Would You Like Fries With That? - The Fast Food Model for the Corporate Physician

Allegations that suggest the continuing degradation of the professionalism of employed physicians just appeared in the Palm Beach (FL) Post.  A former physician employee of Solantic Urgent Care, a for-profit chain of urgent care clinics, described to state investigators the life of employed physicians there.

Putting Revenue First

Physicians answered to managers who put revenue first:

Thirty-something business graduates lacking in any medical training supervised the clinics' doctors and were encouraged to maintain an adversarial relationship with them, Prokes said.

Those clinic managers' raises and bonuses depended on their achieving ambitious goals for patient visits, labor and overhead costs, per-patient revenues and customer satisfaction.

Prokes said clinic manager turnover was high, and a succession of managers wrote him up for a variety of infractions: arriving five minutes late, failing to suggest Solantic's pharmacy at three points of contact and suggesting a patient might want to return later, when there would be less of a wait.

As is common elsewhere, there was pressure to see as many patients as possible:

Prokes told state investigators that he found the atmosphere increasingly untenable, as he was pressed to see 70 to 90 patients each day.

'They actually told us not to sit down for 14-hour shifts,' Prokes told state investigators. '[Former Solantic CEO Rick] (Scott) does not care about the quality of medicine. They care about how fast you see people.'

A Business Model from the Fast-Food Industry

A former Solantic executive admitted that the business model came straight from the fast-food industry:

[Former Solantic Chief Operating Officer Shaun] Ginter said the retail concept that he, Scott, and then-CEO Karen Bowling created drew on lessons from the fast food and other retail industries. Counters were built at standing height, for example, because it speeded workflow, he said.

'The culture, the workflow, were all streamlined for a more efficient delivery, a more efficient method of care,' said Ginter, who had previously managed drug stores with small clinics within. 'The name of the game is keeping your costs tight, and Rick, Karen and myself were very focused on keeping costs down.'

Up-Selling Unneeded Services

Just as in the fast food industry, the help was expected to up-sell. In particular, Dr Prokes charged that physicians were strongly pushed to suggest services patients did not need, but that brought in more revenue:

Doctors were monitored with cameras in the clinics' common areas, [Dr Randy] Prokes told investigators. Staff were expected to suggest extras, including vitamins and probiotics, and a colon cancer screening test considered unreliable and outdated by CDC officials.

The Background: Rick Scott, Columbia/HCA, and the State of Florida

Note that Rick Scott just sold Solantic LLC to private equity group Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe, per the Jacksonville (FL) Business Journal. Note further that Scott was the former CEO of Columbia/ HCA, which ultimately paid a huge fine for fraudulant practices:

John Schilling was working as reimbursement supervisor for Columbia/HCA's Southwest Florida division, where he oversaw Medicare and Medicaid compliance and the cost reporting.

'Before HCA, when it was just Columbia, the CEOs of the hospitals were making up to 100 percent of their salaries as a bonus; the CFOs made 50 percent. Even some of the directors were making 25 percent bonuses,' Schilling said.

It drove a do-anything-to-make-the-numbers mentality, he said. Schilling now runs a firm called Ethics Solutions, where he helps potential whistleblowers.

'There were no incentives for being in compliance with Medicare and Medicaid rules,' Schilling said. 'It was about, how are we going to make it profitable, and if we meet our goals, it means we get our bonuses.'

He found that the hospitals in his area kept two sets of books. The one for Medicare auditors showed inflated costs, so that hospitals could justify higher reimbursement rates to take advantage of a funding formula that has since changed.

The hospitals also kept 'real' books with different numbers. The discovery put him in an ethical bind, he said. When he took his concerns to a supervisor, he was told not to rock the boat. Ultimately, his whistleblower lawsuit proved among the most damaging to his employer, which eventually paid $1.7 billion to the federal government to settle criminal fraud and abuse charges.

Scott, who wanted to fight the charges rather than settle, was never charged, and said he was unaware of what his managers had been doing.

After Scott left Columbia / HCA, he used the riches he acquired as its hired executive to help fund an ultimately successful campaign for the governorship of Florida, his current office. (See posts here and here.)

Summary

We have previously posted, most recently here, about how physicians are increasingly becoming employees of for-profit corporations. We have discussed other instances in which such corporations are appearing to pressure physicians to provide "care" to patients in such a manner as to increase corporate revenue, whether or not it is good for patients. We noted that when insurance companies hire physicians, they are likely to push them into providing less care across the board, since the insurers are paid per patient, not for what is done to each patient. When hospitals, hospital systems, and other entities that directly provide care hire physicians, they are likely to push them into channeling patients to get tests, drugs, and procedures for which the corporations are most highly paid.

