not previously been presented together so that their pattern is evident, as we did above on Health Care Renewal.  It is true that in 2009, then Pfizer CEO Jeffrey Kindler acknowledged the company has had ethical lapses, and called on government and industry leaders in general to face up to ethical breaches or else the people would find a way to force changes upon them (see post here.) However, not even then did Kindler detail Pfizer's own troubled history, and he did not last much longer as CEO.

I have not found any other publication that puts together the list of bad behaviors that appears above. Most publications in business sections of the news media focus on only the most recent lapses. The medical, and health care/ services/ policy research literature generally ignores these issues entirely.

So here is the tragedy of the anechoic effect. Because it is still simply not done to talk about the poor stewardship, bad leadership, and ethical misadventures of big health care organizations, the dysfunction just continues.

As long as we fear to even talk about what has gone wrong with the leadership and governance of health care, how are we ever going to make any real improvements?

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Health Care's "99 Percenters"

As Occupy Wall Street has gone from an obscure protest covered only on blogs and social media to a national phenomenon, the apparent parallels between the issues it is raising and the issues we have been raising in health care grows.

99 Percenters

A growing number of protesters are calling themselves the "99 Percenters," (Alter, Jonathan.  Why Occupy Wall Street Should Scare Republicans.  Bloomberg, October 6, 2011.  Link here) referring to those who are not in the top 1% of earners.  (The top 1% of income is clearly greater than $250,000/ year [see 2009 census data on US household income here], and likely around $380,000 a year [based on the distribution of income reported on tax returns here.]) 

In health care, nearly all who are paid more than $380K/ year are either proceduralists (some medical sub-specialist physicians, and some surgeons, again mainly sub-specialist), or managers and executives of health care organizations.

Health Care's 1% 

We have been discussing since 2007 how the inequality among physicians' incomes favoring those who do procedures over primary care and other "cognitive" physicians has been driven not by the market, but by regulatory capture.  The fees paid for all physicians services by Medicare, a fee schedule adopted without question or major changes by nearly all insurers, are set through the Resource Based Relative Value System (RBRVS) by the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  CMS, in turn, gets virtually all its input on these fees from the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC), a private committee of the American Medical Association (AMA), made up largely of proceduralists, whose deliberations are secret, and whose membership has been secret until recently.  See here for most recent posts.  Note that the CMS' peculiar relationship with the RUC is now subject of a lawsuit that accuses this relationship of violating the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Klepper B, Kibbe D. A legal challenge to CMS' reliance on the RUC.  Health Affairs Blog, August 9, 2011.  Link here) 

The real top earners in health care, however, are not physicians, but executives of big corporations, non-profit and especially for profit.  We have discussed endlessly how huge their compensation may be, and how it seems unrelated to any aspect of their own or their organizations' performance, especially not to how much they benefit patients' or the public's health.  Furthermore, we have noted how executives have prospered even when their management seems overtly hostile to the health care mission, when it leads to ethical missteps requiring legal settlements, or even guilty pleas or verdicts to criminal charges. 

So health care's "99 percenters" ought to be angry at the top 1%.

The Power of Finance

Furthermore, the Occupy Wall Street protesters are not merely upset with the upper 1%, but particularly outraged by those in the financial sector, which "with regulators and elected officials in collusion, inflated and profited from a credit bubble that burst, costing millions of Americans their jobs, incomes, savings and home equity."  Then, "the initial outrage has been compounded by elected officials' hunger for campaign cash from Wall Street, a toxic combination that reaffirmed the economic and political power of banks and bankers, while ordinary Americans suffer.  Extreme income inequality is the hallmark of a dysfunctional economy, dominated by a financial sector that is driven as much by speculation, gouging and government backing as by productive investment." (Anonymous. Protesters against Wall Street.  NY Times, October 8, 2011. Link here)

In another report, the protesters "unite around a common theme: bankers are ripping off America.  Two secondary themes also emerge....  One is that the super rich own the politicians.  The other is that the news media, almost across the board, view events through the eyes of the super rich." (Johnston DC. Occupy Wall Street.  Reuters Blogs, October 7, 2011.  Link here.)

