Another Hospital Putting on the Ritz

The usual definition of a hospital is an institution which treats the sick and injured,.  That is a messy business, so some hospital executives seem to yearn to be doing something a little more - shall we say - upscale.  For example, the Chattanoogan reported:

Erlanger Health System will launch in October one of the most ambitious employee training initiatives in its 120-year history. All 4,500 employees will participate in a new service excellence program based on the legendary Ritz-Carlton service model.

'This is not a program. This is the beginning of long-term cultural transformation,' says Erlanger CEO James Brexler. 'Our board and leadership team believe this initiative is one of the most significant developments in the continued evolution of Erlanger.'

The Erlanger Health System strategic plan, adopted by the board of trustees last year, identified service excellence as a priority. Funding for the initiative was approved in this year’s operating budget. The corporate university of Ritz-Carlton was selected to help take Erlanger’s patient experiences to the next level.

A hospital, of course, provides services to patients. However, it seems glaringly obvious that the sort of services required by the sick and injured, especially the critically ill, are very different than those people who go to four-star hotels. Providing care to a patient on a ventilator (breathing machine), for example, hardly resembles providing spa services to a wealthy hotel guest.

Furthermore, Erlanger Health System is a public, non-profit health system with a mission that involves service to the poor:

To deliver excellence in medical care to improve the health status of our region, while providing vital services to those in need, and training to health professionals through affiliation with academic partners

The Boston hotel in the Ritz-Carlton chain, its flagship property, boasts that it:

features hotel rooms and suites in Boston designed as sanctuaries of urban luxury.

Where is the parallel to providing health care services to "those in need" who are acutely ill and injured?

By the way, a few days after the Erlanger, Ritz-Carlton connection was announced, the Time Free Press noted questions about how the contract was awarded:

Erlanger officials defended the no-bid procedure Monday, saying the hospital was correct in bypassing a competitive bid process and awarding a 'professional services' contract to Ritz-Carlton.

'Tennessee law says government entities do not have to bid professional services,' hospital spokeswoman Susan Sawyer said.

Even early in the process, Whisman said, 'it was so clearly the Ritz going forward.'

'There was a lot of board support, executive-level support and steering committee support,' she said. 'Ritz had it all.'

Furthermore, how well the money will be spent may be difficult to find out:

In October, a Ritz-Carlton speaker is expected to lead several four-hour sessions, each of which will hold 400 employees, hospital officials said.

The bill for those sessions is $288,000. On Thursday, Sawyer said Ritz-Carlton prohibited the media from attending the sessions because of proprietary information the hotel chain prefers to keep secret.

It is not that the hospital system has money to burn, as the Chattanoogan just revealed:

Erlanger Health System officials reported a $1.3 million loss for July,...

In addition,

Admissions were under budget by 1.6 percent for the month and ahead of the previous year by 3.8 percent.

So, in summary so far, a public hospital system that is currently experiencing budgetary challenges is spending hundreds of thousands of dollars for the Ritz-Carlton luxury hotel chain to train its employees in secret sessions about "service excellence," and the hospital system's management thinks this is a top priority.

In my humble opinion, this illustrates a larger problem with the leadership of health care. Health care organizations are often lead by ultra generic managers, that is, managers trained in such fields as marketing, public relations, and finance, but without any experience or training in actually taking care of patients. (The supremacy of generic management is strange given that patient care itself has become so specialized.) The utter lack of gut feeling for what health care is really about seems to lead to managers thinking that hospitals are like automobile assembly plants, or in this case, like luxury hotels. I cannot but help believe that such ultra generic managers, who do not appreciate the values of health care professionals, and do not understand the health care context, are going to make some very bad decisions, and are an important cause of health care dysfunction.

I cannot help believe that the Erlanger CEO, Mr James Brexler, (whose most advanced degree was a "Masters of Public Affairs from North Carolina State University") was entirely off base when he was quoted:

'This is not a flavor-of-the-month thing,' continues CEO Brexler. 'This is a strategic priority and business imperative. We are committed to this. We are excited about it. Our staff is excited. Our physicians are excited. The results, we believe, will be evident to our patients and their families.'

True health care reform would make sure health care leaders actually understand health care and uphold its values.

PS - Long ago, we noted the trustees of another hospital system who seemed to think that Ritz-Carlton experience was perfect background for hospital executives.

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Will Hired Executives Let "Healing Prevail Over Profit?" - Questions from Public and Catholic Non-Profit Health Systems

Hospital - noun, 1.  a charitable institution for the needy, aged, infirm or young  2.  an institution where the sick or injured are given medical or surgical care, Merriam-Webster


             - noun.  1.  an institution providing medical and surgical treatment and nursing care for sick or injured people, Oxford Dictionary

Two recent NY Times articles raise concerns that changes in leadership may cause hospitals to stray from their original purpose. 

Cook County Health and Hospitals System

The first NY Times article discussed leadership of Cook County Health and Hospitals System (in the Chicago, IL area). This is a public health system whose mission was traditionally "to serve Cook County's neediest patients." The management of the system, however, is now increasingly in the hands of paid consultants. For example, until recently, its COO (chief operating officer) was:

Mr. [Tony] Tedeschi, [who] like other of the system’s recent top managers, works for the Sibery Group, which has had contracts with the system to provide temporary executive talent.

Furthermore, his successor was

Ms. [Carol] Schneider, whose contract runs through December, works for the Washington Group Ltd., a consulting company that provides administrative help to the system.

Furthermore,

PricewaterhouseCoopers has a three-year, $50 million contract calling for it to save the system $300 million or bring in the equivalent in new revenue.

Not to mention,

consultants from the Sibery Group, which is based in Oak Brook, [were appointed] to top management posts within County Health. For example, a Sibery employee, Robert Hamilton, was until recently chief operating officer of Provident Hospital. Another, David Sibery, was until recently head of support services for the health system.

Turning leadership over to executives hired by outside, commercial firms has lead to concern.

The role consultants play at County Health is the object of strong criticism from doctors, nurses and other staff members who say they fear that consultants driven by the bottom line are at odds with the system’s obligation to serve Cook County’s neediest patients. Hundreds of front-line staff members have been laid off in the last two years.

One particular concern was the lay-offs directed by yet another group of consultants.

The county decided to close Oak Forest based in part on the advice of Navigant Consulting, which in a 2009 report found that Cook County’s hospitals were overstaffed compared to those of other health systems. Navigant’s assessment also formed the basis for the layoff of 1,350 people systemwide in the last two years.

Doctors, nurses and union leaders argued that Navigant’s calculations were flawed.

Most troubling are allegations that outsourced leadership by commercial consultants is stifling health care professionals' input into the system, including perhaps whistle-blowing about threats to its core mission:

A doctor at a county clinic who would not let his name be used because he feared losing his job said consultants were 'coming at it like our county system is a system that could make money.'

The purpose of the system 'is to take care of people regardless of their ability to pay,' the doctor said. 'If they want to get out of that commitment, that’s fine, but they’re going to leave people in the dust.'

In addition,

A nonunion supervisor, who would speak only on the condition that her name not be used for fear of retaliation, said the constant presence of consultants — and a lack of clear results — was undermining staff morale.

'I’ve never seen employee morale as low as it is now, at all levels,' the supervisor said.

A survey of employees conducted by management in January found that fewer than a third of health system employees think senior managers are 'trustworthy' or have 'a sincere interest in the well-being of employees.' The survey also found that more than half of employees do not think they can voice their opinion without fear of retaliation.

Dr. Richard David, co-director of neonatal intensive care at Stroger Hospital, said doctors were frustrated that Pricewaterhouse consultants had not sought their advice and seemingly ignored opinions offered by medical staff members.

Dr. David said cuts most likely recommended by consultants were interfering with patient care in his unit. He cited calls from other doctors that go unanswered because staff reductions have left only one desk clerk, who also covers another unit.

So it appears that through the miracle of out-sourcing, nominally public hospitals can now be lead by hired executives from commercial firms, whose corporate culture may be more about laissez faire capitalism than serving the poor. 
SSM Health Care

The second NY Times article was about the exit of nuns as leaders of Catholic hospitals and health systems.  In summary,

In 1968, nuns or priests served as chief executives of 770 of the country’s 796 Catholic hospitals, according to the Catholic Health Association. Today, they preside over 8 of 636 hospitals. ... only 8 of 59 Catholic health care systems are directed by religious executives.

