A New Low - A Hospital CEO Got a "Golden Parachute" for A Merger that Never Occurred

We recently posted about how top hospital managers are often the first to benefit from mergers and acquisitions, which once again have become fashionable in management circles.  Now it appears that top executives can benefit even from failed mergers, as reported by the Daytona Beach (Florida) News-Journal,

Five months after Bert Fish Medical Center's failed merger, one board member said he was surprised to learn payments are still being made toward the $1 million buyout of the former hospital CEO.

Hospital board member Joe Benedict said he didn't know former hospital Chief Executive Officer Bob Williams, who steered the board into the illegal deal with Adventist Health System, is due to receive his $289,000-a-year salary until 2014 –– paid through the publicly owned hospital.

At the time the merger was announced, a memorandum of understanding with Williams became public and showed the deal had triggered a three-year buyout clause in Williams' contract. Starting July 1, 2010, the Adventist agreement paid him his salary for three years, as his contract required, plus seven months and eight days –– a deal worth $1 million and benefits.

'That man has got away with a lot more than he should have,' said Benedict, a former County Council member, explaining that he considers Williams as responsible for the failed merger as Jim Heekin, the board's former attorney.

These payments were made to the former CEO despite the cost of the failure of the merger:

The hospital district incurred $3.4 million in administrative and legal fees as a result.

Apparently, there are allegations that the merger failed because former CEO Williams agreed to keep the board meetings of this public hospital secret, which was illegal:

The hospital board has voted to pursue a legal malpractice lawsuit against Heekin, of the Orlando firm Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, for his advice to keep the public out of talks about merging the New Smyrna Beach hospital with a partner. The 21 closed meetings that were held over 16 months were called 'so much darkness for so long' they couldn't be cured, according to a ruling earlier this year from Circuit Judge Richard Graham, who threw out the merger.

Also,

Williams is quoted in transcripts of the closed meetings telling board members not to tell anyone Adventist had been chosen as Bert Fish's partner

Other contractual provisions for golden parachutes exist, but have yet to be activated:

Benedict said he's still hopeful he can undo other buyout clauses in hospital contracts he believes obligate the hospital to pay more than is allowed, under state law, for the departure of Bert Fish Medical Center administrators. According to the current contracts, provided to the News-Journal, the hospital's current CEO, chief financial officer and chief of nursing must be paid 24 months' salary should they be dismissed from their positions through no fault of their own. Their departures could be a possibility if Bert Fish were to seek another merger partner who doesn't want to keep them on.

The contracts were executed June 30. On July 1, a new state law went into effect that limits the buyout of public employees to 20 months.

Summary

So, a hospital CEO had a contract that made him eligible to begin receiving "golden parachute" payments just because a merger was in process, and these payments could not be stopped even though the merger was declared illegal, and hence never occurred. We noted recently that CEOs and other top officials of health care organizations are often the first to benefit financially from mergers and acquisitions, even when such transactions to not prove so beneficial to the affected institutions, much less patients' and the public's health in the long run. Here is a case in which a CEO could get extra money just because a merger was contemplated. This is some sort of new record for health care leaders personally profiting from their insider positions.

There has been growing public outrage about how ordinary people who play by the rules are disadvantaged in today's economy, while insiders profit from their positions. There ought to be equal outrage in health care over its version of this pheonomenon.

As long as health care leaders can continue to put their self-interest ahead of the health care mission in this way, is it any wonder that health care costs continue to rise while access and quality suffer? When will would be health care reformers realize that to truly reform health care, we will have to reform health care leadership? We need health care leaders who understand and uphold the mission, are accountable for how well they do so, and whose incentives depend on how they do so. We do not need leaders who put their self-interest first. Right now, however, that seeems to be the leadership we have.

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CEOs First to Benefit from For-Profit Takeovers of Non-Profit Hospitals

Last year, we noted concerns about the againy fashionable practice of for-profit corporations taking over previously not-for-profit hospitals and hospital systems. Two examples we cited were the planned acquisitions of Detroit Medical Center (DMC) by Vanguard Health, which was owned by the Blackstone Group, and of Caritas Christi Health Care by Cerberus Capital Management.