Finance's Links to Health Care

We have noted parallels between the effects of Wall Street and health care on the economy.  Furthermore, we have noted active ties among Wall Street and health care organizations. (Look here for examples.)  Top executives and board members of some of the financial firms most obviously responsible for the global economic collapse/ great recession have served on boards of trustees of top medical schools and academic medical centers, and their parent universities.  The top leaders of medical schools, academic medical centers, and their parent universities have served on the boards of such financial firms.  There are also board interlocks among Wall Street firms and all sorts of health care corporations.  The corporate culture of Wall Street and health care have long overlapped. 

We have further noted how the leadership of big health care organizations has deceptively influenced policy, particularly through stealth health policy advocacy.  Meanwhile, until the last few years, much of health care dysfunction has been anechoic.  Now the media is beginning to report some of the abuses.  Little about them appears, however, in the medical and health care literature that health care professionals are likely to trust more than news media. 

Summary

We have frequently suggested that true health care reform requires reform of health care leadership and governance.  We need leaders who understand the health care context, uphold health care professionals' values, and put patients first.  We do not need leaders who are ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted, or corrupt.  We need governance that is accountable, honest, transparent, ethical, and again puts patients first.  Maybe to do that we will have to "occupy health care."

In any case, it is time for health care's "99 percenters" to stand up for their patients and the integrity of their values. 

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10 Years of Pfizer Leadership - "A Saga of Ambition, Intrigue, Backstabbing, and Betrayal"

A remarkable story about mismanagement of health care has appeared in the mainstream media, and most remarkable is that this article in Fortune chronicled 10 years of poor leadership by three CEOs at Pfizer Inc, the world's biggest drug company

The CEO Who Would Not Leave

In 2001, William C Steere Jr retired as CEO, but did not really leave, muddying the chain of command:

In January 2001, Steere, by then 64 and a company legend, retired as CEO. He handed the job to his handpicked No. 2, Hank McKinnell. Steere stepped aside -- but not out. He received a consulting contract, with an office and secretary at Pfizer headquarters. Most important, Steere was granted the title of chairman emeritus and retained his seat on the Pfizer board. Governance experts widely regard such lingering as a recipe for trouble. Steere would remain a potent influence for another decade, outlasting his two successors.

Waffling About How to Support the Pipeline

The next CEO was Henry "Hank" McKinnell Jr, who was faced with a declining pipeline of new drugs. His response was to go from one extreme to another:

Pfizer's pipeline simply couldn't support the growth the company had promised investors. Three of its blockbusters were about to lose patent protection and face generic competition, meaning their profits would plummet. The biggest issue, of course, was Lipitor -- by 2005, it was bringing in a staggering $12 billion a year, more than a quarter of Pfizer's revenues. The company wouldn't lose its exclusive rights to Lipitor until late 2011, but already Wall Street was wondering how Pfizer could possibly replace it.

McKinnell kept boosting R&D budgets, maintaining Pfizer's 'shots on goal' approach -- the more compounds you explored, in theory, the more drugs you'd generate. But drugs can take a full decade to be developed and approved, and nothing big would be ready for years.

So McKinnell fell back on the refuge of the desperate pharma CEO: In July 2002 he announced the acquisition of Pharmacia, the industry's seventh-largest company, for $60 billion in stock.

A Power Vacuum and the Infighting Begins

When that did not work, McKinnell made himself scarce, leading to infighting among the next level of executives:

But even as Pfizer struggled to digest this latest meal, McKinnell seemed to spend less and less time at headquarters, becoming head of industry trade groups, funding an institute in Africa to combat AIDS, even writing a book about reforming health care.

