What is Life is Really Like in Pharma? - These xtranormal Video Cartoons Come Close.

Sadly, the 'xtranormal' video cartoons at the following URL capture all too well what life is like in the pharmaceutical industry - buzzwords, neologisms, nouns turned into verbs, new paradigms, team players - and per the site, endless inane "initiatives" and related threats to sanity.

I've been there; while a parody, these videos are uncomfortably close to reality.

http://www.youtube.com/user/ZombieSymmetry/feed

"I'll have to ideate on that for awhile, Mike"

Even sadder are managers who believe their own babble.

-- SS

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"Barbarians at the Gate" - Making Private Equity Less Private, and Understanding Its Effects on Health Care

One good byproduct of the tumultuous everlasting 2012 campaign for the US presidency has been to shed light on a number of political and economic issues that had previously been ignored, especially those relating to the global financial crisis or great recession.  In turn, many of these issues may be relevant to our understanding of our ongoing health care dysfunction. 

The latest issue to achieve prominence was the nature of private equity firms.  Current presidential contender Mitt Romney used to work for Bain Capital, a private equity group.  As we discussed here, Bain Capital owned a variety of companies, including some important health care corporations.  More importantly, attacks on Mr Romney's record at Bain by other candidates have lead to a broader discussion of the nature of private equity.  This discussion is very relevant to health care, since private equity firms have taken over a number of important health care corporations, and more recently, have begun to take over formerly non-profit health care organizations.

Therefore, we will summarize what has become known about private equity, and then consider its implications for health care.

Understanding Private Equity as Re-Branded Leveraged Buy-Out Firms

- Private Equity Firms are Just Re-Branded Leveraged Buyout Firms

The first good statement to this effect I found was by Merrill Goozner in the Fiscal Times(1):

Private equity is actually a misnomer, since the modus operandi of those investors is no different than the leveraged buyout firms that pioneered junk-bond financing in the 1980s.

As reported by the Los Angeles Times(2):

'Being known as a leveraged-buyout-deal shop wasn't the most attractive label out there,' said Colin Blaydon, director of the Center for Private Equity and Entrepreneurship at Dartmouth's Tuck School of Business. 'Private equity has a much nicer ring to it.'

In fact, according to Forbes columnist Robert Lenzer,(3) the famed investor Warren Buffet called this re-branding

'Orwellian': Buffett wrote that 'private equity' is a 'name that turns facts upside-down: A purchase of a business by these firms almost invariably results in dramatic reductions in the equity portion of the acquiree’s capital structure compared to that previously existing.'

I must admit I always thought private equity firms simply collected large amounts of capital from investors, then used the pooled capital to buy out troubled firms. I assumed that because these investors therefore had a large personal stake in these firms, they would want to increase at least their financial value. I also thought that leveraged buy-out firms ceased to exist after all the bad press they got in the 1980s. It turns out I was wrong on all counts. Probably, a lot of other peoples' beliefs about private equity were similarly wrong.

Once the equation of private equity and leveraged buyout firms is made, understanding what they do and its implications are easier.

- Leveraging the Buy-Out

The modus operandi of leveraged buyout firms is to make their purchases of troubled corporations mainly with borrowed money. As Merrill Goozner put it(1),

Private equity firms generally finance anywhere from 60 to 90 percent of their purchases with borrowed cash.

Note that,

Interest payments on those debts are treated just like any other expense, and are therefore deductible from earnings.

- Then Leveraging the Acquired Company

If this leveraging were the only leveraging done in a leveraged buy-out, the implications might not be that big, except for the acquiring firm. After all, when the leveraged buy-out firm borrows the money, it then becomes obligated to pay it back. However, then comes the tricks.

One important trick was described in the following example by economist Dean Baker on the Beat the Press blog(4),

To take a simple example, suppose a public company (let's call it Gingrich Inc.), has $1 billion a year in profits. If Gingrich Inc. paid taxes at the full 35 percent rate (fat chance), it would have $650 million [thanks Robert] a year to either keep as retained earnings or to pay out as dividends to its shareholders.

Now suppose that a PE company (we'll call it Romney Capital) steps in. The current price to earnings ratio in the stock market is around 14, so Gingrich Inc. would have a pre-takeover market value of approximately $9.2 billion (14*$650 million). Romney Capital then arranges for Gingrich Inc. to borrow $6 billion which it pays out as a dividend to itself. This means that the Romney Capital has just gotten back almost two-thirds of its investment.

A somewhat less vivid description of the process appeared in a post by Robert K Lifton on the Huffington Post(5):

Most often, in order to increase the return on capital invested by the fund, the fund will borrow a significant portion of the purchase price of the business. And sometimes, if it can, the fund will take back as a distribution immediately upon closing the purchase of the business, a portion of its investment in the purchase price, reducing its own investment and enhancing its return on the investment left in the business. This distribution may come from the company's existing cashable assets or from money that the company is caused to borrow.

Thus, it appears that while the leveraged buy-out (or private equity) firm borrowed money to finance the purchase of a company, it can almost immediately get out of its obligation to pay off that loan, by making the acquired company its own loan, and using proceeds from that to end the LBO firm's debt. The leverage, and the obligation to pay back a debt has almost magically been transferred from the LBO or private equity firm to the acquired company. That has big implications, as Lifton wrote(5):

This additional leverage also creates additional risk; if things don't go right the business will not be able to pay the carrying costs of the debt, the lender will take over the business and the fund will lose its investment. Sometimes, that results in the acquired company placed in bankruptcy proceedings either to liquidate its assets to pay off the debt or to restructure, a process Bain also experienced.

- Selling Assets to Further Reduce the Private Equity Firm's Debt

LBO firms have another trick up their collective sleeves. As Dean Baker continued his example(4),

Now suppose that the Romney Capital arranges to sell off some of Gingrich Inc.'s assets, such as real estate or a highly profitable subsidiary, and then uses the proceeds to make a payment to the Romney Capital rather than leaving the money under the control of Gingrich Inc. Such sales may allow Romney Capital to recoup the rest of its investment and possibly more.