At the time, we noted, "for-profit leaders tend to expect even larger compensation than not for-profit CEOs. Their decisions tend to be driven by their short-term compensation, rather than the good of the organization." So we asked, "will making a not-for-profit health care organization into a for-profit corporation really lead to more efficiency and lower costs?" In a later post, we worried about "ever-increasing executive compensation while making money becomes the overwhelming priority for the organization, completely eclipsing such quaint concepts as quality of care, reasonable costs, or adequate access."

About one and one-half years later, we have some follow-up from the media about the results of these deals, especially as they pertain to executive compensation.

Detroit Medical Center, Vanguard Health Systems, Blackstone Group

Our post last year quoted then Mike Duggan, then CEO of DMC, that "We were being choked to death by the nonprofit business model."

This month, the Detroit Free Press reported,

Detroit Medical Center CEO Mike Duggan's total compensation this year from Vanguard Health Systems, the private health care company that bought the DMC, is $2.41 million in pay, bonuses and several years of stock options, up from the $1.98 million in 2009 when DMC was a nonprofit, according to public documents.

About $1.3 million of Duggan's total compensation is in stock options that he would start receiving next year through 2019, the documents show.

Note also that,

The package also calls for Duggan to get $1 million if he's fired or $5 million if Vanguard sells the DMC to another company -- fairly common conditions in contracts, experts said.

Duggan's new compensation package puts him in the top tier of local health care executives.

It seems like Mr Duggan is no longer being "choked to death."

Cursory review of the media reveals that since the acquisition, DMC has some major construction projects planned. However, I saw nothing yet about whether the acquisition has decreased costs, increased access, or improved the quality of care.

I should note that Mr Duggan appears just a bit uncomfortable with his generous compensation in this era of anger about the power of the one percent:

Duggan said he agreed with Occupy Wall Street protesters who point to the growing gap between the poor and rich: "I do believe people should be able to work hard and earn a lot of money. (But) the gap between the top and the bottom is not fair in this country," he said. "I don't have the ability to fix the world, but my wife and I are making a gesture that's appropriate for us. If people say we get paid a lot of money, I think they are right. I'm trying to do something to share some of the benefit."

The gesture mentioned above would be

he and his wife plan to create a foundation next year to hold the stock earnings, after taxes, for scholarships for children of DMC employees.

Whether it is carried out, of course, remains to be seen.

Caritas Christi Health Care, Steward Health Care, Cerberus Capital Management

The initial story about the proposed take-over in the Boston Globe noted that one rationale was how:

Caritas has long struggled financially, but since coming to the chain two years ago, [CEO Dr Ralph] de la Torre has worked to strengthen its financial position by aggressively cutting costs and boosting revenue from medical care. It posted operating income of $30.5 million for the fiscal year ending last Sept. 30 compared with a $20.5 million loss the prior year.

The aim would be:

to provide quality community-based care at a reasonable cost.

Some specific goals of the proposed take-over would be

Under the agreement, Cerberus will invest $430 million to $450 million immediately to pay off Caritas debt, finance renovation projects, and provide working capital, while also assuming its pension liability.

To pursue all this,

While de la Torre and other senior executives will retain their current salaries and benefits, they would be eligible for additional compensation from Cerberus based on the financial performance of the hospitals, Caritas officials said. They said the details of those financial incentives have yet to be worked out.

Last month, a Boston Globe article provided a little more clarity about these compensation arrangements:

Ralph de la Torre, former chief executive of Boston-based Caritas Christi Health Care, drew a total pay package of $2.2 million from the Catholic hospital system in 2009, making him the best-compensated hospital executive in Boston that year, according to documents filed with the state attorney general’s office.