That left a power vacuum, and Bill Steere, the former CEO, seemed more than willing to fill it. He was a familiar figure at Pfizer's New York headquarters, where he worked out in the basement fitness center and ate lunch in the cafeteria. Steere was always happy to lend an ear and share his views. His retired status and public reserve concealed tremendous influence. 'He says almost nothing,' says a person familiar with Pfizer's board. 'But people look to him to see how he nods and how he moves, because he knows the company better than anyone.'

With Pfizer no longer soaring, internal squabbling intensified. Vexed by what he viewed as Steere's meddling, McKinnell even tried to terminate his consulting contract. Steere fended off that move.

Furthermore, McKinnell's ideas about succession planning led to further infighting:

By 2005, McKinnell was already making plans for his succession. He promoted three executives to vice chairman, setting off what would become a long and increasingly bitter contest to choose the next CEO.

More Waffling Over Acquisitions Versus Spin-Offs

As Pfizer's stock price continued to fall, the board pushed McKinnell into rretirement in 2006, and replaced him with Jeffrey Kindler. However, Kindler also could not make up his mind whether to grow or shrink the company:

Suddenly desperate to shrink the company -- which had just completed two giant mergers -- Kindler announced plans for brutal layoffs that included axing 20% of the vaunted U.S. sales force.

Yet even as he was making massive cuts, Kindler was also pondering acquisitions, toying with alternative strategies. The first was a 'string of pearls' approach -- a handful of smaller purchases, each aimed at filling a single strategic gap, such as biotech. The second strategy was yet another megadeal -- namely, buying Wyeth. That company had $23 billion in sales, strength in vaccines and biotech, a large over-the-counter products division, and several blockbusters of its own, including Prevnar, an antibacterial vaccine for children.

But after more than a year of on-and-off debate, Kindler just couldn't make up his mind.

Inconsistent Leadership for Research and Development

the process of overhauling R&D was a messy one. Kindler shuffled through three research chiefs during his 4 1/2 years as CEO. He closed six R&D sites, then halted research in 10 disease areas even while setting a new goal of launching four new internally developed drugs a year by 2010. He split the research operation in two -- setting up a separate unit for biologic drugs (and launching an expensive new facility in San Francisco) -- only to reverse the decision 30 months later after taking on Wyeth's big biotech operation.

Among the shuttered Pfizer sites was one at Ann Arbor, the birthplace of Lipitor. Says Bruce Roth, the scientist known as 'the father of Lipitor,' who lost his job when the Ann Arbor site closed and now works for Genentech: 'When every 18 months you throw the organization up in the air and are shifting therapeutic areas or closing sites, you have this period of turmoil when everybody in the organization is paralyzed. You need some continuity to do science.'

Kindler was struggling for answers in a complex industry where his own experience was limited. In an effort to bring in fresh thinking, Kindler spun his leadership team like a top. Company veterans Shedlarz, chief medical officer Dr. Joseph Feczko, and CFO Alan Levin departed. Frank D'Amelio, Kindler's new CFO, arrived from Lucent. Sally Susman, his new communications chief, had worked at Estée Lauder (EL). His new general counsel, Allen Waxman, resigned abruptly for "personal reasons" after just one year; replacing him was Amy Schulman, a high-profile litigator at DLA Piper.

In Thrall to a Questionable Subordinate

The Fortune article devoted considerable space to document Mr Kindler's trust in a questionable subordinate.

Perhaps the only thing as destructive to Kindler as his inability to trust his colleagues was the one Pfizer executive in whom he did place his trust: Mary McLeod. The head of human resources under Kindler, McLeod would leverage her relationship to the CEO to become both his emissary and a power in her own right. Kindler's loyalty to her would undercut him at a crucial moment.

Kindler did not seem to realize why she had lost her former position:

Her tenure at Schwab had ended disastrously, though there's no sign Kindler knew that when he brought McLeod in. As Schwab's head of HR and chief of staff to CEO David Pottruck in the early 2000s, McLeod had proved toxic, according to six members of Pottruck's executive team. They say she isolated him from other points of view and went to extraordinary lengths to remove rivals. Meanwhile she criticized him behind his back and bragged that she had the CEO under her thumb.