Of course, the result is

Gingrich Inc. is then left as a highly indebted company with few assets.

In this story, Romney Capital may have earned a substantial profit on a limited investment (it recouped most of its money almost immediately when it loaded Gingrich Inc. with debt), without doing anything to improve the operation of Gingrich Inc. If Gingrich Inc. manages to stay in business and generate profits, then this will increase the return. Romney Capital may be able to resell the company and treat the whole sale price as profit.

On the other hand, if Gingrich Inc. goes bankrupt, this will primarily be a problem for creditors, since Romney Capital has already gotten its investment back. In effect, Romney Capital might have secured large gains entirely by financial engineering, while creating no value whatsoever.

Let me underscore that. The LBO model (now also the private equity model) enables the acquiring LBO firm to avoid any losses, by shifting all the risk and obligations to the acquired firms. This puts these firms at considerable jeopardy.

- Tactics to Prepare Acquired Firms for Sale

Of course, LBO/ private equity firms want to do more than not lose money. To make real money, they must be able to sell off the firms they acquire. To do so, they must make these firms, or their components, seem attractive, at least in the short term. To do this, they employ a standard set of tactics out of the generic management playbook.

So, per the LA Times(2),

layoffs are part of the playbook that elite investment firms use to squeeze cash out of struggling companies.

Also, per Lifton(5),

To increase the profits of the acquired company, the fund may reduce the number of employees, reduce pay levels or curtail work time.

In addition, per Josh Barro writing for the Forbe blog(6), other tactics can include

downsizing, increased automation, offshoring, and the like.

- The Private Equity/ Leveraged Buy-Out Version of the Anechoic Effect

It is striking that while Mitt Romney worked at Bain Capital in the last century, and private equity has been around, if not growing, since then, the current presidential campaign seems to be the first occasion which prompted any real public discussion about the nature of private equity, and its significance for the larger political economy. Thus private equity/ LBO seem to have been anechoic for a very long time (like much about how our current health care system operates seems to be anechoic.)

This version of the anechoic effect seems to have been deliberately created by the private equity/ LBO firms.

A Washington Post commentary(7) quoted Mitt Romney,

You know I think it's fine to talk about those things in quiet rooms,...

As a New York Times story(8) put it, these firms are lead by

a group of Wall Street executives who prefer to operate out of the spotlight

A story in Politico(9) called private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms

one of the most secretive redoubts of the American economy

The article went on to suggest that these firms may well have something to hide:

Josh Kosman, author of 'The Buyout of America: How Private Equity Is Destroying Jobs and Killing the American Economy.' [said] 'Most private equity firms are because once you look behind the numbers, there is much they don’t want you to see.'

Furthermore,

Private equity companies often tend to have confidentiality agreements with their investors (Bain would not comment on what agreements it has). Several equity experts interviewed for this story thought any disclosures from Bain were likely to spook its investors.

The private equity business model is based on taking companies out of the public markets, where reporting requirements are strict and investors punishing, making changes that will hopefully make them more profitable and then selling them or taking them public through an IPO.

The part that happens behind the curtain is not always pretty, and private equity firms have learned over the years that it’s hard to tell a complicated story in the media. The goal of private equity is to keep things private.

'It’s had very little consciousness in the political realm until Romney came along because these guys are smart enough not to try to become Treasury secretaries,' said Bill Cohan, a former Wall Street banker-turned-investigative journalist who wrote 'Money and Power: How Goldman Sachs Came To Rule The World.'

In addition, Dean Baker suggested that the confidentiality is used to hide how private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms remove capital from acquired companies(4),

The sort of asset stripping described here, which harms creditors by taking away potential collateral for their loans, violates the law. However it is extremely difficult to prevent, especially with private equity companies that have to make few public disclosures.

Thus secrecy/ confidentiality/ deception should be regarded as one of the main tactics used by private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms.

Implications for Health Care

Mitt Romney's candidacy has generated a surprising amount of discussion about the effects of private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms on the political economy. Many are worried that despite his claims, such firms cause more job loss than job creation. In the Huffington Post(10), Robert Creamer wrote that private equity/ LBOs have contributed to the sense that ordinary people who play by the rules suffer while well-connected insiders prosper:

It just doesn't make sense to them that a relatively tiny number of people -- who don't build a product or create a service -- can make massive amounts of money, while ordinary people who work hard and play by the rules see their incomes flat-line.

Their view is simple. They create cars, or food, or houses or computers -- or they provide police protection, or care for sick people, or teach our kids. Why should they be asked to sacrifice when guys who basically gamble for a living -- as Wall Street speculators -- make incomprehensibly large sums of money?

There seems to be a good argument that the tactics used by private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms might be bad for the general political economy.

Moreover, these firms often take over health care corporations, drug and device companies, health care information technology companies, health insurance companies, for-profit hospital chains, etc. There is reason to think that their standard tactics used on such targets are likely to be particularly bad for health care.

Many health care corporations depend on a long-term view to be successes. To develop new products, drug, device, and health care IT companies must pursue research and development projects that take years. All health care companies depend on highly trained, specialized workers and professionals. To sustain these sorts of employees requires a long-term attention to their development. So private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms' short-term focus, transfer of debt and risk to the acquired companies, and emphasis on short-term generic management cutting costs techniques including lay-offs, outsourcing, etc clash with the sophisticated long-term focus these companies require.

These health care organizations often require the complex interplay of many components. Private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms' efforts to sequester and sell particular assets may disturb this complex system.

Health care quality, and successful research and development require transparency. Extreme emphasis on secrecy by private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms threatens such transparency.