The package, which included base salary, a performance bonus, and incentive compensation linked to improving finances at the hospital chain, marked an increase from the $1.2 million de la Torre earned from Caritas in 2008.

Note that after the take-over, the Caritas Christi system was renamed as Steward Health Care.

So prior to the actual take-over by Cerberus, but presumably while initial negotiations about it were going on, Dr de la Torre had already become the best paid hospital CEO in Boston.

Becker's Hospital Review noted that De la Torre's 2010 total compensation was exactly $2,270,076. The Caritas Christi 2010 IRS form 990 also listed 19 executives who received more than $400,000. Of these, 11 received more than $600,000. Meanwhile, according to this form, the system's losses were accelerating, going from -$6,583,625 in 2008 to -$23,858,733 in 2009.

So, it seems that Dr De la Torre became significantly richer in anticipation of the proposed (and now accomplished) take-over of Caritas Christi by Cerberus Capital Management, even though his hospital system's hemorrhaging of money was increasing at that time.

Again, I was not able to find any clear evidence whether the take-over had decreased costs, increased access, or improved quality of care. I did find one report suggesting that some Steward Health nurses did not think that it had stabilized their pensions as promised. According to the Boston Business Journal,

Nurses and other health care workers from several of the hospitals owned by the for-profit Steward Health Care, plan to protest outside the company's Boston headquarters today at 1:30. They include nurses from St. Elizabeth’s Medical Center, Brighton, Norwood Hospital, Good Samaritan Hospital in Brockton, Morton Hospital in Taunton, Quincy Medical Center Carney Hospital in Dorchester, Holy Family Hospital in Methuen and Merrimack Valley Hospital in Haverhill.

Nurses argue that Steward, owned by New York private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management, has not honored agreements to the workers, including a commitment to create a defined-benefit pension plan. They also say that Steward has threatened to eliminate essential services in retaliation for the nurses demand for the pension plan.

Summary

Two acquisitions by private equity firms of non-profit hospital systems have resulted in increased compensation for the systems' CEOs, and perhaps other top executives.  These increases predated any recognizable improvements in quality or access, or decreases in health care costs.

Acquisitions of non-profit hospitals and hospital systems by for-profit entities, including private equity firms, is one of the newly fashionable ways our health care leaders have promised to improve care, increase access and control costs. The evidence about whether this tactic accomplishes these aims is not yet in. However, it appears that this tactic may be another, and a rapid way for top health care executives to increase their personal incomes.

Health care professionals, patients, and the public at large ought to be increasingly skeptical of the latest fashions in health care management, especially those that have potential to further enrich managers.

As we recently noted, more people in the US and other countries are frustrated that their attempts to work hard and follow the rules of the economic system yield less rewards. Meanwhile, it appears that well-connected insiders are increasingly gaming the system for their personal profit. We have noted how health care executives' compensation seems independent of their talent, skill, or innovation, much less their ability to uphold the values and fulfill the mission of their organizations. Their compensation often seems to rise inexorably, regardless even of the financial status of their organizations.

Now it appears that inflating compensation in anticipation of or due to a merger or acquisition is another mechanism by which insider executives gain, while others in health care lose.

Once more with feeling .... true health care reform requires competent, ethical leadership that upholds health care's core values within a governance structure of accountability, integrity, transparency, and honesty. Tackling the deep problems in health care will require tackling the deeper problems in the global political economy which helped to generate them.

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The Restless Shade of AHERF and the Return of Merger Mania: Highmark Tries to Buy Another Insurance Company, a Hospital System, a Medical School, and Physicians' Practices

Starting in the 1990s, as US health care became more commercialized, a wave of mergers lead to super-sized hospital systems, insurance companies, and pharmaceutical companies.  Not all those mergers, especially involving hospitals, prospered.  Although the mergers were justified as drivers of increased efficiency, health care has become decreasingly accessible, increasingly expensive, and of no better quality.  However, now a whole new wave of mergers seems to be upon us. 