In this current case, the allegations fit the latter pattern. Furthermore, At least one former executive admitted that "the name of your game is keeping your costs tight," not providing the best patient care.

There is more and more evidence that doctors who provide direct patient care as employees of for-profit corporations, and possibly other large organizations, are being increasingly pushed to put corporate revenue ahead of their patients' best interests. It should be obvious that this is unethical. Doctors swear oaths to put their patients' interests first.

Patients should be extremely wary of the care provided by doctors who are employed by large organizations. Doctors should be extremely wary of working for such organizations to provide direct patient care.

Below, I have repeated my humble suggestions from last week, with some additions, for

What Is to Be Done?

Patients:
- Find out if their physicians are employed, and if so, by whom.
- Find out what incentives their physicians have, if employed, to recommend more or less care of certain types.
- Find out whether other aspects of the physicians' employment arrangements, e.g., contractual confidentiality clauses, could affect his or her relationships with patients
- Avoid doctors employed by for-profit companies who have incentives to provide more or less care than what may be best for the patient

Physicians:
- Do not accept any employment offer or contract which has incentives to provide more or less care than is best for individual patients
- Who are already employed disclose to their patients such employment, and any incentives it may provide to provide more or less care
- Urge professional societies, and certifying and accrediting organizations to further investigate threats to physicians' professionalism arising from employment, and develop strategies to mitigate such threats

Policy-makers:
- Rapidly investigate the extent that for-profit companies whose revenues depend on physicians' decisions are hiring physicians to take care of patients, and the incentives and influences that these companies use to affect physicians' decisions
- Develop regulations that force disclosure of all such employment and relevant incentives and influences
- Consider further regulation of organizations that so employ physicians
- Consider whether such "commercial practice of medicine" ought to be once again banned.

ADDENDUM (12 July, 2011) -  See also this related post on KevinMD.

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Here Comes Your New Doctor, Brought to You By UnitedHealth

A long time ago, practicing physicians were mainly self-employed solo practitioners. As health care became more bureaucratic, physicians formed group practices as partnerships, which sometimes employed additional junior or part-time physicians. Some physicians worked for non-profit practice foundations, often affiliated with academic medical institutions, sometimes with non-profit physician-run health insurers, like some Kaiser plans. However, traditionally, almost no practicing physicians were employed by for-profit corporations. In fact, until about 30 years ago, it was considered unethical for physicians' practices to be "commercialized, or treated like a commodity in trade." (See posts here and here.)

That is all changing, and apparently quickly.

We recently discussed how a private equity company, Cerberus Capital Management, bought out a formerly non-profit hospital system, Caritas Christi, and its associated physicians' practices. Thus, what were formerly Caritas Christi physicians ended up employed by for-profit Steward Health Care, owned entirely by Cerberus (see this post).

For-Profit Health Insurance Companies Hiring Physicians to Take Care of Their Patients

Not it is commercial health insurance companies rushing to hire physicians, as reported by the Washington Post and Kaiser Health News:

United health services wing is quietly gaining control of doctors who treat patients covered by United plans — buying medical groups and launching physician management companies, for example.

It’s the latest sign that the barrier between companies that provide health coverage and those that provide care is crumbling.

Other large insurers, including Humana and WellPoint, have announced deals involving doctors in recent months, part of a strategy to curb rising health costs that could cut into profits and to weather changes to their business arising from the federal health law. But United is the biggest insurer by revenue, making the trend much more significant.

As they are supposed to do, the reporter clearly included both sides of the story, including how UnitedHealth justified its new business strategy:

Employers and other customers 'are saying, I want more value for the dollars I spend in health care,' said Dawn Owens, chief executive officer of OptumHealth, United’s health services subsidiary. But, 'there’s also a realization that the delivery system isn’t ready for that kind of change. That’s where we come in.'

The tools needed to control costs and improve care are things insurers have 'invested in over the years,' she said. 'The provider community doesn’t have those tools.'

The article even got a UnitedHealth board member to provide a somewhat confusing defense of the new practice:

Gail Wilensky, a United board member and health official in President George H.W. Bush’s administration, said the insurer doesn’t seek to control every doctor who sees patients enrolled in its health plans. Typically, insurers contract with doctors to care for their policyholders. She also cautioned the strategy is in the early stages and has not yet proven its success.