Even more pointed concerns may arise when private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms endeavor to take over non-profit health care organizations. We plan to discuss these in a subsequent post.

The NY Times(g) noted that in the 1980s, leveraged buy-out firms

were branded as 'barbarians at the gate' - the title of a book [by Burrough and Helyar, link here] about the takeover of RJR Nabisco by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts.

Now 30 years later we are finally having a conversation about the role of these firms in the greater political economy. We in health care should be having a parallel discusion about their role in our sphere. I submit that their role was not likely productive. Since health care should not merely be looked upon as a means to make money, but as a public good, we ought to be talking about how to restrain private equity/ leveraged buy-out firms from doing it more damage.

References

1. Goozner M. Private equity's edge: buy now, deduct taxes later.  Fiscal Times, Jan 9, 2012.  Link here.
2, Hamilton W. Private equity industry: a bad rep, but is it deserved. Los Angeles Times, Jan 12, 2012. Link here.
3. Lenzer R. Why Warren Buffet disdains the private equity crowd. Forbes, Jan 14, 2012. Link here.
4. Baker D. NPR does fluff piece for private equity. Beat the Press, Jan 13, 2012. Link here.
5. Lifton RK. Mitt Romney and Bain Capital: understanding the reality. Huffington Post, Jan 13, 2012. Link here.
6. Barro J. The discussion we should be having about Bain. Forbes, Jan 12, 2012. Link here.
7, Robinson E. Reexamining the myth of no-fault capitalism. Washington Post, Jan 16, 2012. Link here.
8. Lattman P, Lowrey A. As Romney advances, private equity becomes part of the debate. New York Times, Jan 10, 2012. Link here.
9. Hagey K. Mitt Romney's Bain Capital days: a black box. Politico, Jan 11, 2012. Link here.
10 Creamer R. Why the Bain Capital controversy is so damaging to GOP chances this fall. Huffington Post, Jan 16, 2012. Link here.

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The Corporate Psychopaths Theory of Health Care Dysfunction

A new article in the Journal of Business Ethics suggested that the global financial crisis, or great recession, was primarily due to a fundamental flaw in the leadership of financial organizations, one that has important implications for health care organizations. 

The article, Boddy CR. The corporate psychopaths theory of the global financial crisis.  J Bus Ethics 2011; 102: 255-259 is here.  Its premise was:

The Corporate Psychopaths Theory of the Global Financial Crisis is that Corporate Psychopaths, rising to key senior positions within modern financial corporations, where they are able to influence the moral climate of the whole organisation and yield considerable power, have largely caused the crisis.

Note that in 2004 we first posted about the possibility that a proportion of corporate managers, including those in health care, could be psychopaths, raised then by two experts on psychopathy, Paul Babiak and Robert Hare. In 2006, they published Snakes in Suits, about the dangers of psychopaths as executives and managers (see post here). However, the issue got scant attention in those days of letting the good times roll.

Defining Corporate Psychopaths

Boddy described psychopaths as:

the 1% of people who have no conscience or empathy and who do not care for anyone other than themselves. Some psychopaths are violent and end up in jail, others forge careers in corporations. The latter group who forge successful corporate careers is called Corporate Psychopaths.

Corporate Psychopaths as Leaders

Such people do not make good leaders:

Although they may look smooth, charming, sophisticated, and successful, Corporate Psychopaths should theoretically be almost wholly destructive to the organizations that they work for. The probable mal-effects of the presence of psychopaths in the workplace have been hypothesized about in recent times by a number of leading experts and commentators on psychopathy.

Researchers report that such malevolent leaders are callously disregarding of the needs and wishes of others, prepared to lie, bully and cheat and to disregard or cause harm to the welfare of others. Corporate Psychopaths are also poorly organized managers who adversely affect productivity and have a negative impact on many different areas of organizational effectiveness.

How Corporate Psychopaths Could Have Become Prevalent
Despite the dangers posed by such leadership, corporate psychopaths may rise quickly in management:

Psychologists have argued that Corporate Psychopaths within organizations may be singled out for rapid promotion because of their polish, charm, and cool decisiveness. Expert  ccommentators on the rise of Corporate Psychopaths within modern corporations have also hypothesized that they are more likely to be found at the top of current organisations than at the bottom.

The nature of current corporate culture may facilitate the rise of corporate psychopaths:

These Corporate Psychopaths are charming individuals who have been able to enter modern corporations and other organisations and rise quickly and relatively unnoticed within them because of the relatively chaotic nature of the modern corporation. This corporate nature is characterized by rapid change, constant renewal and quite a rapid turnover of key personnel. These changing conditions make Corporate Psychopaths hard to spot because constant movement makes their behaviour invisible and combined with their extroverted personal charisma and charm, this makes them appear normal and even to be ideal leaders.

The destabilization of modern corporations likely lead to the ascendancy of the corporate psychopath:

However, once corporate takeovers and mergers started to become commonplace and the resultant corporate changes started to accelerate, exacerbated by both globalisation and a rapidly changing technological environment, then corporate stability began to disintegrate. Jobs for life disappeared and not surprisingly employees’ commitment to their employers also lessened accordingly. Job switching first became acceptable and then even became common and employees increasingly found themselves working for unfamiliar organisations and with other people that they did not really know very well.

Rapid movements in key personnel between corporations compared to the relatively slower movements in organisational productivity and success made it increasingly difficult to identify corporate success with any particular manager. Failures were not noticed until too late and the offending managers had already moved on to better positions elsewhere. Successes could equally be claimed by those who had nothing to do with them. Success could thus be claimed by those with the loudest voice, the most influence and the best political skills. Corporate Psychopaths have these skills in abundance and use them with ruthless and calculated efficiency. In this way, the whole corporate and employment environment changed from one that would hold the Corporate Psychopath in check to one where they could flourish and advance relatively unopposed.