The Proposed Highmark Blue Cross/ West Penn Allegheny Health System Merger

The latest example to get national attention is the proposed combination of already large non-profit health insurer Highmark Inc, a Blue Cross Blue Shield plan, and non-profit hospital system Allegheny Health System.  The national attention was in a Wall Street Journal article by Anna Wilde Matthews, which described the proposed transaction:

Pittsburgh insurer Highmark Inc. struck a deal to acquire the second-largest hospital chain in its region, an ambitious, controversial step that would further blur the lines between those who pay for medical care and those who provide it.

Under the tentative plan, nonprofit Highmark will pump as much as $475 million into the five-hospital West Penn Allegheny Health System, which has been operating in the red for the past five years.

If state and federal regulators sign off on the plan, Highmark officials say the deal will allow them to move away from traditional fee models that reward providers for providing unnecessary procedures and services.

Instead they would pay salaries to doctors, offering them incentives to achieve quality and efficiency goals. The integrated model would also rely on primary-care doctors to coordinate patients' care and focus on preventive efforts.

Highmark officials said the deal is the best way to keep West Penn in business. 'It brings our expertise as an insurance company into the provider system,' said Kenneth R. Melani, Highmark's chief executive.

This deal is unusual because it would unite a health care insurance company/ managed care organization with a hospital system.

The Context: An Already Concentrated Health Care Environment

The deal appears in the context of and may be in response to an already concentrated health care environment.  Per the WSJ:

The newly combined Highmark-West Penn will face off against the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, which is officially known by its acronym, UPMC. The prestigious $8 billion,19-hospital network employs 2,881 doctors and has about 56% of the inpatient market share in Allegheny County. It also owns a health plan with about 1.6 million members.

UPMC's current contract with Highmark runs out next June. Paul Wood, the hospital system's vice president for public relations, said the network won't sign a new one after the acquisition. 'In effect, Highmark expects UPMC to subsidize our competitor,' he said.

UPMC has had its issues, too, as discussed in posts here. 

The deal is also more extraordinary because it was accompanied by several other proposed deals that would create quite a sprawling health care entity.

The Extended Scope of the Merger

First, and as noted in the WSJ article, the proposed deal would involve physicians' practices:

Highmark may also buy or invest in other providers, including doctor practices, Dr. Melani said.

However not noted in the WSJ article, or in a contemporaneous Pittsburgh Post-Gazette article, was that since 2010 there has also been a proposal on the table for Highmark to merge with a non-profit Blue Cross Blue plan in neighboring Delaware. The latest discussion of this deal can be found on DelawareOnline, and was just noted in a Philadephia Inquirer commentary.

In Delaware, a bill that would remove a major obstacle to Highmark's proposed affiliation with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Delaware sailed through the legislature, passing the Senate unanimously Tuesday and the House, 34-5, Wednesday.

That is not all. It seems that while pursuing the merger with Highmark, West Penn Allegheny Health was also pursuing an arrangement with Temple University to set up a branch of its medical school in Western Pennsylvania. As noted by the Pittsburgh Tribune Review:

West Penn Allegheny Health System leaders expressed optimism on Friday about their partnership prospects with Highmark Inc. as they announced plans with Temple University to establish a four-year medical school campus in the North Side.

So it appears that lined up against the UPMC behemoth could be another behemoth combining a large Pennsylvania insurance company, a Delaware insurance company, a good-sized hospital system, physicians' practices, and a branch of a medical school.  So we see a new effort to divide the health care supposed "market" among a few large, vertically-integrated health care systems.

The Eerie Shadow of AHERF

Maybe all these simultaneous deals, which would apparently create a conglomerate of Highmark Blue Cross, Delaware Blue Cross Blue Shield, West Penn Allegheny Health System, Temple University Medical School, and possibly a large group of doctors' practices, were all being discussed separately because of how they could be seen as a strange shadow of the spectacularly failed Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation (AHERF) of the late 1990s.