The focus of the article was on the retirement of Sister Mary Jean Ryan as CEO of SSM Health Care, (SSM honors Sisters of St. Mary, a predecessor of the Franciscan Sisters of Mary, the Sister's order). Sister Mary Jean Ryan was not a typical hospital system CEO:

her legacy ... extends to preaching about the dignity of patients, paying blue-collar workers above scale, making her hospitals smoke-free, banning the use of foam cups and plastic water bottles, and insisting on gender-neutral and nonviolent language. There are no 'bullet points' in SSM presentations, and photographs are 'enlarged,' never 'blown up.'

Even Sister Mary Jean can struggle to define precisely what the nuns brought to their hospitals. 'There is this thing called presence, she said, explaining that she was trained to see Jesus in the face of every patient....

Also, her leadership:

meant turning away business arrangements with doctors who decline to accept Medicaid. It has meant discounting treatment for the poor and offering charity care to the uninsured, just as the order’s founders did. The St. Louis nuns’ earliest ledgers denoted patients unable to pay as 'Our dear Lord’s.'

But Sister Mary Jean has left, and this, and the general loss of religious leadership of Catholic hospitals and health systems:

has stirred angst in many Catholic hospitals about whether the values imparted by the nuns, concerning the treatment of both patients and employees, can withstand bottom-line forces without their day-to-day vigilance. Although their influence is often described as intangible, the nuns kept their hospitals focused on serving the needy and brought a spiritual reassurance that healing would prevail over profit, authorities on Catholic health care say.

Money is likely to become much more important at SSM:

Mr. William P Thompson, Sister Mary Jean’s handpicked successor, said he planned to hold fast to her commitment to patients, the environment and nonviolence. But he also acknowledged that he would be 'trying to drive more efficiencies in the system.'

One cannot help but wonder if these "efficiencies" will resemble those deployed by the outsourced consultant leadership of Cook County. 

On Private Equity and Catholic Hospitals

Furthermore, there is reason to think that Catholic, non-profit hospitals and health care systems may become even more like commercial firms. An article in HealthLeaders Media about the increasing interest by private equity firms in non-profit hospitals and health care systems noted,

[A] well-publicized deal was the buyout of Massachusetts-based Caritas Christi Health Care, which was a nonprofit, by Cerberus Capital Management. [see our posts here and here] The 2010 sale not only gave Caritas a cash infusion, but altered its tax status to for-profit. These acquisitions moved to center stage the use of private equity capital as a strategic opportunity for healthcare leaders.

For instance, this past February, the nation's largest Catholic health system, Ascension Health, partnered with the Stamford, CT–based private equity firm Oak Hill Capital Partners, embarking on a joint venture to buy Catholic hospitals.

Leo P. Brideau, FACHE, president and CEO of the St. Louis–based Ascension Health Care Network, says the joint venture allows the organization to provide an alternative funding source for the acquisition of Catholic healthcare entities.

Then,

Brideau says seeing other Catholic hospitals financially flounder—only to be sold to non-Catholic entities—aligns with the organization's mission to grow its network of Catholic hospitals. The vision to strengthen Catholic healthcare was another driver for Ascension's partnership with Oak Hill Capital.

However, the article raises further concerns about whether private equity's interest in non-profit, particularly Catholic hospitals will help these institutions' missions.  The thinking of one private equity expert was:

The core goal of a nonprofit hospital or health system is to provide patients with high-quality, cost-effective care, while earning a healthy margin; private equity firms have a different end goal. The general aim of a private equity firm is to achieve a large return on investment in the form of capital gains. How the private equity firm achieves those ends is where hospitals need to do their homework, [managing partner of Linden Capital Partners Brian] Miller says.

Despite what private equity gurus may think, non-profit hospitals' missions never used to make a goal "earning a healthy margin" co-equal with that of taking good care of patients. It does not appear that achieving "a large return on investment" will be compatible with the traditional culture of Catholic hospitals in which "healing would prevail over profit."

Nor does it appear compatible with the recent words of Pope Benedict XVI (as reported by the AP, via the Boston Globe):

'The economy doesn’t function with market self-regulation but needs an ethical reason to work for mankind,' he told reporters traveling aboard the papal plane. 'Man must be at the center of the economy, and the economy cannot be measured only by maximization of profit but rather according to the common good.'

He said the current crisis shows that a moral dimension isn’t 'exterior' to economic problems but 'interior and fundamental.'

Summary

As hospitals and health systems are increasingly lead by people from the world of business, at a time when business culture increasingly believes "greed is good," the fundamental values of hospitals and health care professionals are more often ignored, if not directly threatened. 

To repeat, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

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Being a Non-Profit Hospital CEO Means Never Having to Say You Are Sorry

When my arm was twisted heartily to see the movie "Love Story" a very long time ago, I could never understand why so many audience members sighed upon hearing that immortal line, "love means never having to say you're sorry."  I could not understand it then, and still cannot.

However, it seems that for reasons that are not any more clear, being the CEO of a not-for-profit hospital or hospital system also means never having to say you are sorry, as shown in some recent stories from the media.

Not Sorry for Leaving

Originally published in the Fargo (ND) InForum:

The merger 1½ years ago of Sanford Health and MeritCare created a new entity that doubled in size and covers a service area of more than 130,000 square miles.

But the unified health care giant needed only one top executive, and the departing chief administrator received a $1 million contract buyout, according to documents obtained by The Forum.

Dr. Roger Gilbertson, a neuroradiologist who had served as MeritCare’s top executive since its founding 17 years earlier, received a 'separation payment' provided by his contract of $1,000,920, according to a report Sanford filed with the Internal Revenue Service that recently became available.

Not only did Dr Gilbertson not have to say he was sorry for leaving, he collected what amounted to a million dollar plus bonus just for going out the door.

Not Sorry for Leaving Amidst Financial Losses

A long story in the Atlanta Journal Constitution discussed compensation for a number of Atlanta area hospital and hospital system CEOs.  For example,

Edward Bonn of Southern Regional Health System, which operates Southern Regional Medical Center and two affiliated facilities, made $2,610,175 in fiscal 2009. Bonn left the system that year and received his pay of $421,822 plus $2.2 million from a retirement plan. Hospital CEOs commonly receive extra pay from retirement plans when they leave.

Bonn did not receive a bonus because the hospital system lost $12 million that year, the hospital said.

Mr Bonn apparently did not need to say he was sorry for collecting over $2 million when that amount was equal to about one-sixth of his system's yearly loss.

Not Sorry for Financial Losses Plus a "Culture of Entitlement"

This story was in the Peterborough (NH) Examiner:

Former Peterborough Regional Health Centre CEO Paul Darby was given at least $340,126 plus benefits as a financial package after his retirement in December 2009.


He didn't work a single day or offer a single service in 2010 while earning the second top salary at PRHC, just behind current CEO Ken Tremblay.

'The compensations with Paul were in line with similar arrangements with other CEOs and other public hospitals which include support to the executive following the employment period,' board chairwomen Barb Cameron said. 'It is important that we are able to make transitions between leaders smoothly and these kinds of arrangements with the executive allow us to do that.'

Darby retired before a whirlwind of controversy hit the hospital last year including a scathing peer-review report blaming hospital top brass for a 'culture of entitlement' leading to spiraling, cumulative debt.


When Darby left, the hospital faced a growing deficit of just under $25 million.

He was paid $364,275 in 2009, $310,983 in 2008 and $269,419 in 2007.

At least his severance package was less than one-sixth of the deficit.
Not Sorry for Not Even Revealing One's Salary

Here is a local Rhode Island story reported by WPRI:

The nonprofit group that runs three Rhode Island Hospitals including Women & Infants won’t say whether its new chief executive will receive a seven-figure pay package that matches his predecessor’s.

Care New England tapped Cambridge Health Alliance CEO Dennis Keefe as its new president and CEO this week. He will succeed John Hynes, who is retiring, in August.

Care New England spokeswoman May Kernan said the organization would not release details about Keefe’s compensation. 'Other than complying with public reporting requirements as part of the federal [IRS] 990 forms, we do not disclose personal salary information,' she told WPRI.com in an email.

Hynes’ compensation totaled $1.5 million in 2008-09, up from $873,332 in 2007-08, tax records show.

Note that the hired executives of big for-profit corporations also are increasingly uncomfortable about public discussion of their compensation (see this post).
Where All CEOs Are Above Average

The rationales presented for such apparently exceptional treatment given non-profit hospital CEOs (and other hired health care managers) are those we have heard before.

The most prominent rationale for exceptional treatment of an individual CEO is that he (or rarely she) was such an exceptional leader. This would be more believable if it was not used so often, suggesting that those who defend these leaders, often including the boards of trustees who are supposed to supervise them, believe all hospital CEOs, like the mythical children of Lake Woebegone, are above average.