The Harms Caused by Corporate Psychopaths as Executives

Thus, Boddy hypothesized the rise of management by corporate psychopaths lead directly to the global financial crisis or great recession:

As evidence of this, senior level remuneration and reward started to increase more and more rapidly and beyond all proportion to shop floor incomes and a culture of greed unfettered by conscience developed. 

Corporate Psychopaths are ideally situated to prey on such an environment and corporate fraud, financial misrepresentation, greed and misbehaviour went through the roof, bringing down huge companies and culminating in the Global Financial Crisis that we are now in.

Writing in 2005, this author commentating on Corporate Psychopaths predicted that the rise of Corporate Psychopaths was a recipe for corporate and societal disaster. This disaster has now happened and is still happening.

What Could be Next

Worse, if this hypothesis is true, as long as it is not addressed, things will get worse:

The very same Corporate Psychopaths, who probably caused the crisis by their self-seeking greed and avarice, are now advising governments on how to get out of the crisis. That this involves paying themselves vast bonuses in the midst of financial hardship for many millions of others, is symptomatic of the problem. Further, if the Corporate Psychopaths Theory of the Global Financial Crisis is correct then we are now far from the end of the crisis. Indeed, it is only the end of the beginning.

Some Agreement

The plausible theory that corporate psychopaths ascending to top management positions in finance caused the global financial crisis has been noticed by a few prominent financial pundits. Writing in Bloomberg, William D Cohan agreed with Boddy's suggestion that "anyone who makes decisions that affect significant numbers of other people, concerning issues of corporate social responsibility or toxic waste, for example, or concerning mass financial markets or mass employment, should be screened to make sure that they are, at the very least, not psychopaths and at most are actually people who care about others."

Brian Besham, writing in the Independent, suggested that Richard Fuld, former CEO of Lehman Brothers, whose bankruptcy kicked off public awareness of the global financial collapse, saying he wanted to eat the hearts of those selling his company's stock short (see this post), was a "terrifying" example of corporate executive psychopathy. Worse, Besham noted that he had discovered an case of an investment bank which "psychometric testing to recruit social psychopaths because their characteristics exactly suited them to senior corporate finance roles."  It may be that corporate psychopaths are actively recruiting their fellows.

Implications for Health Care

This is chilling. It also unfortunately is highly relevant to health care. As we noted, most recently here, leaders of big finance firms, including those whose failures were most spectacular, now often sit on boards of trustees of hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools, and their parent universities. Thus, the likelihood that a good proportion of the stewardship of our most prominent not-for-profit health care organizations may be in the hands of psychopaths is not negligible.

Furthermore, health care organizations have become as unstable and chaotic, in the way these terms were used by Boddy, as finance firms. This would suggest that their current nature would make it as easy for psychopaths to rise to positions of power in them as they may have in financial firms. In health care we certainly have seen the consequences he suggested were due to psychopathic managers, including

- intimidation (per Boddy, corporate psychopaths are "prepared to lie, bully and cheat and to disregard or cause harm to the welfare of others");
- self-interest ("pursuit of self-enrichment and self-aggrandizement") leading to outrageous executive compensation ("senior level remuneration and reward started to increase more and more rapidly and beyond all proportion to shop floor incomes")
- fraud and other crime ("corporate fraud, financial misrepresentation, greed and misbehaviour went through the roof,... ")

So as we noted in 2006, "a high prevalence of psychopathic managers could explain the prevalence of mismanagement, conflicts of interest, and corruption in the leadership of health care organizations that we have often discussed on Health Care Renewal."

Boddy's first suggestion to deal with the problem in finance was:

Measures exist to identify Corporate Psychopaths. Perhaps it is time to use them.

However, it is as hard to imagine top health care leaders willingly and honestly submitting to the use of instruments designed to identify psychopaths as it is to imagine finance leaders doing so. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine how corporate psychopaths in positions of leadership would ruthlessly deploy their legions of public relations personnel and lawyers to quash any challenge should the notion that they are so dominant gain any credibility.

However, if there is any significant prevalence of corporate psychopaths among the leaders of health care, woe will be unto us until we identify and remove them.

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Covert's Anechoic Misadventures

We have frequently discussed how health care leaders' compensation seems to reflect the opposite of the pay for performance they often tout.  One example we discussed recently turns out to be even more vivid than we first discovered.

Last week we discussed the case of Mr Michael Cover, the CEO of the small, public Palomar Pomerado Health system in southern California, whose total compensation increased to over $1 mllion a year, while his hospital system was cited for severe, life-threatening medical errors.  The current and previous system board chairmen called his work "excellent, and " phenomenal," and asserted Mr Covert was "one of the nation's leading health administrators."

It turns out that a local weekly newspaper, the Community Paper, investigated Mr Covert's background in 2008, and what they found was not exactly the story of one of the nation's leading health administrators.  Let us summarize his record over 25 or so years.

1980s - Failure to Investigate the Michael Swango Case

As reported by the Community Paper:

Michael J Swango had received a surgical internship at Ohio State University in 1983. Nurses began noticing that apparently healthy patients on floors where Swango worked began dying mysteriously with an alarming frequency. One nurse caught him injecting some 'medicine' into a patient who later became strangely ill. The nurses reported their concerns to the administrators, headed by Michael Covert, but were met with accusations of paranoia. Only a perfunctory investigation was conducted.

In response to the board's inquiries, Surgery Director Dr. Larry Carey expressed misgivings about Swango, citing run-ins with hospital personnel and, specifically, the episode with several patients who became ill after treatment by Swango, one of whom died (and for whom Swango would later plead guilty to having killed).

At no time did Mike Covert, as executive director of the Ohio State University Hospital system, call in either University Police or Columbus, Ohio Police to investigate the matter, even though patients of Dr. Swango had died, even though documented observations and evidence had been submitted to the proper internal authorities.