As discussed here, AHERF was a large integrated health care system formed out of multiple mergers.  AHERF which went bankrupt in 1998, leading to massive layoffs, hospital closures, and the near dissolution of a medical school (which ended up taken over by Drexel University). The former AHREF CEO, whose high compensation (for the time) was accompanied by an autocratic management style, ended up in the local jail on a plea bargain. Note that West Penn Allegheny Health System was formed from some of the pieces of the failed AHERF, and seems to have never fully recovered from its previous troubles.

Despite the fact that the AHERF bankruptcy was the second largest US bankruptcy up to its time, this vivid case was notably anechoic. The lack of echoes it originally produced made it prototypical of the anechoic effect.

The link to AHERF was briefly noted in the Post-Gazette article:

'They are well-capitalized, and we're not,' said David L. McClenahan, WPAHS board chairman, speaking of Highmark. 'That's putting it mildly.' In the decade since the collapse of the Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation, whose bankruptcy eventually bore the West Penn Allegheny Health System, WPAHS has been persistently starved for capital, he said.

So far, however, the ominous implications of that previous debacle have not been publicly discussed.

How Some Executives Would Gain

Perhaps the executives rushing to make a deal are being distracted by the potential for personal gain. The DelawareOnline article noted that current executives of Delaware Blue Cross Blue Shield may be able to pull the ripcords of their golden parachutes if its proposed merger with Highmark goes through:

Seven executives at Blue Cross Blue Shield of Delaware, for example, are due a combined $6 million in severance pay -- equal to about three years of salary -- if they lose their jobs.

Details of Blue Cross severance payout packages have attracted attention recently because top executives at Delaware's largest health insurer are busy pressing for a merger with Pittsburgh-based insurer Highmark Inc., which could mean the elimination of some top positions.

Highmark has pledged that Blue Cross President and CEO Tim Constantine will keep his job after the merger's closing, if the deal is approved by state regulators. But Constantine, who has an annual salary of $420,000, would be due a $1.6 million payment if he were to lose his job.

Six other top executives, who earn between $245,000 and $330,000 annually, have potential payouts equal to about $4.3 million. Highmark has not discussed the fate of those officers, who range in position from the company's general counsel to its chief medical and financial officers.

That article further noted:

Some observers worry that the prospect of large severance payments could cloud the judgments of executives working to close the deal.

Considering the size of the Blue Cross payouts in relation to annual salaries, the payout promises deserve attention, said Ethan Rome, executive director of Health Care for America Now, a Washington consumer advocacy group. Severance agreements are typically in place to provide a cushion between jobs, he said. 'Three years is a long time,' Rome said. 'Three years is not a severance. It's a substantial payout.'

One wonders which other executives involved in these potential deals may also have prospects for either larger compensation or golden parachutes. This could include executives in particular current executives of West Penn Allegheny.  One also wonders whether the creation of this new conglomerate will produce rationales for big raises for the current executives of all the organizations involved who get to work for the new merged entity.  Perhaps someone should ask them.

Further Implications

Of course the various mergers were touted as productive of new efficiencies, as attempts to obtain increased market power usually are. As reported by the Post-Gazette:

While the short-term goal of this partnership is to preserve a 'fragile' Pittsburgh hospital system, the long term goal, said Highmark CEO and President Kenneth Melani, is the creation of a new model of health care, one that is outcomes based, with an integrated delivery and financing system.

;Health care services are becoming less affordable,' he said. 'It's important to have choice. It's important to have a second system.'

And, as we discussed here, the former CEO of AHERF pledged "new forms of organization that are more flexible, more adaptive, and more agile than ever before." But common sense and history suggests that increasing market domination will be good mainly for the market dominators, not their customers, or in this case, their patients, clients and students.

As Dr Westby Fisher asserted about how the new conglomerate will likely own physicians' practices:

So doctors lose more professional independence and autonomy and have even more chance that clinical decisions will be compromised by bureaucratic dictates. Yet ask patients who they want steering the boat when they get sick: their doctor.