For example, the InForum article provided this explanation of Dr Gilbertson's compensation:

The only comment Sanford provided The Forum was a statement about Gilbertson’s contributions to MeritCare over his long tenure.

'Dr. Gilbertson’s gift to this region is invaluable – 30 years in medicine and 17 years as President/CEO of MeritCare only glance the surface,' said Andrew Richberg, a Sanford executive vice president. 'His vision for health care integration, medical knowledge and dedication to patients made him a pillar in our industry.'

Gilbertson’s legacy, Richberg added, is 'strong, safe and sustainable health care for all people, in their hometowns, all across the region.'

While the article did not suggest Dr Gilbertson's leadership was poor, it is hard to believe that he alone was responsible for "strong, safe and sustainable health care for all people ... all across the region." I am sure there are many other health care professionals in North Dakota who have worked for many years, and who have a strong vision, good medical knowledge, and dedication to patients.  I am sure almost none got $1 million severance packages.  If health care in North Dakota is really that good, is that not because of a lot of hard work by a lot of health care professionals?

The rationale of exceptional treatment for exceptional individuals would also be more believable if it was not used to defend CEOs whose organization performed poorly under their leadership. For example, in the Peterborough Examiner:

'I would like to acknowledge that these are big salaries, but they are big positions in a large hospital involving large responsibilities and requiring unique skills,' [hospital board of trustees chairwoman] Cameron said,....

Would not having the large responsibility for a large deficit argue against a large severance package?

The Market Made Us Do It

Despite substantial evidence and strong arguments (see here) that health care cannot approach being an ideal free market, another favorite rationale for CEO exceptionalism is that the market made us do it. For example, per the AJC:

The number of people who can manage these facilities is limited and recruitment is competitive, [Georgia Hospital Association President Joseph] Parker said.

Qualified leaders will gravitate to other fields over time if compensation for nonprofit CEOs is decreased, [executive search consulting company Mercer Inc partner Jose] Pagoaga said. The 'substandard leadership' that replaces them will degrade the quality of medical care for the community.

There’s debate on the issue.

It’s hard to believe that people who choose the field of charitable medical care would leave because they make only $800,000 a year instead of $1.5 million, said Mark Rukavina, executive director of the Access Project, a Boston patient advocacy organization.

But Pagoaga said nonprofit hospitals cannot count on their charitable duty to attract and retain the best administrators.

'Yes, it’s a social mission, but this is not the priesthood and these people have not taken a vow of poverty,' he said. 'You can’t discount the views of people that look at this as an altruistic mission and think that pay should therefore be limited. All I’m saying is there is an entirely different point of view based on free-market principles.'

In the real world, of course, poverty would hardly be defined as an income less than $1 million a year. Mr Pagoaga never explicated the point of view based on "free-market principles," but I wonder if it can be summarized as "greed is good?"  It would be interesting to see how Mr Pagoaga could explain how health care is like unto an ideal free market.  

Non-Profit Organizations are Not Very Different from For-Profit

Perhaps the most intriguing argument was found in the AJC article:

Pay in excess of $1 million a year may seem high for an organization subsidized by taxpayers, but hospital executives and industry representatives said the public should think of these hospitals not as charities, but as complex, billion-dollar organizations.

Georgia hospitals report to 27 state and federal agencies and engage in multimillion-dollar building projects. The larger hospital systems have billions in revenue and are among the largest employers in their communities. Many also operate for-profit subsidiaries.

'You can’t lose sight of the fact that it’s not an ice cream shop on the side of the street,' said Joseph Parker, president of the Georgia Hospital Association.

Note that currently US non-profit organizations do not have to report much data on their for-profit subsidiaries.  The above argument suggests they deserve considerably more scrutiny.
Of course, that last explanation begs the question of why the compensation of for-profit hired executives should be even higher, with CEO compensation often well more than two orders of magnitude, that is, hundreds of times higher than that of the lowest paid also hired employees (see this post).

Summary

I submit that non-profit hospitals and hospital systems do have a "social mission," which ought to be upheld by their leadership. Despite the rationales supplied above, the leaders ought to be accountable, which may sometimes mean having to say they are sorry.

As I have repeated endlessly,... health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

What Is to Be Done?

Based on our ever enlarging file of cases on compensation of the top hired managers of non-profit health care organizations, let me make some concrete suggestions, based on my humble opinion.

A step forward would be to make the finances and compensation arrangements of health care non-profit organizations at least as transparent as those of large public for-profit organizations. So my big idea is:

- Non-profit health care organizations above a reasonable threshold size should provide prompt, public, annual reports analogous and very similar to the reports required by the US Securities and Exchange Commission of public, for-profit companies.

These reports should include, at a minimum, a summary of financial and operational status, an audited financial report, an explanation and accounting for any for-profit subsidiaries and any interlocking non-profit organizations, the compensation given to the CEO and some minimum number of the top-paid officers and employees, a detailed explanation and rationale for the pay of these individuals, and a listing of other affiliations and all conflicts of interest affecting them.

If need to supply such information causes non-profit health care organizations' hired executives and boards of trustees some cognitive dissonance, that would be a good thing. 

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Should a "Phenomenal" $1 Million CEO be Accountable for "Errors that Caused Severe Injury or Death?"

A recent story with some local color once again illustrates the cognitive dissonance evoked by current patterns of compensation of health care leaders.

Let me start chronologically.

The Stratospheric Compensation of the CEO, and Its Justification

In 2009, the compensation given to the CEO of the Palomar Pomerado Health, a public health system in the vicinity of San Diego, California, provided some headlines. As reported then by the San Diego Times-Union,

Palomar Pomerado Health CEO Michael Covert has received a 26 percent — or $154,000 — pay raise.

The increase, approved by the hospital district’s board of directors last month, is retroactive to July 1, the beginning of the fiscal year, board Chairman Bruce Krider said.

The increase brought Covert’s pay from $582,000 a year to $736,000 a year.

Not unexpectedly, the hospital system board chair had an explanation:

Krider said Covert has done a 'phenomenal job' of improving the quality of care and charting the district’s future, but is underpaid compared with five California hospitals that generate gross revenues of $357 million to $457 million a year.

By 2010, it was apparent that Mr Covert's compensation was even larger than it appeared above. As reported then by the San Diego Times-Union:

The top official at Palomar Pomerado Health, a public agency serving health-care needs in Poway and Escondido, receives in excess of $1 million in compensation per year.


Michael Covert, who has run the North County hospital district since 2003, receives a base salary of $736,000 a year. Retirement, bonuses and other benefits push Covert’s total pay past $1.1 million.

The compensation package is in the median range of his private and nonprofit counterparts and places Covert among the elite among public employees.

At that point, the system's board chairman gave a similar justification:

Bruce Krider, the health-care district chairman, said Covert does an excellent job managing a complex enterprise that includes two major hospitals. Covert juggles the interests of staff, physicians, patients, volunteers, board members and other stakeholders, he said.

'A million dollars sounds pretty good to anybody, but my view is, pay a lot and expect a lot,' said Krider, a management consultant who also is a former hospital executive. 'You can’t have some mediocre public servant. You need somebody that has got vision, that can see the issues that are most important and put it all together.'

Later in 2010, when it turned out that Mr Covert was the second most highly paid government official in California (and the most highly paid official was facing criminal charges), the Times-Union reported:

'We have to compete for talent with all of the for-profit and nonprofit health systems,' said Theodore Kleiter, a former hospital administrator who is now chairman of the Palomar Pomerado Health board of directors. 'If you want the top management, that’s what you have to pay.'

Kleiter said Covert is one of the nation’s leading health care administrators and noted only 3 percent of the district’s $480 million budget comes from taxpayers.

'The people in our area expect the best and we’re trying to provide that,' Kleiter said

Also, per the Los Angelest Times a few weeks later:

Officials at the hospital strongly defended his pay.

"There's this notion that because you're a public agency you should hire less-talented people than private companies, and if we followed that idea, PPH would not be where it is today," hospital spokesman Andy Hoang said. "We must compete for the best physicians, nurses and executives to provide the highest level of care. The community deserves that."

So, do we see a pattern here? According to one board chairman, Mr Covert had "vision," was doing an "excellent job," a "phenomenal job."  Furthermore, the chairman gave Mr Covert credit, apparently sole credit, for improving quality of care within the system, and noted how he was responsible apparently for all that was done by everyone who worked in or was associated with the hospital.  That board chairman was a "management consultant", and "former hospital executive."  The next chairman thought Mr Covert was "top management." and one of "the nation's health care administrators."  That chairman was "a former hospital administrator."  Finally, a paid hospital spokesman insisted Mr Covert is one of the "best executives."