'It’s just trying many different ways to see what appeals to the American public and what adds value,' she said. 'Whether it will actually mark the trend of the future, I don’t know.'

"Incentivizing" Doctors to Do Less

At least the WaPo/ Kaiser Health News story cautiously tip-toed up to the obvious potential downside of commercial health insurers employing doctors to see patients, the issue of whose interests such employed physicians might put first:

Many patients insured by these companies are going to see much tighter management of their care.

'Health-care costs are still going to rise,' said Wayne DeVeydt, chief financial officer of WellPoint, which entered the business of running clinics in June with the announcement that it would acquire CareMore, a health plan operator based near Los Angeles that owns 26 clinics. 'But the only way to stem those costs in the long term is to manage care on the front end.'

That means enlisting doctors. Their orders drive most health-care spending, including the wasteful share: treating heart patients with expensive stents when cheaper drugs might work, or overusing high-tech imaging devices, for example. By managing doctors directly, insurers believe they can reshape the practice of medicine — and protect their profits.

For instance, Cigna, another large insurer, saves 9 percent on patients treated by doctors in a Phoenix medical group it controls, said Stephanie Gorman, president of Cigna Arizona. Cigna has expanded the group over the past 18 months in response to the health law, and it now serves patients at 32 locations.

'The doctors, at the end of the day, control the patients, and currently they’re financially incentivized to do more tests, more procedures,' said Chris Rigg, a Wall Street analyst for Susquehanna Financial Group. 'But, if they’re employed by a managed care company, they’re financially incentivized' to do less.

That thought unnerves consumer advocate Anthony Wright of Health Access in Sacramento, who worries that profit pressure could affect care. But Wright also said there may be upsides to more tightly managed care: 'No patient wants to get more procedures than they actually need.'

How Doing Less Can Harm Patients

Let us look at that from a different angle. Commercial insurance companies increase revenue when they decrease their "medical losses," that is, the money they pay for policy-holders' care. Physicians employed by such companies, but who take care of patients who may be those companies' policy-holders, could be "'incentivized' to do less." That is more than "unnerving."

It is widely accepted that many patients get tests and treatments whose benefits do not outweigh their harms, and the costs of such interventions increase the costs of health care while doing patients no good, and perhaps harm. If we could eliminate those unneeded tests and treatments, we could decrease costs and improve patients' outcomes.

Yet another important driver of health care costs are tests and treatments whose benefits outweigh their costs, but which are priced much higher than could be justified by their benefit/harm ratio. It could also be that many tests and treatment are priced fairly.

So "incentivizing" physicians to do less across the board could very well harm patients by depriving them of interventions whose benefits outweigh their harms. It appears that for-profit insurers who hire physicians are likely to place their physician employees in a situation in which incentives to do less may conflict with the physicians' duties to do what is best for each patient.

That is more than unnerving.

Hiding Physicians' Commercial Employment

That this new sort of employment requires much more scrutiny very quickly is also suggested by how the commercial health insurance companies are trying to hide their new relationships with physicians. As reported in the article, UnitedHealth Group's subsidiary:

Optum and its Collaborative Care unit have acquired Memorial Healthcare IPA and AppleCare Medical Management in Orange County, Calif., as well as WellMed Medical Management, which runs clinics in Texas and Florida. Collaborative Care also launched Lifeprint in Phoenix.

In some cases, the company obscured its role. For instance, a Collaborative Care business, NextDoor Health, which is partnering with a local doctors group to open retail clinics at Wal-Mart stores in Texas and other states, describes itself on its Web site as 'a privately held LLC based in Minneapolis.' United is based just outside of Minneapolis.

The Mirror Image: "Leakage Reduction"

Note that the essential conflict caused by a doctor hired to take care of patients by a company that profits from decreasing care across the board is the mirror image of the conflict caused by a doctor hired by a for-profit hospital system. In the latter case, the doctor is hired by a company which profits from increasing those services which are particularly well reimbursed. So we noted previously that doctors hired by the for-profit Steward Health Care system were being pushed to reduce "leakage," that is, referral of patients outside of the system for well-reimbursed services. "Leakage reduction" could also harm patients, although in a more subtle way, perhaps. Doctors incentivized to refer more patients within the system for well-reimbursed services, which are now mostly invasive procedures and high-technology tests may get patients to undergo interventions which are unnecessary, and sometimes whose harms outweigh their benefits, thus leading to adverse effects without any benefits.