Later, after Swango had been arrested in Illinois, the Ohio authorities got involved, however:

'It was only then,' says Dick Harp, Lead Investigator for the Ohio State University police department on the Michael Swango case, 'when the Quincy, Illinois, police department called us and told us they had this guy who had been a doctor at Ohio State and he had poisoned some people, that we got involved.' Harp said he contacted the Ohio State Hospital University staff and there appeared to be a collective effort to resist the investigation. They were not terribly cooperative, he said.

Eventually,

The Columbus Dispatch, Columbus, Ohio’s, daily newspaper, reported in a June 1985 article that as a result of the controversial fallout caused by this failure to notify police authorities, a new hospital policy was implemented. This, following an internal report concerning the allegations against Swango as well as a highly critical internal report against Dr. Swango.

Swango was convicted of aggravated battery for attempting to poison co-workers in Illinois, and in 2000 pleaded guilty to killing three patients, and is in jail for life.

In retrospect, Covert's resistance to investigating complaints about Swango does not seem to have exemplified excellent leadership.

The 1990s - Jury Findings of Illegal Revocation of Privileges

Mr Covert then moved to Kansas, and then to Sarasota, Florida to become CEO of Sarasota Memorial Hospital.

The Community Paper noted that Mr Covert and the Hospital lost a multi-million dollar lawsuit that alleged the they had illegally revoked a physicians' hospital privileges:

Dr. Flynn and his attorneys alleged, and proved, that Michael Henri Covert, president and CEO of Sarasota’s Memorial Hospital, and the Sarasota County Public Hospital Board, doing business as Sarasota Memorial Hospital, unlawfully and without just cause, revoked or terminated the medical privileges of a doctor at the hospital who specialized in pain management, and that they did so because the doctor had earlier (in 1994) filed and pursued a federal lawsuit. Secondly, the jury also found that the Hospital Board had additionally executed the revocation and termination of medical privileges for other than the filing of the federal lawsuit. Under Section II of the jury verdict they also found that the Sarasota County Public Hospital had terminated or revoked the doctor’s privileges as as a result of the doctor having exercised his freedom of speech rights.

Called to the witness stand, Michael Covert was clearly and thoroughly impeached by Plaintiff’s attorney, Tony Leon.

Impeachment is a lawyer’s fancy word that simply means the witness and his veracity is questioned. The witness is accused of not being honest in his actions and statements. Based on his testimony while being impeached, the jury then made their judgment, ruling against Michael R. Covert and the Sarasota Memorial Hospital, finding the Defendant had violated 28 U.S.C., Section 1983 (depriving the plaintiff of his constitutional rights of free speech) and the Plaintiff was entitled to damages.

The Community Paper story also alleged that Sarasota Memorial lost millions of dollars through an ill-advised subsidiary set up by Mr Covert to buy physicians practices.

Losing the trial and losing the money again hardly seem to be the mark of an outstanding leader.

21st Century - Alleged Misrepresentations to Secure Government Funding

Mr Covert became CEO of Palomar Pomerado in 2003. In 2007, the Community Paper reported:

Mike Covert, the president and CEO of the Palomar Pomerado Health District, was quite active in promoting Proposition BB which would deliver $496 million dollars to the district to aid in building a new hospital. It suggested further that Mr. Covert was so active that he and his minions may have, in fact, made substantial misrepresentations in order to persuade the electorate to pass the bond issue. We also documented how the cost overruns had run up to $1.2 billion dollars (from an original projected cost of $753 million). This figure was later trimmed back to $990 million. Further, the downtown business community was concerned that a major promise that was made about importing the administrative staff to the existing downtown Palomar Hospital campus might not be kept. If that promise was broken then downtown Escondido might well become a ghost town.

That story lead the paper to inquire further.  Further, misrepresentations are not the mark of an excellent leader.

2008 - Alleged Dictatorial Management Style

Reporters found:

Talking with medical staff, newspaper reporters from Columbus, Ohio, and Sarasota, Florida, and with medical staff here in North San Diego County, a picture of an energetic, eager, impatient, egotistical, demanding, and often angry chief executive emerges. It was interesting that a parallel term was used by medical staff in Sarasota and in Escondido to describe Mr. Covert’s management style. 'He’s a Little Hitler,' was the common expression used by both medical communities.

According to several medical staffers at Sarasota Memorial Hospital, Covert was not well liked, was described as manipulative and that he would do anything to get his way. Former board member Catherine Bowles, who had been at odds with the board and Covert testified at Dr. Flynn’s trial that 'people who complained about patient care were not warmly received by a majority of the board.' Nor, it is said, by Mr. Covert.

A number of others who know him, both within the medical community as well as within the Escondido community at large, agree that he is a highly egotistical man. He has to have things done his way. He is very good at playing politics and is also very good at playing hardball with contracted medical service suppliers.

Yet another doctor gave a somewhat contrasting view: 'He’s affable on one hand . . . a very good salesman; in front of a group he’s almost evangelical in his passion . . he almost bowls you over. Makes me kinda question someone who has so much zeal like . . 'I’m right.''

'Like all CEO’s, he’s very egotistical. He wants to have total control over everything, including the doctors.'

It is said he wields departmental administrative assignments as a tool and dangles the financial remuneration of them, ranging from as little as $10,000 to as much as $150,000 a year, as an incentive to fall in step with his wishes.

A number of doctors who practice at the Escondido campus of Palomar Medical Center confided to us, off the record, that they feared Covert.

One doctor complained, 'Covert is trying to take over as dictator of the hospital. There is supposed to be a separation between the hospital, the medical staff and the administrator. If you have the administrator making all the decisions then all decisions are made on money issues rather than what is best for the patient or the patient population. This poses a threat to the medical population and harms the quality of medical care. Covert is simply Hitler reborn.'

Another doctor agreed, saying, 'At most hospital districts, administrators don't normally show up at Medical Executive Meetings unless invited . . . but here, administrators are present at closed meetings. They should not be privy to private medical meetings/discussions and they tend to dominate the meetings.'