Celebrity Endorsements and Fines for Medical Errors

On the other hand, once more reported by the Times-Union, some community residents, including hospital nurses, were not convinced that Mr Covert's performance was so unequivocally brilliant:

More than 200 community residents signed petitions raising questions about the salary paid to the chief executive at Palomar Pomerado Health and other business practices at the medical organization.

'Your highest priorities should be improving the health of our residents ... Out of control executive pay, costly celebrity spokespeople endorsements and out-of-district clinics (are) a waste of public funds,' the petition states.

The signatures were collected by nurses concerned about the compensation package and other issues over the past months.

By the way, concerning the issue of celebrity endorsements:

The district signed former San Diego Chargers running back LaDainian Tomlinson to a $2 million promotional contract before he signed with the New York Jets, a marketing plan that was criticized by some employees.

And this week, there was more reason to think that all is not so "phenomenal" at Palomar Pomerado.

The San Diego Union-Tribune just reported about California hospitals fined by the state for serious errors affecting patient care. 

Five San Diego County hospitals were fined a total of $300,000 for errors that caused serious injury or death to patients, state regulators announced Thursday.

The penalties were levied for leaving a retractor inside one patient and a 28-inch guide wire inside another after surgery, giving two deadly drug overdoses, and leaving a patient unattended who fell and then died from a fractured skull.

Palomar Medical Center in Escondido, Pomerado Hospital in Poway and Scripps Memorial Hospital in La Jolla were each fined $75,000, the highest fines among 12 California hospitals penalized by the state on Thursday. All three had been cited at least twice before, prompting the higher penalty.

Note that the previous citations came in 2010, the year in which Mr Covert's compensation exceeded $1 million.
Of course, medical errors are unfortunately not rare. I suspect that while we may be able to reduce them, they cannot always be avoided. I do not mean to condemn these hospitals, nor the people who work there.

In one sense, it would be silly to expect Palomar Pomerado Health to be perfect, for errors and mistakes never to be made there. It also would be silly to blame the system's CEO for everything that went wrong there.  It would be silly, except that the justifications given for the comparatively stratospheric compensation given to the CEO of this government funded health care organization implied that he was nearly perfect, and he was responsible for all the good that went on within the organization.

Summary

So here again we see an example of a health care leader who is nearly god-like, is responsible for all the wonderful things that his organization does, and is therefore worthy of pay sufficient to make him rich, at least according to the board of directors to whom he is supposed to report.  On the other hand, there seems to be no real evidence of the CEO's near divinity, and if he is supposed to be responsible for all the wonderful things his organization does, he also ought to be responsible for its errors and mistakes. 

In fact, comparatively high executive compensation justified by hyperbole seems more likely to indicate a board that is not sufficiently independent to exert stewardship than an executive who is truly exceptionally brilliant.  Lack of such stewardship, in turn, may lead to lack of executive accountability and hence poor rather than brilliant outcomes for the health care organization. 

So here is the latest example of CEO disease.  As it becomes more prevalent, health care leadership becomes more disconnected, unaccountable, and self-interested.  The increasing prevalence of CEO disease in health care may explain why costs keep increasing, access keeps declining, and quality and safety are stagnant.


As I have said before,.... health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

 If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.


We need to launch a crash program to prevent CEO disease and cure existing cases, before it kills off our health care system.

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How Large Health Care Organizations Set the "Rules of the Game" to Dominate Health Care

The notion that health care is increasingly "dominated by large, bureaucratic organizations which do not honor ... [its] core values"(1) just made it into a main-stream, large circulation US medical journal.  A brand new commentary in the American Journal of Medicine(2) by Supri and Malone declared:

To explain why we have the most expensive health care system in the world and yet one of the lowest performing, we need to take a perspective that focuses on the US institution of medicine as a whole. We expose the hidden rules by which this institution operates and discuss how its powerful organizations shape, control and perpetuate this ailing system.

The article then described the main types of large, powerful health care organizations:

The US institution of medicine is not a single, comprehensive and cohesive system of health care. Instead, it is comprised of a myriad of large and powerful organizations, including insurance companies, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), corporate for-profit hospital chains, and pharmaceutical companies. This institutional structure is large and vast, and has over the years become ever more labyrinthine.

Note that there are even more kinds of large and powerful health care organizations, including non-profit hospitals and hospital systems, employers acting as payers for health care, government agencies, device and biotechnology companies, health care information technology companies, public relations firms, medical education and communication companies, contract research organizations, professional societies, patient advocacy groups, accrediting bodies, health care charities, etc, etc, etc.  But the point is that the large organizations, not the patients, the physicians, nor the public dominate.

Supri and Malone suggested that each kind of organization sets the "rules of the game," that is, the priorities important to the organization, which are very different from the core values that many of us believe ought to guide health care:

Not only is the institutional structure large, it is dynamic, and actively creates, shapes, and maintains the institution of medicine. It does this through what we call setting the “rules of the game”; that is, by imposing the terms by which the system operates.

For example,

Insurance companies have set the rule 'restrict choice and coverage.' They enact this through their elaborate system of copayments and deductibles, exclusion clauses and loopholes, each designed to deter patients from claiming the health care they need, and to override physicians' medical judgment.

Similarly, it cited the rules for managed care, "manage care," that is, "restrict utilization of health care" regardless of patients' needs; the pharmaceutical industry, "charges as much as we want, because insurance will pay;" and "corporate hospital chains ... test as much as we want, because insurance will pay." Thus it made the point that US health care now is driven by the priorities of large organizations whose interests at best may disregard and at worst may conflict with providing the best possible care for individual patients.

Further, the resulting complexity is to the benefit of the large organizations:

As each organization has created its own 'rules of the game,' the institution of medicine has grown into a complex entity that few really understand. This very complexity actually works to the advantage of the organizations that comprise the system, creating an operating environment that allows them to siphon off billions of dollars. It is one of the main reasons why the cost of health care has spiraled out of control.

This is very important, and suggests that the system will just become more bureaucratic, complex and opaque until it finally collapses.

Finally, it raised the point that the organizations collude to promote their priorities at the expense of patients' and the public's health:

Although each organization sets their 'own rules of the game,' they are also strongly and deeply interlinked, and cooperate and collaborate to protect the system of health care that they have devised, so that it remains intact and continues to serve their own interests.

Although  Supri and Malone did not differentiate the leadership of large organizations from the organizations themselves, we have pointed out that the top leaders of various kinds of organizations seem to think alike, becoming a sort of de facto executives' guild, with a "superclass" of oligarchs at its pinnacle.  The guild may be enabled by these leaders' often huge compensation and other benefits and corporate arrangements that keep them shielded from the vicissitudes of daily life that patients, health care professionals, and lower level organizational employees must face.  Furthermore, the leadership of these organizations is often interlinked, for example, by leaders of one organization serving on boards of directors or trustees of others.

It is so nice for us at Health Care Renewal to have some company. It is a very important blow to the anechoic effect for these sorts of views to appear in a mainstream medical journal.

When I interviewed a motley group of physicians and health care professionals in the early part of the 21st century, many expressed concerns about how medicine had been taken over by large organizations which did not honor its values. The article published in 2003(1) in Europe which tried to summarize their concerns probably could not have been published at that time in the US, but its publication remote from its main topic only made it more anechoic. It may be that an article published in a respected American journal will generate some more echoes. Here is hoping that Health Care Renewal can help create some such echoes. 

Obviously, those who lead large organizations in health care will not be happy about that, so it is possible this article's appearance in a main-stream journal may incite some pushback, perhaps generated by the public relations machines of the large health care organizations (see this post about how Wendell Potter's excellent Deadly Spin documented how large organizations use propaganda and disinformation to undermine viewpoints that threaten their domination.)

In conclusion, I strongly support Supri and Malone's final sentiments:

The sum of the 'rules of the game' devised by these organizations has resulted in a fragmented, haphazard and broken system of health care. Reform is long overdue, and demands root and branch transformation of the 'rules of the game' governing the US institution of medicine. This requires us to understand these rules, who is setting them, and how these rules are being used to exploit the system of medicine. Only then can we begin to heal our ailing health care system.

Well said!

But now almost 8 years since the publication of "A Cautionary Tale," we still have a long way to go.

References


1.  Poses RM. A cautionary tale: the dysfunction of American health care.  Eur J Inte Med 2003; 14: 123-130.  Link here.
2.  Supri S, Malone K. On the critical list: the US institution of medicine. Am J Med 2011; 124: 192-193.  Link here. 

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Why Weren't Existing Laws About Hospital CEO Compensation Enforced in Washington State?