Summary

So in my humble opinion, the sudden rush of for-profit health care companies to hire doctors to take care of patients ought concern patients, health care professionals, and health care policy makers a lot. Physicians employed by for-profit corporations whose revenues are affected by their own decisions have serious conflicts of interest.

Just how bad these conflicts are may be difficult to determine, because there seems to be little public knowledge about how physicians are actually "incentivized" by these corporations. Note that the WaPo article never discussed the details of the incentives the insurance companies imposed on their employed physicians. Note also that our previous discussion of "leakage" reduction was not based on any public knowledge about how the employed physicians might have been influenced to reduce leakage.

Also, just how frequent these conflicts may be may also be difficult to determine, because it appears that employed physicians do not always reveal who their employers are.

What is To Be Done?

I strongly suggest that

Patients:
- Find out if their physicians are employed, and if so, by whom.
- Find out what incentives their physicians have, if employed, to recommend more or less care of certain types.
-  Find out whether other aspects of the physicians' employment arrangements, e.g., contractual confidentiality clauses, could affect his or her relationships with patients
- Avoid doctors employed by for-profit companies who have incentives to provide more or less care than what may be best for the patient

Physicians:
- Do not accept any employment offer or contract which has incentives to provide more or less care than is best for individual patients
- Who are already employed disclose to their patients such employment, and any incentives it may provide to provide more or less care

Policy-makers:
- Rapidly investigate the extent that for-profit companies whose revenues depend on physicians' decisions are hiring physicians to take care of patients, and the incentives and influences that these companies use to affect physicians' decisions
- Develop regulations that force disclosure of all such employment and relevant incentives and influences
- Consider whether such "commercial practice of medicine" ought to be once again banned.

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The Perils of Physicians Practicing as Corporate Employees: the Contract Trap

A seriously chilling cautionary tale corroborated some of my previously expressed fears about the perils of physicians practicing as corporate employees.  It unlikely venue was the April 25, 2011 issue of Medical Economics.  The article, not yet on the web, was "Selling to a Corporation Poses Challenges," by Todd R C Neely.

Here is how the case started:

A start-up company with a new medical treatment became a publicly traded corporation. The company's top managers were not physicians; they were finance and business experts familiar with the ways of Wall Street.

To meet the corporation's goals and Wall Street expectations, the company used stock sale proceeds to aggressively market itself to doctors and buy established physician practices around the country. It quickly captured market share, exponentially raised the number of patients by the practices it owned, and developed substantial revenue streams.

The physicians who sold their practices thought that selling would be a win-win situation for them and for the corporation. As marketed to them, the company would handle the business aspects of owning a medical practice - the ubiquitous paperwork, employee issues, and all the rest of the nonclinical task so distasteful to doctors. The physicians would spend all their work time practicing medicine using the latest technology. Benefiting from the company's promotion to the public, they would see an increase in their patient base. They would receive a base salary and, most significantly, a percentage of the profits of their practice.

But here is how things turned out:

Everything was great until the end of the first year. The physicians expected large payments from their practices' increased profits, but the large bonuses never came.

What went wrong? The physicians were so blinded by the marketing pitch that they apparently never read the fine print:

In negotiating the sale of the practices and the employee contracts, the doctors had not required the company to specify in writing what expenses the corporation would charge an individual practice and what accounting rules would be followed. So the corporation charged the practices for marketing, accounting, human resources, financing, and other services, wiping out the profits of each practice.

The contracts were apparently designed by the corporation to favor all its interests (which should not have been surprising), but was accepted as is by the physicians:

The contracts specified in precise terms the physicians' responsibilities, noncompete provisions, confidentiality, dispute resolution and the like. But although the contracts stated the corporation's initial responsibilities - mainly making payment on the negotiated purchase price - it phrased the company's other obligations in remarkably vague terms, or, astonishingly, did not specify them at all. The company was to make its 'best efforts' to accomplish certain goals, but the contract left the phrase 'best efforts' undefined. The phrase turned out to be quite malleable. The company's other responsibilities were to be determined at a later, unspecified time.

The company's best efforts always turned out to be whatever efforts it chose to make.

It was a trap,baited by marketing, into which the physicians neatly fell:

Many sought legal advice and were told they had no legal resource. The noncompete clauses - fair provisions under the contract terms to which the physicians thought they were agreeing but that were disastrous under the terms (or lack thereof) of the actual contract - were broad, tight, specific, and ironclad. Many of the physicians even were barred from practicing medicine within the geographic area in which they lived. And under the equally ironclad confidentiality clause, the doctors could not publicly discuss their situations or, for that matter, anything else of significance about the corporation; if they did, they would be subject to high fines and penalties.