After an internal investigation, Pottruck fired McLeod in 2004, he confirms. In an e-mail sent to McLeod the day of her termination, read aloud to Fortune, Pottruck wrote: 'The issues are about the perceptions others have of you around character, integrity and divisiveness … There is a perception that you do not tell the truth.'

Ms McLeod's ascendancy seemed to create toxicity:

McLeod seemed uninterested in the details of how the streamlined department would actually function. Even top deputies say she was virtually unapproachable, preferring to communicate by e-mail and quarterly videocast.

McLeod's primary focus was the care and feeding of the CEO. She became Kindler's protector and surrogate, whispering in his ear, controlling access to him, delivering his blunt messages. Kindler admiringly called her 'Neutron Mary,' after his hero, Jack Welch. McLeod seemed to encourage his harshest nature, telling him, according to a person who was present, that one senior executive was 'a B player,' another too ambitious, someone else a 'crybaby.'

McLeod also publicly denigrated her employees, announcing at one town hall meeting in 2008 that two big positions would have to be filled from outside because no one inside Pfizer was capable of doing the job.

Yet Mr Kindler seemed to make sure Ms McLeod's compensation reflected his good relationship with her, not her relationship with the rest of the company:

McLeod's emoluments were so lavish they might make her one of the company's five most compensated employees, which would require Pfizer to disclose the details in its annual proxy statement. In early 2008 company governance chief Peggy Foran investigated the issue and tallied nearly $1 million in payments to McLeod, including those relating to her various houses, the helicopter use, and a large bonus to buy her out of a consulting partnership. Then there was McLeod's salary and regular bonus of $900,000 and restricted stock and options.

As Mr Kindler continued to flounder, his excess faith in Ms McLead undercut his support among other executives:

loyalty to the CEO among members of his 'executive leadership team,' or ELT, was growing tenuous. One catalyst for the disaffection was Mary McLeod. With the CEO's support, she had become feared inside Pfizer. Kindler seemed blind to her shortcomings, opening up a divide within the ELT. Says one executive: 'There was Mary and Jeff, and then there was the rest of us.'

When the board finally realized how much dysfunction Mr Kindler's trust in Ms McLead was causing, it was the beginning of the end of his CEO-ship. Her increasingly bizarre behavior lead to an inquiry:

The two-week investigation was conducted by Bart Friedman, an attorney with Cahill Gordon & Reindel who specializes in corporate governance work. After interviewing all of McLeod's direct reports, Friedman found nothing illegal. He did, however, conclude that HR was thoroughly dysfunctional, and riven by inept management. In his view, this was a simple case of incompetence.

On Wednesday, Dec. 1, Pfizer's executive team gathered for a day of meetings with the CEO. Mary McLeod was missing. After hearing Friedman's report, Kindler had finally parted ways with his controversial HR chief -- though not without a generous severance package.

Now it was Kindler whose job was threatened.

Summary: Per Fortune

Indeed, what has occurred at the company -- whose $68 billion in annual sales are built on blockbuster drugs such as Lipitor and Viagra -- is extraordinary. Once a Wall Street darling and corporate icon, Pfizer has tumbled into disarray. In the decade that ended with Kindler's departure, its stock price sagged from a high of $49 down to $17 and its drug pipeline dried up (problems the company continues to grapple with today). Pfizer lost its way, stumbling through a frantic series of zigzags in the hopes of finding new blockbusters to sustain its prodigious profits in the future.

Meanwhile, its managers descended into behavior that would do Shakespeare -- or Machiavelli -- proud. There was the ex-CEO who couldn't relinquish his power and quietly maneuvered to undercut two successors he had helped install. Then there was the human resources chief who divided the staff rather than uniting it. Most of all, there was Kindler himself, a bright man with some fresh ideas for reforming Pfizer but a person who agonized over decisions even as he second-guessed everybody else's actions. The story of Jeff Kindler's tumultuous tenure at Pfizer is a saga of ambition, intrigue, backstabbing, and betrayal -- all of it exacerbated by a board that allowed the problems to fester for years.