Public radio station KUOW reported on the generous compensation given hospital CEOs in Washington:

KUOW has learned that 15 hospital executives in Washington made $1 million or more in 2009. That elite group includes 14 nonprofit executives and one head of a government hospital. CEOs at Multicare, Providence, Virginia Mason and Valley Medical each made more than $2 million.

Those numbers can be found in the hospitals' latest tax filings and other public records. The pattern was more lopsided in the two prior years. Nobody working at a public hospital cracked the top 10 list of the state's highest hospital paychecks in 2007 or 2008.

But then the story takes an interesting twist:

Most of Washington's largest hospitals are nonprofit organizations. The state gives the nonprofits a break on their business taxes to help reduce the cost of health care.

The hospitals have to jump through some hoops to qualify for the reduced taxes. For one thing, state law limits how much the hospitals can pay their executives. Their pay has to be comparable to what public servants in Washington make in similar jobs — or else no break on their B&O taxes.

Somehow everyone seems to have forgotten about this part of the law:

The limit on executive pay has been on the law books for 30 years.

Gowrylow: 'Frankly, I don't think it's something that's been on our radar since the mid–80s.'

Mike Gowrylow is a spokesman for the Washington Department of Revenue. He says the recent million–dollar incomes were news to the department.

Gowrylow: 'But it's certainly something that I think we need to take a look at again and examine whether these nonprofits are paying their executives excessively or not.'

Gowrylow says the agency only audits 2 or 3 percent of tax returns. It mostly relies on businesses to comply voluntarily with the state's tax laws.

Gowrylow: 'We can't be everywhere. If we become aware of a nonprofit or any other business that's underreporting their taxes, we investigate those complaints, and if tax is due, we will assess it.'

He says the agency can recover back taxes for the past four years, along with penalties and interest.

Although the article cited an unsuccessful legal action to enforce the law in a particular case in 1986, why the state government seemed to forget about it after that is unclear, and maybe deserving of further investigation.
Right  now, hospital management seems to be trying to avoid the issue, or is arguing about the meaning of "comparable,"

Several present day hospital officials declined to be interviewed on tape. They told KUOW they believe they are in compliance with the state law. But they generally provided little detail to back up that claim.

Providence and Group Health representatives both said their organizations are so large and complex that there may not be any comparable public service jobs in Washington.

Swedish spokeswoman Melissa Tizon told me that CEO Rodney Hochman's pay was generally comparable to what the highest paid public hospital executives made, at Valley and Evergreen hospitals.

On the other hand,

Harborview is the state's largest hospital. Eileen Whalen is its head and an employee of the University of Washington. She makes about $470,000.

[State Senator Karen] Keiser: 'That's really not comparable to the million dollar and more salaries of other hospital directors in our state. We are paying attention here in Olympia to that.'

Other executives at UW Medicine did make more than Whalen. Still, none of them, not even the president of UW, made as much as any of the 15 highest paid executives at nonprofit hospitals in 2009.

I searched high and low to find any public officials making as much as the top nonprofit CEOs.

The only one I found who consistently did so was the UW football coach. But it might be hard to argue that Steve Sarkisian's job is comparable to running a hospital system.

We have discussed numerous cases of executives of not-for-profit hospitals and hospital systems receiving lavish compensation and benefits that seem out of proportion to any reasonable measure of their performance or of their positions' difficulties.  (Remember that advocates of corpulent executive compensation love to cite the size of the company and the number of employees, but the CEO really has only to manage the next tier of executives, rarely numbering more than a dozen.)

As we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

However, the twist in this story is that it appears the lavish compensation of hospital executives in this particular state may have violated state law, or at least the tax breaks these hospitals got may have violated the law, given their leaders excessive compensation, and that the law in question is over 30 years old.  However, the law seems to have been forgotten or ignored for nearly all that time, for reasons that are unclear. 

This seems reminiscent of how the Responsible Corporate Officers' Doctrine seems to have been forgotten and ignored.  this post from June, 2010).  However, in the last 30+ years, this notion has been ignored and abandoned by US government regulators at least in so far as it applies to health care organizations, particularly drug, biotechnology and device companies.

The big question is why have such laws and legal practices, which have not been repealed or refuted, instead been ignored and forgotten?  Surely this cries out for investigation.

Of course, It seems that somehow in the brave new world of laissez faire, anything goes capitalism foisted on health care over the last 30 plus years, old practices and customs that limited the power and enrichment of top leaders may have seemed increasingly prudish, and those advocating them may have seemed to be old fuddy duddies to those bent on personal gain.  But unhipness and scorn of prudishness are not reasons to ignore an existing law. 

So it is not that there are no legal tools to prevent abuses by leaders of health care organizations.  Instead, there has been increasing forgetfulness of the existence of such tools, and perhaps a growing effeteness of enforcement that has lead to a reluctance to even try to use them.  So we can start truly reforming health care by simply enforcing the laws that are already there. 
  

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ACO = Arrogant Clinical or Aggressive Care Oligopoly?

In the 1970s, it was managed care organizations.  In the 1990s, it was vertically integrated health care systems.  In the 2010s, the fashionable concept for improving health care, apparently beloved by left-wing policy wonks and right-wing health care executives is the "accountable care organization." (ACO).  Development of the ACO is funded by the recently passed US health care reform legislation.  The official definition of ACO from the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services is: 

An Accountable Care Organization, also called an 'ACO' for short, is an organization of health care providers that agrees to be accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare beneficiaries who are enrolled in the traditional fee-for-service program who are assigned to it.

Oddly enough, that seems like it could also describe a 1970s managed care organization, or a 1990s vertically integrated health care system. The only real difference is the idea that the ACO would be paid fees for service. All these similar concepts embody the notion that health care needs to be highly organized into big, bureaucratic organizations to improve quality and access while controlling costs.

Back in August, we warned:

There seems to be a strange and increasing alliance between politically- correct academic theorists and proponents of raw economic power. The theorists' notion of "accountable care organizations" seems to have become a great foil for would-be monopolists, yet the theorists have done nothing to show how their creation would really bring "power to the people." Meanwhile, maybe 'ACO' should stand for 'aggressive care oligopoly.' Meanwhile, be extremely skeptical of the latest health care fad, especially when it is supported both by academics and CEOs.

I am not sure you really heard it here first, but you did hear it here early. Now, three months later, our doubts have become main-stream.

Revisiting Sutter Health

n California, National Public Radio continued to document the increasing market dominance of the Sutter Health system (which we discussed in August here) as it marches toward becoming an ACO:

Through new construction and expanding its doctors' groups, Sutter Health is enhancing its position as one of the most dominant hospital systems in California. In addition, Sutter is further ahead of many competitors in fashioning itself into a so-called accountable care organization, responsible for coordinating care between hospitals, specialists and primary doctors.

A companion article gave examples of how this emerging ACO is becoming increasingly oligoplistic:

Hospital prices in the Sacramento region are among the highest in California, driven in large part by the negotiating clout of the hospital chain Sutter Health.

Over the last decade and a half, Sutter has gradually accumulated hospitals and amassed a roster of doctors who contract exclusively with the company. Sutter is now one of the largest hospital chains in California with 24 acute care hospitals.

'In this Roseville market, which is a big suburban area, the hospital is Sutter,' says John Murray, a veteran insurance broker. 'It's a lock right now. Because Sutter dominates the market, major insurance companies, like Blue Cross and Aetna, can't sell policies that exclude Sutter hospitals and doctors. That dependence means the hospital chain can dictate high prices.'

Concerns about Sutter's market dominance are also increasing:

'As Sutter gets bigger,' says Anthony Wright, executive director of Health Access California, a nonprofit advocacy group based in Sacramento, 'it can dictate higher prices and is less accountable for ensuring good quality because it has a lock on certain markets.'

Doubts in the New York Times

In the New York Times, Robert Pear reported:

When Congress passed the health care law, it envisioned doctors and hospitals joining forces, coordinating care and holding down costs, with the prospect of earning government bonuses for controlling costs.

Now, eight months into the new law there is a growing frenzy of mergers involving hospitals, clinics and doctor groups eager to share costs and savings, and cash in on the incentives. They, in turn, have deployed a small army of lawyers and lobbyists trying to persuade the Obama administration to relax or waive a body of older laws intended to thwart health care monopolies, and to protect against shoddy care and fraudulent billing of patients or Medicare.

Consumer advocates fear that the health care law could worsen some of the very problems it was meant to solve — by reducing competition, driving up costs and creating incentives for doctors and hospitals to stint on care, in order to retain their cost-saving bonuses.