Again, a "brilliant" leader who is manipulative, rebukes criticism, and dictatorial?

2008 - Contrasting Praise from the Board

While the physicians questioned his management style, just as we noted this year, the then board chairman was effusive:

You and your readers need to know that Covert is one of the most highly regarded executives in the industry. He has received a number of very prestigious awards. Some of them puts him in the company of surgeon generals, such as C. Everett Koop. He has held high executive and board membership in national organizations.

At that time, the board chairman claimed that when Mr Covert was hired, after having been recommended by a national search firm, none of the issues noted above had come to light. 

2008 - The Temporary End of the Story

The Community Paper story ended on a disquieting note, suggesting that even the extensive results of their investigation recounted above were not complete, and that there might be grounds for a criminal investigation:

There are many other comments from physicians, other leads to follow in pursuit of the rest of this story. However, we, as a weekly newspaper, have neither the time nor resources to explore the labyrinthine depths of hospital administration committees, subcommittes, advisory councils, etc. Side financial agreements, whether or not their are 'kickback' arrangements within the hospital structure. That additional research and reporting would be better left to someone who has the resources, such as a Grand Jury.

I could find nothing to suggest any further investigation ensued. There appears to have been no local reaction to the Community Paper story. As we noted above, instead Mr Covert got a raise, and is currently getting over $1 million a year in total compensation.

Summary

A more complete look at the record of one CEO of one small, public hospital system suggests even more discrepancies between his ever increasing remuneration, justified by ongoing effusive support by his board, and a record that at best suggests multiple questionable management decisions and multiple bad results.

Note that even though considerable information was available on the public record that should have lead to questions about his leadership, this information remained relatively anechoic, and the questions were not repeated.  We have found that very few have been willing to question or investigate the powers that be in health care, and that direct or implied concerns about how health care is lead tend to be anechoic.

This case demonstrates the sorts of problems in health care governance and leadership that we started Health Care Renewal to discuss. Perverse incentives and poor oversight seem to encourage leadership by the wrong people, hired for the wrong reasons, to do the wrong thing.

There is again an ongoing discussion in the US about the costs of health care. Bad leadership of health care organizations is not only directly costly, but leads to huge indirect costs as the results of bad, if not sometimes corrupt decisions. As Matthew Holt pointed out in a comment on our earlier post on Palomar Pomerado, it is not that the case above is an outlier. It is likely just a better documented version of what is going on throughout health care.

Yet outside of a few lonely bloggers, not many people talk about bad leadership and bad governance as fundamental, major causes of our ongoing health care crisis.

We say again, true health care reform will require having health care leadership and governance that displays accountability, integrity, transparency, and honesty.  But first, we have to be willing to openly discuss bad, that is unaccountable, opaque, dishonest, and corrupt leadership. 

Hat tip to our own Health Care Renewal blogger Dr Scot Silverstein for finding the 2008 Community Paper story (see his comment here).

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Blast from the Anechoic Past: Former UCI Fertility Doctor Arrested in Mexico

Soon after we started Health Care Renewal, we ran a series of posts about the University of California-Irvine (UCI) medical school and medical center, featuring stories of mismanagement of major programs, especially those involving organ transplantation (liver, kidney, and bone marrow) while the top executives who presided over the mess received generous compensation, sometimes in strikingly irregular ways, and while at least one whistle-blower alleged he lost his job for complaining about safety issues.  Some of the stories went back another 10 years, to 1995.  One particularly striking story involved the UCI infertility program.  Three physicians were accused of stealing ova from some women to implant in others.  One physician was convicted, and two fled the country (see post here).

One of those physicians just turned up.  As reported by ABC News at the end of 2010:

U.S. authorities are working to extradite one of the doctors accused of being behind of the biggest fertility scandals in history. Mexican authorities arrested Dr. Ricardo Asch last month.

Back in the 1990s, Asch and another fertility doctor, Jose Balmaceda, were charged with stealing embryos and eggs belonging to dozens of women who sought treatment at the University of California-Irvine Center for Reproductive Health and implanting them into other women.

They are also accused of not reporting more than $1 million in earnings, and fleeing the country to avoid prosecution.

Marla McCutcheon is one of the women who says she was victimized by Asch. She was one of his patients until she decided to switch physicians because she said she found him 'uncaring.'

McCutcheon, from Irvine, Calif., says she found out years later that after she'd left Asch's care that there were leftover eggs she didn't know about. To this day, she doesn't know what happened to those eggs.

'I would have done anything for those eggs at that time. It's still hard for me to grasp that there might be something to my eggs. Someone may have been able to get pregnant from them,' McCutcheon said.

At the time of the scandal, ABC News saw documents showing that more than 60 other women who were patients at the fertility center had eggs taken from them without their consent. Asch, however, said he knew nothing about it. During the time the incidents occurred, it was not illegal to transfer human tissue without consent.

The case had major repercussions for how fertility clinics operate:

The scandal allegedly involving Asch, Balmaceda and another doctor, Sergio Stone, rocked the field of reproductive medicine, and doctors say they still feel its effects.

'Reproductive medicine is very new. It's come a long way and we've made tremendous progress, but because of scientific advances, it's very high-profile,' said Dr. Jani Jensen, a Mayo Clinic reproductive endocrinologist in Rochester, Minn. 'Whenever there are publicized incidents like this that involve ethical issues, it's sometimes difficult to engender the public's trust.'

Dr. Howard Zacur, director of the Division of Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility at the Johns Hopkins Fertility Center in Baltimore, Md., said patients still want reassurance their eggs and embryos will be protected from these types of incidents.

It is now against the law in California to take eggs from a woman without her consent.

Note that the disconnect between problematic quality of care at UCI and the generous compensation afforded its top leaders continued through 2010, as this post discussed.