Health Care Dysfunction Made Visible

In "a cautionary tale: the dysfunction of American health care," published in 2003, I postulated causes of our country's health care malaise based on qualitative interviews with physicians and cases I found that instantiated their concerns. One major concern was about "ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, or even corrupt leadership." Since then, on Health Care Renewal, we have discussed a large number of cases of such bad leadership. However, most cases have come from news reports which cover only a single incident or small slice of time. The Fortune article on Pfizer covered 10 years of leadership that at least appeared ill informed and of doubtful competence.

Given that Pfizer is the world's largest pharmaceutical company this long duration case narrative does underscore our concerns. That such an important health care organization could be so badly lead for so long suggests that our fears about the problems of leadership of large health care organizations were, if anything, understated. As the Fortune article's authors put it:

Pfizer is an enterprise with the noble calling of easing pain and curing disease. Yet its leaders spent much of their time in the tawdry business of turf wars and political scheming.

When these sorts of sentiments start appearing in business magazines, health care professionals and policy makers ought to realize how overdue are our serious efforts to improve leadership and governance in health care.

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Covert's Anechoic Misadventures

We have frequently discussed how health care leaders' compensation seems to reflect the opposite of the pay for performance they often tout.  One example we discussed recently turns out to be even more vivid than we first discovered.

Last week we discussed the case of Mr Michael Cover, the CEO of the small, public Palomar Pomerado Health system in southern California, whose total compensation increased to over $1 mllion a year, while his hospital system was cited for severe, life-threatening medical errors.  The current and previous system board chairmen called his work "excellent, and " phenomenal," and asserted Mr Covert was "one of the nation's leading health administrators."

It turns out that a local weekly newspaper, the Community Paper, investigated Mr Covert's background in 2008, and what they found was not exactly the story of one of the nation's leading health administrators.  Let us summarize his record over 25 or so years.

1980s - Failure to Investigate the Michael Swango Case

As reported by the Community Paper:

Michael J Swango had received a surgical internship at Ohio State University in 1983. Nurses began noticing that apparently healthy patients on floors where Swango worked began dying mysteriously with an alarming frequency. One nurse caught him injecting some 'medicine' into a patient who later became strangely ill. The nurses reported their concerns to the administrators, headed by Michael Covert, but were met with accusations of paranoia. Only a perfunctory investigation was conducted.

In response to the board's inquiries, Surgery Director Dr. Larry Carey expressed misgivings about Swango, citing run-ins with hospital personnel and, specifically, the episode with several patients who became ill after treatment by Swango, one of whom died (and for whom Swango would later plead guilty to having killed).

At no time did Mike Covert, as executive director of the Ohio State University Hospital system, call in either University Police or Columbus, Ohio Police to investigate the matter, even though patients of Dr. Swango had died, even though documented observations and evidence had been submitted to the proper internal authorities.

Later, after Swango had been arrested in Illinois, the Ohio authorities got involved, however:

'It was only then,' says Dick Harp, Lead Investigator for the Ohio State University police department on the Michael Swango case, 'when the Quincy, Illinois, police department called us and told us they had this guy who had been a doctor at Ohio State and he had poisoned some people, that we got involved.' Harp said he contacted the Ohio State Hospital University staff and there appeared to be a collective effort to resist the investigation. They were not terribly cooperative, he said.

Eventually,

The Columbus Dispatch, Columbus, Ohio’s, daily newspaper, reported in a June 1985 article that as a result of the controversial fallout caused by this failure to notify police authorities, a new hospital policy was implemented. This, following an internal report concerning the allegations against Swango as well as a highly critical internal report against Dr. Swango.

Swango was convicted of aggravated battery for attempting to poison co-workers in Illinois, and in 2000 pleaded guilty to killing three patients, and is in jail for life.

In retrospect, Covert's resistance to investigating complaints about Swango does not seem to have exemplified excellent leadership.