It continues to be clear who the winners and losers are as health care reform unfolds. But when doctors lose autonomy, patients lose autonomy.

It’s that simple.

To argue that the only way to control the health care dollar is to bloat the bureaucratic levels of our system is a fool’s game. However, bureaucrats promote bureaucrats – it’s always been this way. Until doctors and the public speak up, there’s simply nothing to stop this train.

So I wonder if this complex merger will get more scrutiny than the many mergers that have preceded it in the last 30 years. Someone who is more likely to get answers than I am should be asking:
- What evidence is there that this merger will lead to any benefits to individual patients or to the public health?
- How will any efficiencies achieved benefit anyone other than the organizations' current and future managers?
- What sorts of management layers will the complexity of the multiple mergers proposed necessitate between current Highmark executives and current management of its new acquisitions?
- If the current problem is existing market concentration, why will these mergers be a better solution than a direct approach to that concentration?
- How will the current leaders of all the organizations involve personally benefit from this merger?

Meanwhile, increasing concentration of power in health care continues to benefit the leaders of the enlarging health care organizations, while reducing the choice of individual patients and the autonomy of health care professionals.

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Should the President of the University of Michigan be Held Accountable for Johnson and Johnson's Adulterated Drugs and Defective Devices?

We first started to discuss the intense conflicts of interest generated when leaders of academic medicine are also members of boards of directors of for-profit health care corporations in 2006.

The issue really made the big time in 2010 when the New York Times published a front page article in its Sunday Business section about whether university presidents who also were corporate directors were part of an "academic-industrial complex."

University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman as a Director of Johnson and Johnson

One such director we discussed this year is Mary Sue Coleman, President of the University of Michigan, and hence leader of a prestigious medical school and academic medical center, who is also Director of the large health care conglomerate, Johnson and Johnson. This relationship became locally controversial when President Coleman supported a smoking ban on campus, and critics pointed out that Johnson and Johnson is a prominent maker of smoking cessation products.

Now President Coleman's role on the Johnson and Johnson board made it into the national media, as the topic of an editorial in the Detroit News:

Should public officials moonlight as corporate operatives? This is a question being raised at the University of Michigan in the wake of the administration's decision to ban smoking on campus.

While some students have criticized the ban, many take issue with the priorities of the administrators who backed it: Specifically, U-M President Mary Sue Coleman, whose decision-making may have been influenced by her membership on the board of Johnson & Johnson, a private company. The right thing for Coleman to do would be to resign from her corporate position, or, at the very least, refuse to accept payment.

(Not to toot my own horn, but I thank the editorial writer for quoting me as a "high-profile" ethicist.)
The issue in this editorial, and in the earlier discussion of President Coleman's responsibilities for Johnson and Johnson, was whether the latter could influence specific decisions made in the former role.

However, events since our original posts on this case should create a new set of concerns.

Johnson and Johnson's Recall of Over-the-Counter Childrens' Medications

Johnson and Johnson has been dealing with a series of crises generated by revelations of problems in how it manufactures many of its marquee drugs and devices.

We posted here about problems in the manufacture of well known over-the-counter childrens' medications, such as childrens' Tylenol (acetaminophen) and Motrin (ibuprofen), by Johnson and Johnson's McNeil Consumer Healthcare subsidiary. Medications were found to be contaminated, and the plant making them was shut down.

Stringent Cost Cutting, Merger Mania, and Executives Who Don't Understand their Company's Business

Since then, investigative reporting by Fortune suggested that quality control problems were the result of that tactic popular among corporate executives to boost profits and hence their own over-stuffed pay checks, stringent cost cutting:

McNeil's quality-control department thrived for a few years. Then, not long after Larsen retired in 2002, it began to slowly weaken. The culprit was a familiar one -- cost cutting -- but in a subtler form. There were no wholesale layoffs in quality control. Instead experienced staffers were repeatedly laid off and replaced with newbies who mostly lacked technical pharmaceutical experience. By 2008 the analytical laboratory, formerly staffed almost entirely by full-time scientists, was half-full of contract workers, according to a former manager there.