Aside from its colorfulness, there are other reasons to recall the story of the stolen ova and the subsequent troubles at UCI.  First, the list of problems over 15 years discussed in our series of posts suggests an institution whose leadership culture is seriously disturbed.  I cannot view the institution from a distance and figure out what the fundamental problems are with its leadership and governance, but there must be some.  (Note that per a 2006 post, an internal report did fault lack of accountability, leadership by people with no medical background, absence of clear reporting lines, and the overlooking of whistleblowers, but these are just descriptions of bad management and governance, not explanations of them.  Furthermore, it is not clear whether there have been any fundamental changes in leadership or governance since then.  If there readers know there is more to this, please let me know in the comments section below.)

Second, this case illustrates how the anechoic effect has decreased recognition that the problems at UCI may be part of more systemic problems.  Despite the number of problems that occurred, their vividness, and their coverage in local media, the troubles at UCI have not gotten national media attention, nor as far as I can tell, have they ever been discussed in the medical, health care, health services research, or health policy literature.  (I have tried multiple Google scholar searches using the institution's name, and keywords including "scandal," and the names of some of the physicians most prominently named in our series of posts, and have found nothing relevant.)  The 15 year history has produced almost no echoes, and hence now has become as striking a black hole in the annals of bad health care leadership and governance as was the case of the fall of the Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation (AHERF). 

Certain issues that we discuss on Health Care Renewal have become less anechoic, in particular, conflicts of interest caused by academic physicians financial ties to the drug, biotechnology and device industries.  However, the larger issues of mismanagement by lavishly compensated, and hence perversely incentivized executives remains relatively anechoic.  I am not sure how big a scandal it will take to remove the taboo from discussing it. 

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Health Insurers Sanctioned, Fined

It has not been a good few weeks for big US health insurance companies.  First was a report (e.g., per the Wall Street Journal) that three companies had been suspended from selling Medicare Advantage plans:

The U.S. government's Medicare program has ordered three health insurers--Universal American Corp. (UAM), Health Net Inc. (HNT) and Arcadian Health--to stop marketing to and enrolling new members in their Medicare Advantage health and prescription-drug plans, saying the companies violated regulations.

In particular,

Universal American was told to stop marketing to and enrolling people in its Medicare Advantage plans effective Dec. 5. The action doesn't affect current members or the enrolling of beneficiaries in the company's stand-alone Medicare prescription-drug plans.

Health Net had to suspend the marketing of and enrollment in its Medicare Advantage plans and stand-alone Medicare prescription-drug plans as of Friday, as the government said the company's conduct poses a 'serious threat' to enrollees. The sanction doesn't affect the status of current enrollees, however.

In a letter Friday to Theodore Carpenter, head of Universal American's Medicare Advantage business, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services alleged the company has a 'longstanding pattern of prohibited marketing practices targeted to highly vulnerable populations in violation' of federal law and guidelines as well as contractual terms with CMS.

Universal American is a 'chronic poor performer' with respect to the regulations, according to CMS, which said the company's agents engaged in aggressive sales tactics and abusive behavior, and misled or confused beneficiaries or misrepresented the plan.

The agency's letter to Health Net government-programs executive Scott Kelly said the company's conduct 'poses a serious threat to the health and safety of its enrollees,' as a result of the company's 'intractable failure to provide its enrollees with prescription drug benefits in conformance" with laws, guidelines and contract terms.' CMS cited a 'history of non-compliance.'

Then, the state of California fined and ordered restitution from multiple companies, as reported by the San Francisco Chronicle:

State regulators Monday fined seven of California's largest health insurers nearly $5 million for systematically failing to pay doctors and hospitals fairly and on time.

The California Department of Managed Health Care issued the fines following an 18-month audit in which investigators looked at a small but statistically significant sample of claims. The investigation found the plans were paying on average about 80 percent of the claims correctly, far below the legal threshold of 95 percent.

'Our clear and consistent message is that California's hospitals and physicians must be paid fairly and on time,' said Cindy Ehnes, director of the Department of Managed Health Care, which is charged with regulating the states' health maintenance organizations, or HMOs.

In addition to the fines, the companies must pay the doctors and hospitals restitution that is expected to run into the "tens of millions of dollars," Ehnes said. The plans will also be required to come up with a plan to correct the problem and submit to future audits.

Failing to pay providers properly makes it tougher for them to survive in the struggling economy, Ehnes said. 'If providers are not paid, patient care and access suffer,' she said.

Regulators fined Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield of California $900,000 each. United/PacifiCare was fined $800,000 and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan and Health Net were both hit with fines of $750,000.


The fines for Cigna and Aetna were $450,000 and $300,000, respectively, for a total of $4.85 million.

Please note that some of these companies have become "frequent flyers" on the Health Care Renewal blog.  Anthem Blue Cross in California is a subsidiary of WellPoint. WellPoint, in particular, just appears again and again on Health Care renewal.  A list of all posts about that company is here, and see this post for a list of past ethical and management missteps.  Health Net appeared in both stories above, and appeared on Health Care Renewal here.  Posts on Aetna are here.

Having been writing for this blog now for several years, I am struck by how often the conduct of particular health care organizations has been discredited, without any discernible effect on the organization's leadership or course.  It is particularly striking how the attention paid and pay given to the leaders of some health care organizations contrasts with the public record of their organization's bad behavior.

In particular, contrast the long catalog of misbehavior by WellPoint, noted above, with the enormous earnings of the company's CEO (more than $13 million in 2009), and her status as a prominent speaker on health care policy (see post here). 

In the laissez faire, anything goes, wild, wild west economy of today, spearheaded by the financial service companies that lead us to the global economic collapse, it seems that ethical leadership counts for nothing.  This is bad when it applies to the leadership of financial services, whose bad leadership can cost us all a lot of money.  It is worse when it applies to health care, whose bad leadership can cost us our health and our lives.