The 1990s - Jury Findings of Illegal Revocation of Privileges

Mr Covert then moved to Kansas, and then to Sarasota, Florida to become CEO of Sarasota Memorial Hospital.

The Community Paper noted that Mr Covert and the Hospital lost a multi-million dollar lawsuit that alleged the they had illegally revoked a physicians' hospital privileges:

Dr. Flynn and his attorneys alleged, and proved, that Michael Henri Covert, president and CEO of Sarasota’s Memorial Hospital, and the Sarasota County Public Hospital Board, doing business as Sarasota Memorial Hospital, unlawfully and without just cause, revoked or terminated the medical privileges of a doctor at the hospital who specialized in pain management, and that they did so because the doctor had earlier (in 1994) filed and pursued a federal lawsuit. Secondly, the jury also found that the Hospital Board had additionally executed the revocation and termination of medical privileges for other than the filing of the federal lawsuit. Under Section II of the jury verdict they also found that the Sarasota County Public Hospital had terminated or revoked the doctor’s privileges as as a result of the doctor having exercised his freedom of speech rights.

Called to the witness stand, Michael Covert was clearly and thoroughly impeached by Plaintiff’s attorney, Tony Leon.

Impeachment is a lawyer’s fancy word that simply means the witness and his veracity is questioned. The witness is accused of not being honest in his actions and statements. Based on his testimony while being impeached, the jury then made their judgment, ruling against Michael R. Covert and the Sarasota Memorial Hospital, finding the Defendant had violated 28 U.S.C., Section 1983 (depriving the plaintiff of his constitutional rights of free speech) and the Plaintiff was entitled to damages.

The Community Paper story also alleged that Sarasota Memorial lost millions of dollars through an ill-advised subsidiary set up by Mr Covert to buy physicians practices.

Losing the trial and losing the money again hardly seem to be the mark of an outstanding leader.

21st Century - Alleged Misrepresentations to Secure Government Funding

Mr Covert became CEO of Palomar Pomerado in 2003. In 2007, the Community Paper reported:

Mike Covert, the president and CEO of the Palomar Pomerado Health District, was quite active in promoting Proposition BB which would deliver $496 million dollars to the district to aid in building a new hospital. It suggested further that Mr. Covert was so active that he and his minions may have, in fact, made substantial misrepresentations in order to persuade the electorate to pass the bond issue. We also documented how the cost overruns had run up to $1.2 billion dollars (from an original projected cost of $753 million). This figure was later trimmed back to $990 million. Further, the downtown business community was concerned that a major promise that was made about importing the administrative staff to the existing downtown Palomar Hospital campus might not be kept. If that promise was broken then downtown Escondido might well become a ghost town.

That story lead the paper to inquire further.  Further, misrepresentations are not the mark of an excellent leader.

2008 - Alleged Dictatorial Management Style

Reporters found:

Talking with medical staff, newspaper reporters from Columbus, Ohio, and Sarasota, Florida, and with medical staff here in North San Diego County, a picture of an energetic, eager, impatient, egotistical, demanding, and often angry chief executive emerges. It was interesting that a parallel term was used by medical staff in Sarasota and in Escondido to describe Mr. Covert’s management style. 'He’s a Little Hitler,' was the common expression used by both medical communities.

According to several medical staffers at Sarasota Memorial Hospital, Covert was not well liked, was described as manipulative and that he would do anything to get his way. Former board member Catherine Bowles, who had been at odds with the board and Covert testified at Dr. Flynn’s trial that 'people who complained about patient care were not warmly received by a majority of the board.' Nor, it is said, by Mr. Covert.

A number of others who know him, both within the medical community as well as within the Escondido community at large, agree that he is a highly egotistical man. He has to have things done his way. He is very good at playing politics and is also very good at playing hardball with contracted medical service suppliers.

Yet another doctor gave a somewhat contrasting view: 'He’s affable on one hand . . . a very good salesman; in front of a group he’s almost evangelical in his passion . . he almost bowls you over. Makes me kinda question someone who has so much zeal like . . 'I’m right.''