Once stricter than a schoolmarm, the department grew lax. The team that tested the production lines was dubbed the 'EZ Pass system,' according to a former quality-control employee.

Quality problems also appeared to be products of another familiar tactic that "brilliant" CEOs use to quickly boost the bottom line, mergers and acquisitions:

At the end of 2006, J&J, on the hunt for growth amid slowing sales and profits, completed the $16.6 billion acquisition of Pfizer's (PFE, Fortune 500) consumer health care division....

The merger dramatically altered McNeil's position. It had previously been part of the pharma unit, but after the deal it was folded, along with the Pfizer group, into J&J's consumer sector, headed by Colleen Goggins. According to former executives, the difference between divisions was both cultural and financial. 'The people who ran pharma understood the requirements associated with [regulatory] compliance and the investments required to keep that up,' says a former executive. Consumer relied more on marketing, or 'smoke and mirrors,' as an ex-McNeil director scoffs. Perhaps the most striking difference was in profit margins. Companies in the consumer group typically had margins around 10%; McNeil generated more than twice that.

So,

Their new consumer bosses were now in charge of reducing McNeil's spending so that the company could meet the merger targets. Goggins looked to squeeze every cost, former employees say, and her team leaned heavily on McNeil, with its juicy margins, to absorb the cutbacks. 'I was given savings goals that were mind-boggling, unheard-of,' says one former executive.

And the merger brought out another common feature of contemporary management, executives with plenty of power, but almost no knowledge about or experience in the sort of work done by their subordinates:

Because the consumer executives lacked pharmaceutical experience, former McNeil employees say, they demanded ill-advised operational reductions. One VP remembers arguing with one of Goggins's

A Growing List of Recalls and Mistakes

While we learned about how Johnson and Johnson executives pursued all the currently fashionable management techniques to make more money, but likely to the detriment of the quality and safety of their products, we also learned that the problems at the company were not limited to a single factory, the specific products listed above, or a single unit of the company.

The company also recalled some contact lenses made by Johnson and Johnson Vision Care, as reported by the Associated Press,

Health giant Johnson & Johnson has issued its ninth recall of a consumer health product in a year, this time covering millions of 1 Day Acuvue contact lenses sold in Japan and two dozen other countries in Asia and Europe.

The affected contact lenses were mostly sold in Japan and none were sold in the U.S. or Canada, the company said.

Johnson & Johnson said Monday it had received a limited number of complaints from customers in Japan that they experienced an unusual stinging or pain when inserting the Acuvue TruEye Brand contact lenses.

Then it recalled prosthetic hips made by its DePuy orthopedic unit, as reported by Medscape,

An orthopaedic unit of Johnson & Johnson (J&J) is voluntarily withdrawing 2 implant systems for hip replacement after learning that roughly 1 of 8 patients in England and Wales who received the implants needed a second hip replacement operation.

The 2 devices under recall are the ASR XL Acetabular System, a metal cup fitted into the pelvis and the corresponding metal ball that replaces the femoral head, and the ASR Hip Resurfacing System, which is similar except that a metal cap is fastened to the femoral head. Both devices are manufactured by DePuy Orthopaedics of J&J.

Then the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) warned Johson and Johnson's DePuy unit about its marketing of some different joint replacement products, as reported by the Wall Street Journal,

A Johnson & Johnson (JNJ) unit is marketing joint-replacement products without the required approval from federal regulators, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration said in a warning letter recently made public.

In the letter, the FDA said J&J unit DePuy Orthopaedics Inc. is illegally marketing its TruMatch Personalized Solutions system because it hasn't received appropriate clearance to sell the product. Additionally, the FDA found that DePuy is promoting another system--its Corail Hip System--for uses that haven't yet been approved.