'The new law is already encouraging a wave of mergers, joint ventures and alliances in the health care industry,' said Prof. Thomas L. Greaney, an expert on health and antitrust law at St. Louis University. 'The risk that dominant providers and dominant insurers may exercise their market power, individually or jointly, has never been greater.'

Skeptical Liberals and Libertarians
Amazingly, while ACOs seem to be supported by many left-wing policy wonks and right-wing health care executives, they have also rapidly engendered skepticism from both liberals on the left and libertarians on the right, and from within government and the private sector. For example, at the end of the NY Times article we find:

Dr. Donald M. Berwick, the administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, hails the benefits of 'integrated care.' But, Dr. Berwick said, “we need to assure both patients and society at large that destructive, exploitative and costly forms of collusion and monopolistic behaviors do not emerge and thrive, disguised as cooperation.”

Dr Berwick is a well-known advocate of innovative approaches to improve the quality of care, but was tarred as a raving left-winger when he was nominated to his current position.

On the other hand, in the New York Post was an op-ed by Dr Scott Gottlieb:

I warned that the creation of 'accountable care organizations,' which put hospitals in control of all the doctors in their outlying areas, would lead to concentrated power over the provision of medical care -- turning physicians into salaried employees and reducing consumer choices.

Furthermore, he wrote:

Since the ACOs will have local monopolies, they'll also have little incentive to compete for more patients in an open marketplace. Yet this is the only incentive that would spur an ACO to truly innovate and improve its delivery of medical care and offer better services.

Private health plans vie to contract with the best doctors and hospitals, creating market prices for services and competition to improve outcomes. If the ACOs squeeze out this competition, the result will be a de facto 'single payer': Every market will be controlled by a single ACO,....

Dr Gottlieb writes frequently about health care and policy issues, and is a "resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute."

Missing the Main Point: Doctors vs Business Executives as Leaders
At least it did not take long this time for the fundamental flaws in the latest fashionable health care reform effort to get attention. It is really striking that this time around, skepticism is coming from both liberals and libertarians.  Maybe we all have learned something from the failures of managed care and of vertically integrated hospital systems.

A Washington Post op-ed by Steven Pearlstein hinted at one fundamental problem with the ACO concept.

Most reformers believe ...that the best way to deliver affordable quality care is through organizations such as the Mayo Clinic, which coordinate physician and hospital services under one roof and are paid not on the basis of how many procedures they do but on the quality of the care they provide. These organizations tend to rely on salaried doctors, make extensive use of electronic medical records and evidence-based 'best practices,' and, in effect, take on much of the risk traditionally borne by insurers. Several provisions of the new health-care reform law encourage the formation of such 'accountable care organizations.'

Somehow, however, the supposed health care reformers seemed to have overlooked a crucial fact about the Mayo Clinic they are using as a model. The Mayo Clinic traditionally was basically a large physician group practice. It was run by physicians. Even now, the Mayo Clinic's CEO is a physician (Dr John H. Noseworthy) who had a substantial clinical and academic career. The CAO is a nurse, and the three top Vice Presidents are physicians.  I submit the fact that the organization was run by physicians, physicians who once swore to put their patients' clinical care ahead of all other considerations, was crucial to the Clinic's success in taking care of patients as well as maintaining its finances.

However, nearly all of the would-be ACOs we hear about now are centered on big hospital systems, run by business executives who have never taken care of patients, and never swore to put patient care ahead of anything. For example, the most advanced degree possessed by the CEO of Sutter Health is a Master's in Health Administration (see here). Sutter Health does not make biographical information about its top executives particularly easy to find, but according to the most recent (2008) 990 form posted on Guidestar, of its 19 top executives, only 2 had MD degrees. As we have seen time and again on Health Care Renewal, such executives have become extremely good at becoming rich in their jobs. (For example, according to the 2008 990 form, of those 19 executives, all had total compensation greater than $200,000, 16 had compensation greater than $500,000, and 9 had compensation greater than $1 million.) When things go wrong, these royally paid executives may take their golden parachutes and open the exit door, and jump on the slide.

The advent of ACOs reminds me of the advent of managed care. The original managed care organizations, exemplified by Kaiser - Permanante, were also not-for-profit large group practices run by physicians. However, the "managed care organizations" that evolved out of the 1970s law, favored by our glorious former President Nixon, were for-profit corporations run by business executives. Somehow, when legislators seek to promote better health care, the legislation they right often get the crucial details wrong.

The one good thing about ACOs seems to be that they have galvanized liberals and libertarians alike to worry about big, collective, bureaucratic health care organizations run by executives with no clear commitment to putting care of individual patients first.

ADDENDUM (26 November, 2010) - See also comments by David Williams on the Health Business Blog.

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About to be Bought-Out Non-Profit Hospital System Tries to Hide Executives' Golden Parachutes

A report from FloridaToday (in Brevard County) about the sale of a not-for-profit Florida hospital system to a for-profit corporation raises some interesting questions. The background is that the non-profit Wuesthoff Health System was bought by for-profit Health Management Associates (HMA):

HMA, a for-profit hospital management company in Naples, bought the not-for-profit Wuesthoff Oct. 1 for $145 million. Wuesthoff lawyer William Kopit has said it was forced to sell because the hospital system lacked the capital to compete.

The question is about the conditions of the sale:

A foundation formed to manage the proceeds of the sale and continue providing indigent health care has refused to disclose the executive packages to the state, claiming it constitutes a trade-secret exemption under Florida law.

This was despite the state Attorney General's authority to oversee sales of charitable non-profit organizations to for-profit entities:

Under its statutory obligation to oversee charities registered in the state, the Attorney General's Office requested the executive pay information from Wuesthoff, Wiggins said. Wuesthoff's lawyers submitted 40 pages of heavily redacted material. Negotiations led to Wuesthoff agreeing to redact only the names and compensation details of the executives.

The materials submitted suggested a lot of executives getting golden parachutes, but not the amounts or conditions involved:

The unredacted portions show as many as eight former executives receiving three years of salary paid out over 12 months, a pay-to-stay retention bonus for continuing to work for the company during sale discussions, a senior executive retirement package and regular retirement pay and extended health benefits. Based on Wuesthoff's tax returns, those payouts will be in the millions.

So, legal action will ensue:

'Therefore we will look to the court for guidance and abide by any judicial ruling on the public record and trade secret issues,' said Ryan Wiggins, communications director for the attorney general.

The notion that how much a for-profit corporation will pay in golden parachutes to former executives of a not-for-profit hospital system is a "trade secret" just boggles the mind.  What could a competitor possibly gain from this information that could lead to specific action that would disadvantage Wuesthoff?

On the other hand, it might be that the size of these golden parachutes, if revealed, would lead to some raised eyebrows, or worse.  Consider first the contrast between payments made and to be made to fortunate executives and the performance of the health care system. 

Note that what is available on the public record (via the hospital system's latest available, that is, 2008 form 990 disclosures to the US Internal Revenue Service) suggests that in the past, Wuesthoff executives were already quite well-paid. On that form we found the following total compensation reported:
Emil Miller, President: $927,543 ($523,069. compensation; $342,130, benefits; $62,344, benefits)
Brian Bodi, Controller: $184,789
George Fayer, CFO: $439,580
Johnette Gindling, Senior Vice President: $236,975
Marchita Marino, Senior Vice President: $264,529

Nearly a million dollars was a lot of compensation for the CEO of a small, non-profit hospital system in 2007.  Although there is no easily publicly available information about executive compensation since 2007 (the year covered by the 2008 report noted above), these high rates of compensation were paid by a hospital system that now apparently has so little capital that it no longer can "compete" without being bought by a for-profit corporation.   Now the executives who could not amass a competitive amount of capital will amass quite a sizable amount of personal riches.

Consider second the contrast between the extraordinary assertion that these golden parachutes should remain secret, and the hospital system's stated interest in "transparency," or its stated devotion to "five core values that drive our hospital and its mission: integrity, courtesy, compassion, competence and stewardship." It seems that preventing embarrassment about executive enrichment may trump transparency and integrity.

Health care, probably infected by the finance industry that brought us the global financial collapse, aka "great recession," seems to have been overcome by "compensation madness."  A central value of many health care organizations seems to be enriching their top leaders/ managers/ executives, no matter what the financial condition of the organization, or the performance of the leaders in terms of fulfilling the organization's mission.  From these perverse incentives, the perverse incentives favoring short-term financial performance over patient care seem to have sprung.  As Prof Mintzberg wrote, "All this compensation madness is not about markets or talents or incentives, but rather about insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit."