As I have said ad infinitum, to really reform health care, we will need to get accountable, ethical, transparent leadership of health care organizations.

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St. Vincent's Goes Bankrupt, Executives Earn Millions

St. Vincent's Hospital in the Greenwich Village section of New York City was a landmark institution which filed for bankruptcy in April, 2010, and then closed its doors. 

Background

A New York Times article written earlier this year described an institution "threatened with extinction" because it stuck to its mission of "compassionate care" in a health care environment that values "fancy equipment and celebrity doctors."  Thus, "officials blamed a high rate of poor and uninsured patients as well as cuts in Medicare and Medicaid and the hospital's inability to negotiate favorable contracts with health insurance companies...." 

Painting Another Picture

However, a story this week in the grittier New York Post painted a different picture:

St. Vincent's Hospital was looted by execs and consultants in the two years before it closed, then grossly exaggerated its debt, according to blockbuster papers set to be filed tomorrow in Manhattan Supreme Court.

The filing, a petition that seeks to force the state Health Department to turn over documents on the closing, says the defunct medical center blew through millions in 'highly questionable' expenses, including $278,000 for a golf outing, while paying its top 10 executives a combined $10 million a year.

It also shelled out $17 million for 'management consultants,' $3.8 million on 'professional fund-raising' and a staggering $104 million on unspecified costs it listed simply as 'other' on its federal tax returns, the petition says.

But even with all that money going out, St. Vincent's wasn't nearly as cash strapped as it claimed, say the court papers, prepared by a law firm working for doctors and nurses formerly employed there and the hospital's West Village neighbors.

Its crushing debt of about $1 billion, which the hospital blamed for having to close its doors in April, was bloated by hundreds of millions of dollars in loans dumped on St. Vincent's from other medical entities run by the Archdiocese of New York, starting in 2001, after the other institutions merged with the hospital, the papers say.

'The debt of the hospital was specifically exaggerated by numerous factors, including the transfer of debt from other Catholic medical centers and mismanagement by the board of directors,' the documents say. 'These transfers . . . remain undisclosed to the public.'

Historical Parallels
These accusations parallel themes that appeared towards the end of the February, 2010, NY Times piece. First, regarding the transfer of debt:

To remain competitive, in 2000 St. Vincent’s merged with several other Catholic hospitals to form St. Vincent Catholic Medical Centers.

Along with the flagship hospital in the Village, it ran seven other hospitals: Bayley Seton and St. Vincent’s on Staten Island; Mary Immaculate, St. John’s and St. Joseph’s in Queens; St. Mary’s in Brooklyn; and St. Vincent’s Westchester, in Harrison, N.Y. It was also affiliated with St. Vincent’s Midtown, formerly St. Clare’s, in Midtown Manhattan.

The merger was conceived as a way to streamline management and give the hospitals pricing leverage, but it was troubled from the beginning. After closings and sales, the network was left with just one New York City hospital, the flagship; a psychiatric and substance abuse treatment hospital in Westchester; and several nursing homes and other outpatient facilities. Some of St. Vincent’s debt was inherited from the closed hospitals.

Second, regarding mismanagement:

In 2004, St. Vincent’s turned over management to Speltz & Weis, the first in a series of turnaround consultants. It paid the firms millions of dollars a year to run the hospital and hired their officials as hospital executives. The system filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in early July 2005, when it appeared, according to court papers filed by hospital creditors, that it would be unable to make its payroll.

In a lawsuit filed in 2007, some of the hospital’s creditors painted a picture of a hospital system trapped between unscrupulous consultants and a passive or gullible board. The lawsuit accused David E. Speltz and Timothy C. Weis, the hospital system’s former chief executive and chief financial officer, of delaying the bankruptcy organization while they and their consulting firm collected millions of dollars in fees.

The lawsuit accused them of hiring high-priced contractors and padding their fees, instead of using hospital employees to do work. And it says they leveraged their positions with the hospital to negotiate the sale of their consulting company to Huron Consulting Group, in Chicago, also a defendant in the case.

The outcome of that earlier lawsuit was unclear.  It does suggest that St. Vincent's may have been chronically bled by greedy managers and consultants.

Contrasting Financial Health and Executive Compensation

Of course, as one of our unofficial legal consultants noted, anyone can file a lawsuit. However, perusal of the latest 990 form filed with the Internal Revenue Service by St Vincent Catholic Medical Centers for calendar year 2008 did reveal a disquieting contrast.

That form stated that the the hospital lost over $65 million in 2008, and over $34 million in 2007. However, in 2008, here were the compensation of its highest paid managers

- Brian Fitzsimmons, Executive Director, $2,135,401
- Bernadette Kingman-Bez, Senvior Vice President, CCO (?), $1,520,841
- Paul Rosenfeld, Executive Director, CC, $1,196,458
- Henry Amoroso, CEO, $1,081,592

In addition, seven current and former executives at the Senior Vice President of Vice President level earned over $500,000 that year, and another 13 earned over $250,000.

Summary

So clearly, while the hospital was hemorrhaging money, and a little more than a year away from bankruptcy, this not-for-profit hospital whose mission emphasized serving the poor served a large corps of  executives very large amounts of money.  So we see again the pattern of top managers rewarding themselves disproportionately (here, grossly so) given the mission and financial status of their organizations.  The picture is of pay entirely independent of performance, and leaders who are ultimately only in it for the money.

How many more examples like this do we need until there is resolve that real health care reform will make top health care leaders accountable for their performance, and provide them incentives that are fair and rational, rather than perverse?

Post-Script

Of course, if we regard the fall of institutions whose mission was to do good as inevitable in our Darwinian world, an explanation that earlier coverage of this story suggested, all we can do is to throw our hands up.  However, the inevitability argument is often made by those who are benefiting from the current way of doing things.  A more skeptical view of this case, and related health policy issues, may suggest a different approach. 

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