'A review of our records reveals that you have not obtained marketing approval or clearance before you began offering the TruMatch Personalized Solutions System for sale, which is a violation of the law,' the FDA said in the letter.

The FDA added that the Corail Hip System has been misbranded and asked DePuy to immediately stop marketing the Corail system for unapproved uses.

And a few days ago, the now embattled head of the Johnson and Johnson consumer products unit, which was central to some of the earlier recalls, but not to some of the later problems, announced her resignation, as reported by Natasha Singer and Reed Abelson writing for the New York Times,

A longtime senior executive at Johnson & Johnson in charge of the consumer products division is leaving the company early next year, signaling a shake-up after a troubling series of recalls, including of children’s Tylenol, tarnished the company’s reputation in the last year.

The company said Thursday that the executive, Colleen A. Goggins, who testified this spring before a Congressional committee investigating the recalls, would retire in March. Ms. Goggins, 56, has worked at Johnson & Johnson since 1981 and was a member of the company’s senior leadership.

Who Will Be Accountable for a Company in Disarray?

Johnson and Johnson was one of the most trusted names in health care for a long time, perhaps partially because of its forthright response to the apparently external contamination of its Tylenol products in the 1980s. Now it appears to be a company in disarray, battered by numerous recalls of apparently contaminated, adulterated, or defective products, both drugs and devices, allegations that its conventional management wisdom lead to these quality and safety problems, and now with at least one key senior manager leaving.

All that went wrong is not exactly clear yet. Clearly, however, top managers, and the board of directors to whom they report ought to be accountable.

Here is where we return to the case of University of Michigan President Mary Sue Coleman. She is, after all, well-paid to be a director of Johnson and Johnson. Therefore, she ought to be accountable for the type of people hired as top managers, and the general direction of their management. She ought to be accountable for letting Johnson and Johnson CEO William Weldon and consumer products head Colleen Goggins continue in office, and receive outsized compensation, ($19,847,026 and $5,345,737  total compensation respectively last year, see here). She also ought to be accountable for the general thrust of their management, including excess cost-cutting, seeking mergers without clear plans for assimilating them, and putting people who did not understand pharmaceuticals in charge of pharmaceutical production.

The original controversy about President Coleman's role on the Johnson and Johnson board focused on whether her decision to promote a smoke free campus resulted from her conflict of interest.  Then, one defense mounted by President Coleman's spokesperson was:

'It's essential that U-M have a voice and interact with the business world,' said Rick Fitzgerald, a U-M spokesman. 'She thinks it's her duty to understand what the commercial world is doing.'

Now President Coleman has had a chance to have a voice and interact with Johnson and Johnson, and understand what it is doing by assuming a position that gives her ultimate responsibility for the company's top leadership and the direction they took. Now it appears the leadership may have been faulty, and their direction ill-advised.

Will President Coleman take responsibility for that? Maybe some enterprising student journalists at the university should ask her.

Meanwhile, this case now illustrates another important facet of the problems created when leaders of academic medicine serve on boards of directors of health care corporations. The mission of the University of Michigan's medical school and academic medical center includes taking the best possible care of individual patients. Taking the best possible care of individual patients cannot be done when the drugs physicians recommend or prescribe in good faith turn out to be adulterated, or when the devices they employ in good faith turn out to be faulty.

President Coleman's primary interests and entrusted responsibilities include upholding the best possible care for individual patients. Presiding over a company whose sloppy and ill-informed leadership, and misplaced priorities lead to the production of adulterated medicines and defective devices seems to conflict with this primary interest and entrusted responsibility.

Maybe all those academic leaders who accepted apparently cushy jobs on corporate boards will reconsider their decisions when they start being held responsible for their companies' poor leadership and poor decisions leading to poor health care outcomes of the use of their companies' products. They may really start to reconsider when journalists learn that academic leaders are more accessible than the current and ex-CEOs who also populate corporate boards.

Meanwhile, academic medicine ought to really rethink whether continuing to defend the "new species of conflicts of interest" will soon become counter-productive.

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