If we truly want health reform that addresses spiraling costs, declining access, and threatened quality of care, we need to give health care practitioners and leaders positive incentives for being caring, competent, well-informed, and honest, not for clever financial manipulation and short-term profits, or just for managing to show up for work.

ADDENDUM (2 December, 2010) - 4 days after the above post, Florida Today reported that details about the golden parachutes were released:

[Emil] Miller, who ran Wuesthoff for more than a decade, received $6.25 million total. Of that, $2.2 million was severance pay and $3.2 million was retirement pay. The balance was the cost of his employee benefits.

Former CFO George Fayer has the next highest exit pay at $973,000, which includes a $171,000 for staying through the sale and transition. Fayer is a consultant to the foundation, Gindling said.

Chantal LeConte, who ran the Rockledge hospital, received the third highest payout, $553,000. LeConte's package included about $138,000 for staying through the transition.

Given that the health system was merged out of existence because it supposedly no longer had enough capital to "compete," now we see why system leaders were so reluctant to reveal the amounts.

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More on Hospital Market Dominance, Enabled by Secret Pricing

This week two more articles appeared describing how large hospital systems use market dominance to charge more.  Naturally, both were in news publications, not scholarly health services research journals.

San Francisco

Kaiser Health News (via the Contra Costa [CA] Times) discussed hospital market dominance in the San Francisco area.  The article documented how particular systems can command higher prices. Consider the example of John Muir Health vs San Ramon Medical Center:

Often, a hospital's dominance in an area helps determine how much it can charge, experts say. Consider John Muir Health, a two-hospital nonprofit system in the East Bay. With campuses in Concord and Walnut Creek, John Muir has the biggest footprint in the local hospital market, accounting for 54 percent of all the acute care inpatient stays in 2009, more than any other hospital group, according to state data.

The hospital with the weakest market penetration is San Ramon Medical Center, a Tenet-owned, for-profit hospital, with 10 percent of the acute care inpatients.

The least the insurer Aetna paid John Muir for an outpatient colonoscopy was $3,185, according to Aetna's website, which tracks two years of payments. Aetna paid $1,483 to San Ramon Regional Medical Center for the same service. The least Aetna paid John Muir for an uncomplicated birth was $7,722, while its lowest price for a birth at San Ramon was $5,278.

Yet on broad quality measures, John Muir's hospitals generally score no better than San Ramon's, according to the California Hospitals and Reporting Taskforce, a nonprofit that produces hospital report cards published at Calhospitalcompare.org.

San Ramon ranks equal to John Muir's Walnut Creek campus in most major measures, including mortality rates in the intensive care units, overall patient satisfaction and maternity care. John Muir's Concord campus ranks below San Ramon on several measures, including mortality rate and patient experience, though John Muir was rated better in avoiding complications for patients on ventilators.

Then there is Sutter Health:

[Stanford University associate vice president for Benefits Les] Schlaegel says so many employees like to see doctors at the Palo Alto Medical Foundation, a doctors' organization affiliated with Sutter with a clinic near the Stanford campus, that the university feels obliged to keep offering insurance networks that include Sutter.

'Sutter basically has a stranglehold on Northern California,' says Schlaegel. 'They are strategically situated, both for hospitals and medical groups. They know purchasers need them. When you are strategically located, you can say 'this is our price and you can pay it.''

Secret Pricing
The ability of dominant hospitals to charge higher prices is facilitated by secrecy in which hospital pricing is cloaked

The hospitals haven't made it easy for consumers to comparison shop. State law requires hospitals to reveal their charges for specific services. But those charges don't reflect the lower negotiated rates insurers actually pay - rates hospitals usually insist be kept secret. The California Hospital Association has opposed legislation to ban such 'gag clauses'; the most recent of these bills died in the state Assembly in August.

Hospitals have also resisted a four-year campaign by the Pacific Business Group on Health, an employer coalition, and CalPERS to create a 'hospital value initiative' that would allow hospital comparison based on cost and quality of care.

Summary

In many cases, hospitals are able to keep raising prices beyond inflation because their sizes or reputations give them clout in negotiating rates with insurers, researchers say. Yet high prices don't always equate with superior care.

Quality measures for some of the Bay Area's most prestigious hospitals, including Stanford and John Muir, show that in some instances, less expensive competitors perform as well or better in their basic responsibilities, such as avoiding infections and high death rates for patients in intensive care.

'Some hospitals are able to charge higher prices than the market normally would bear, even without providing higher quality,' says Dr. R. Adams Dudley, a professor of medicine and health policy at the University of California, San Francisco. 'That means they're getting those higher prices without really offering more to patients or the rest of society.'

New York City


Meanwhile, a long feature story in New York magazine about the demise of St Vincent's hospital (see our post here) also discussed the market power of its competitors as one factor in its decline:

The city’s largest and most powerful hospitals, which are crucial to an insurer’s customers, exert their leverage to secure deals that are believed to pay well above the average margin; smaller hospitals, which are often located in low-income neighborhoods, have little choice but to accept the dismal rates dictated by insurers if they want to remain in the insurers’ plans. 'When the big players take their cut, there are only scraps left for everyone else,' says the CEO of an outer-borough hospital. “'United HealthCare couldn’t care less about having my hospital in their network. They tell me to take it or leave it.

Secret Prices

Like in California, market dominance is enabled by secret pricing:

the rates negotiated between hospitals and insurance providers are withheld from public scrutiny—even state health and insurance regulators are denied the information

Free Markets?

Secret prices determined by market power hardly sound like characteristics of a free market. Yet in New York, at least, they seem partially to be the result of the free market ideology of previous political leaders:

Then George Pataki took office in 1995, determined to allow hospitals to test their mettle in the free market by negotiating their own terms with insurers. It turned out to be an exercise in shock-therapy capitalism. Inexperienced at the bargaining table, hospitals engaged in intramural rivalry with each other, cutting unfavorable deals with insurers in order to hold on to patients in the short term. With their already thin margins pared down further by deregulation, many hospitals soon built up paralyzing debt loads. Even the largest and seemingly least vulnerable facilities decided that their best hope for survival was to get bigger. A flurry of mergers and buyouts ensued, and by the end of the nineties, the hospital system began to assume its current bewildering patchwork of partnerships and affiliations. Columbia Presbyterian and New York Hospital, both attached to elite medical schools, joined forces. NYU and Mount Sinai forged a deal (it later came undone). On the eastern edge of the city, North Shore hospitals merged with nearby Long Island Jewish, staking out an enormous swath of the hospital market on Long Island, Queens, and Staten Island. Beth Israel and St. Luke’s–Roosevelt, debt-ridden and left on the sidelines by the major academic hospitals, decided to try making a go of it together. It was unclear if bigger was actually better—for patients or the bottom line—but size seemed to offer hospitals a buffer against collapse.

By 2005, less than a decade into its dalliance with free enterprise, the city’s hospital system had taken on something of a post-Soviet tinge, with winners ruling the roost like oligarchs and losers reduced to a state of grim dependency. A pecking order emerged, with elite academic centers at the top, well-regarded independent hospitals like Lenox Hill in the middle, and community hospitals on the bottom.

Summary

We have previously written (for example, here and here) about how increasing market dominance by large, sometimes strategically located, and sometimes politically well-connected (e.g., see here) hospital systems run by conflicted leaders. This seems like another unintended consequence of the "free markets solve all problems" ideology, possibly fueled by conflicts of interest that has done so badly in our financial arena (see here). What some of these free market enthusiasts seem to forget, their forgetfulness perhaps fueled by payments received from the large corporations that have profited from this movement, are that true free markets are hard to maintain. This is particularly so in health care, in which knowledge is asymetric, outcomes are uncertain, and sick and anxious patients have trouble making cool, rational choices (as per Arrow, see this post.)

But if the free market enthusiasts really believe in free markets, why have they not been out campaigning to prevent the "unfree" characteristics, like secret pricing, of current health care markets?  Of course, ending secret pricing might compromise the ability of their financial sponsors to keep earning their millions

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Health Care Leaders in Maine Fail to Learn from Past Experience

From down east Maine comes a telling story about the problems of contemporary health care leadership.  I assembled this case from three articles by Meg Haskell in the Bangor Daily News, links are below. (1-3)

Complaints About the CEO's Clinical Policies

The story begins with complaints about clinical policies instituted by the CEO of Acadia Hospital.