'Like all CEO’s, he’s very egotistical. He wants to have total control over everything, including the doctors.'

It is said he wields departmental administrative assignments as a tool and dangles the financial remuneration of them, ranging from as little as $10,000 to as much as $150,000 a year, as an incentive to fall in step with his wishes.

A number of doctors who practice at the Escondido campus of Palomar Medical Center confided to us, off the record, that they feared Covert.

One doctor complained, 'Covert is trying to take over as dictator of the hospital. There is supposed to be a separation between the hospital, the medical staff and the administrator. If you have the administrator making all the decisions then all decisions are made on money issues rather than what is best for the patient or the patient population. This poses a threat to the medical population and harms the quality of medical care. Covert is simply Hitler reborn.'

Another doctor agreed, saying, 'At most hospital districts, administrators don't normally show up at Medical Executive Meetings unless invited . . . but here, administrators are present at closed meetings. They should not be privy to private medical meetings/discussions and they tend to dominate the meetings.'

Again, a "brilliant" leader who is manipulative, rebukes criticism, and dictatorial?

2008 - Contrasting Praise from the Board

While the physicians questioned his management style, just as we noted this year, the then board chairman was effusive:

You and your readers need to know that Covert is one of the most highly regarded executives in the industry. He has received a number of very prestigious awards. Some of them puts him in the company of surgeon generals, such as C. Everett Koop. He has held high executive and board membership in national organizations.

At that time, the board chairman claimed that when Mr Covert was hired, after having been recommended by a national search firm, none of the issues noted above had come to light. 

2008 - The Temporary End of the Story

The Community Paper story ended on a disquieting note, suggesting that even the extensive results of their investigation recounted above were not complete, and that there might be grounds for a criminal investigation:

There are many other comments from physicians, other leads to follow in pursuit of the rest of this story. However, we, as a weekly newspaper, have neither the time nor resources to explore the labyrinthine depths of hospital administration committees, subcommittes, advisory councils, etc. Side financial agreements, whether or not their are 'kickback' arrangements within the hospital structure. That additional research and reporting would be better left to someone who has the resources, such as a Grand Jury.

I could find nothing to suggest any further investigation ensued. There appears to have been no local reaction to the Community Paper story. As we noted above, instead Mr Covert got a raise, and is currently getting over $1 million a year in total compensation.

Summary

A more complete look at the record of one CEO of one small, public hospital system suggests even more discrepancies between his ever increasing remuneration, justified by ongoing effusive support by his board, and a record that at best suggests multiple questionable management decisions and multiple bad results.

Note that even though considerable information was available on the public record that should have lead to questions about his leadership, this information remained relatively anechoic, and the questions were not repeated.  We have found that very few have been willing to question or investigate the powers that be in health care, and that direct or implied concerns about how health care is lead tend to be anechoic.

This case demonstrates the sorts of problems in health care governance and leadership that we started Health Care Renewal to discuss. Perverse incentives and poor oversight seem to encourage leadership by the wrong people, hired for the wrong reasons, to do the wrong thing.

There is again an ongoing discussion in the US about the costs of health care. Bad leadership of health care organizations is not only directly costly, but leads to huge indirect costs as the results of bad, if not sometimes corrupt decisions. As Matthew Holt pointed out in a comment on our earlier post on Palomar Pomerado, it is not that the case above is an outlier. It is likely just a better documented version of what is going on throughout health care.

Yet outside of a few lonely bloggers, not many people talk about bad leadership and bad governance as fundamental, major causes of our ongoing health care crisis.

We say again, true health care reform will require having health care leadership and governance that displays accountability, integrity, transparency, and honesty.  But first, we have to be willing to openly discuss bad, that is unaccountable, opaque, dishonest, and corrupt leadership. 

Hat tip to our own Health Care Renewal blogger Dr Scot Silverstein for finding the 2008 Community Paper story (see his comment here).

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