[Acadia CEO David] Proffitt has come under fire in recent weeks from current and former Acadia Hospital employees who say the incidence and severity of staff injuries have risen since he initiated a policy that essentially eliminates the use of mechanical and physical restraints with mentally ill patients who become violent. (2)

The concerns were raised with government agencies:

Since the end of July, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration has been conducting an on-site investigation into employee complaints of unsafe working conditions at Acadia. The state Department of Health and Human Services also recently has investigated conditions at Acadia, with a report due later this month. (2)

Furthermore,

The OSHA investigation was triggered earlier this summer by a complaint filed with the agency alleging an increase in patient assaults on staff after Proffitt implemented stricter standards against the use of mechanical and physical restraints, even when patients turn violent.(3)

Loss of Experienced Clinicians

There were also concerns that Mr Proffitt presided over the loss of experienced clinicians who were replaced by those with less experience

Employees also have alleged that Proffitt has fired or pushed out a number of clinical leaders at Acadia, including former Vice President for Medical Affairs Dr. Paul Tisher and former Chief Nursing Officer April Giard. They have criticized his replacements as lacking expertise in psychiatric care.(3)

Lack of Clinical Experience or Training, Questionable Educational Credentials

Given his direct involvement in clinical decision making, it surprising that Mr Proffitt has no clinical training or experience:

Proffitt’s academic qualifications also have been questioned.

Proffitt’s education includes a 1984 bachelor’s degree in therapeutic recreation from the University of Nebraska at Omaha, a 1989 master’s degree in recreational administration from Arizona State University, and a 2007 doctoral degree in health administration from Warren National University, now a defunct, unaccredited on-line program. His academic career has been criticized as being inadequate to prepare him for the top-level positions he has held at both Riverview and Acadia, although neither position requires a doctoral degree.(2)

Repeating the Past

It turns out that similar concerns were raised about Proffitt's performance in his previous position:

Psychiatrists formerly employed at Riverview said this week that both patient care and employee morale eroded under Proffitt’s leadership there.

'Over the course of David Proffitt’s tenure at Riverview, a significant number of long-standing and experienced staff left and were replaced with less experienced or temporary people,' said Dr. Bryan Woods, who was employed at Riverview from 2003 to 2006 and now practices in Portland. “\'In my opinion, this resulted in a decrease in the quality of patient care.'

Woods said Proffitt’s management style was often in conflict with the collaborative 'treatment team' approach commonly used in acute-care psychiatric settings.

'Ultimately, I left, because I simply could not work with him,' Woods said.

Woods’ colleague Dr. Dan Filene, who also worked at Riverview under Proffitt, said direct-care staff at the state hospital were placed at increased risk by a stringent policy that all but eliminated the use of any kind of restraints.

'The staff at Riverview are heroic,' he said. 'It’s not just dangerous; it is emotionally challenging, fatiguing, low-paying work. When they are actively being injured, it can’t help but affect patient care.' Filene stressed that most people with mental illness are not dangerous or violent.

Sen. Stanley Gerzofsky, D-Brunswick, is chairman of the Legislature’s Criminal Justice Committee. The committee oversees the locked forensic unit at Riverview, where criminals with severe mental illness are housed and treated. Proffitt’s policy of doing away with restraints for even the most dangerous patients prompted a number of complaints, he said.

'We heard concerns that staff members were being injured [by patients],' Gerzofsky said in an interview this week. 'Staff were complaining that [Proffitt] didn’t have the right credentials and that he didn’t take the violence very seriously. We had him in front of our committee several times.'

Gerzofsky’s colleague on the committee, Sen. John Nutting, D-Leeds, said he heard from several Riverview patient families and staff members.

'Legislators were called to see if he could be replaced,' he said. 'There was really just one single reason — he was telling doctors how to treat their patients. He was trying to get between the patients and their doctors.

Nutting said parents of patients were especially concerned.

'They wanted their loved ones to get the care their doctors wanted them to receive, not the CEO of the hospital,' he said.(2)

Proffitt's credentials were also questioned before:

Proffitt’s degrees in recreational therapy and his online doctorate, Nutting observed, did little to reassure worried families.(2)

Proffitt's Defenders

The allegations made against Proffitt, which appear to be from clinical professionals and patients' relatives, were countered by support from, perhaps not surprisingly, managers and executives:

Michelle Hood, CEO of the hospital’s corporate parent Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems, says that under Proffitt, Acadia is 'moving in the right direction.' She lauded the progress he has made toward de-stigmatizing mental illness and ramping up Acadia’s outpatient and community services.

Note that Michelle Hood, although she has considerable health care management experience, appears not to have any clinical experience of expertise, from her official biography:

Before arriving at EMHS, Michelle was president and CEO of the Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health System, Montana Region, as well as president and CEO of its flagship hospital, St. Vincent Healthcare. She received her Bachelor of Science in 1978 at Purdue University and her Master of Health Care Administration at Georgia State University in 1981. Her early career included roles of associate hospital director at Emory University Hospital in Atlanta Georgia, executive vice president and chief operating officer of St. Vincent’s Hospital (of now Ascension Health) in Birmingham, Alabama and chief administrative officer of Norton Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky.

Somehow, the process that hired Mr Proffitt, presided over by Ms Hood, did not seem to consider his previous work at Riverview:

At EMHS, Michelle Hood said Proffitt’s troubles at Riverview 'did not come up' during his interviews for the position of CEO at Acadia.

One of 16 applicants in a nationwide search to replace outgoing CEO Dorothy Hill, he had appropriate letters of reference from former employers, she said.(2)

By the way, the process involved checking whether his educational credentials were accurate, but apparently was unconcerned with the meaning of an on-line degree from an unaccredited institution (subsequently closed down by state authorities, see here.)

His educational credentials checked out.... (2)

Hood dismissed concerns about losses of experienced staff:

Asked about the loss of key clinical administrators at Acadia, including Vice President for Medical Affairs Dr. Paul Tisher and Chief Nursing Officer April Giard, Hood said 'turnover is normal' with a new administration and that Proffitt has successfully recruited new talent and promoted qualified staff from within the organization.

The board of trustees of Acadia Hospital also supported their CEO

At the end of last week, John Bragg, chairman of the hospital’s board of directors, said the board supports embattled CEO David Proffitt, despite a deluge of concerns raised by current and former employees and unflattering revelations about Proffitt’s educational credentials and his leadership at his previous post.

At its regular meeting last Wednesday, the board went into executive session to discuss the situation, Bragg said Friday.

'We came out supporting Dr. Proffitt and the changes that are in place and the team he has put together,' he said.

As best as I can tell, Mr Bragg is the President of a local industrial firm, N H Bragg.

By the way, here is what George Eaton, chairman of the board of Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems, the parent not-for-profit corporation for Acadia Hospital, said about the executives that are accountable to him:

By making critical decisions, engaging in aggressive fundraising and other activities, 'exceptional senior executives can and should add many multiples of what they cost to the value of the institution,' he said. Eaton said CEO compensation packages within EMHS are determined using information from comparable institutions nationwide.(1)

Also,

The job of the CEO is 'incredibly complex,' working in 'the most regulated environment in any industry,' Eaton said.

'The prudent thing to do is to get the best people you can,' he said, 'and pay them what you need to in order to retain them — so long as they are achieving the performance goals set by their board.'

Note that Mr Eaton appears to be an attorney, according to the EMHS site, "George F. Eaton II, Esq.; Bangor; attorney, Rudman & Winchell."
Summary

This case illustrates much of what has gone wrong with leadership and governance of health care organizations.

We see health care organizations lead by people who have no experience or training in actually giving health care. Yet people who are not doctors, nurses, or therapists make clinical policies and control clinical care, even against the advice of experienced clinicians. In fact, some such leaders seem to regard clinicians as interchangeable widget-makers making interchangeable widgets. The ill-informed leaders of health care organizations often seem sensitive about their lack of knowledge and experience, and hence may be quick to punish any health care professional who protests their ill-informed decisions.  Moreover, the ill-informed leaders of health care seem to band together to support each other, even in the face of criticism from people with real expertise in health care, or from patients and relatives directly affected by health care and how it is delivered.  Higher level executives who are supposed to supervise lower level executives, and boards of directors which are supposed to exercise stewardship and support institutional values may seem more concerned with protecting the prerogatives of all executives rather than than the patient care mission.

As we have said again, again, again, health care desperately needs leadership that understand the context, and believes in the values.  It needs leaders that puts patients first, ahead of the pay and prerogatives of the executive and managerial class, our would-be new aristocracy.

References


1.  Haskell M. Maine's hospitals: big jobs, big pay. Bangor Daily News, March 6, 2009.  Link.


2.  Haskell M. Acadia CEO criticized at previous post.  Bangor Daily News, September 10, 2010.  Link.


3.  Haskell M. Acadia board supports CEO despite claims.  Bangor Daily News, September 20, 2010.  Link. 

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