What had appeared to the doctors as a mutually beneficial situation turned into a nightmare for them. They lost their practices and money and took years to recover. They had no legal recourse. They could not even warn others. The corporation could, and did, continue with impunity.

Note that it is now obvious why the article was so vague about the identity of the corporation and the physicians it ensnared, and why it took so long for even such a vague version of this story to surface. The confidentiality (and probably anti-disparagement) clauses made it hazardous for anyone who signed these contracts to be forthright witnesses. 

Obviously, the willingness of corporations to employ such clauses means that there may be many more cases like this out there, hidden behind the veil of contractual restrictions on free speech.

We previously discussed how physicians often seem willing to blithely sign contracts without fully understanding them, thereby sacrificing their economic well-being and core values.  Here is another striking case of this phenomenon.  We previously attributed this tendency to learned helplessness. 

The author of this article, however, suggested  that physicians were victims of carefully targeted marketing based on psychological manipulation.  It was meant to capitalize on three major factors: physicians' naive belief that everyone involved with medicine is interested in helping people by behaving rationally and logically; physicians' over-confidence in their ability to avoid failure (presumably including failure due to ignorance or misinterpretation of legal contracts); and physicians' feelings of entitlement. 

In addition, the physicians seemed (probably foolishly) unaware that corporate executives are not interested in physicians' core values:

Unlike physicians, the corporation and its top executives, non-doctors all, were involved in the practice of medicine solely to make money; the medical practices, and the very practice of medicine, were just commodities [to them].

This observation corresponds with numerous observations about how leaders of health care organizations may ignore, or be expressly hostile towards physicians' core values. Thus, while the article went on to give some straight-forward advice about negotiating combined practice buy-out and corporate employment agreements, it becomes obvious that the main lesson is: physicians should not practice medicine as corporate employees. They should not sell their practices to and become employees of for-profit corporations as a way to practice medicine.  Otherwise, rather than being practitioners, they will end up as medical assembly line workers for bosses who only care about the revenue they generate.

Physicians who have already inadvertently, foolishly, or under duress signed contracts that could threaten their professionalism and their patients' welfare need to do the right thing and challenge these contracts.  , or else there will soon be nothing left of the medical profession, and no one left to ethically care for patients. 

With each new anecdote, it becomes clearer that the corporate practice of medicine will end up exploiting physicians and patients alike. So there is also a main lesson for patients: you should not go to doctors who are corporate employees, or practices or clinics that are run by corporations. If you do, you will end up being used only as a means for the bosses to make money.

At a policy level, if we do not stop the corporate practice of medicine, we will all end up as increasingly unhealthy cogs in the corporate health care machine. 

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"Cogs in the Corporate Machine" - More on the Plight of Corporate Physicians

We discussed last week some of the perils of the latest trend towards the corporatization of medicine, practicing physicians becoming employees of hospital systems, including for-profit corporate systems.  A recent article in Medscape Business of Medicine included a striking anecdote about the life of a corporate physician.

Controlling Referrals by Contractual Provision
It started with the revelation that some employed physicians may sign contracts that obligate them to refer patients within the corporate system, even if that is not in their best interests:

Victoria Rentel, a family physician in Columbus, Ohio, joined a hospital-owned group several years ago. At first, nearly everything went fine. There were a few glitches: she'd occasionally order tests or consults at competing facilities, either for patient convenience or because of health plan coverage. When the hospital's administrators found out, they told her it was a violation of her contract; but that didn't stop her because she knew the hospital never enforced this provision.

A Non-Compete Clause, Even for a Laid-Off Physician

It also included the observation that corporate physicians may be abruptly laid off. Worse, being laid off means having to leave town, because apparently even laid-off physicians are still obligated by non-compete clauses in their contracts:

Then, out of the blue, she was informed that the hospital was going to close her practice within 45 days. She knew this wasn't her fault; the recession had hit the hospital hard, and it was laying off nearly half of the primary care doctors in her group. Still, it was a hard pill to swallow.

Making matters worse, her contract's noncompete clause prohibited her from going to work for any of the other healthcare systems in town. To avoid legal sanctions, she joined the student health service at Ohio State University.

Signing Contracts Without Understanding Them
The article's introduction emphasized the problem of physicians signing onerous contracts, perhaps without fully understanding them or without getting adequate legal advice:

Many other physicians -- especially those who, like Rentel, were previously in private practice -- complain about their jobs. In some cases, it's because physicians rushed into the arms of a hospital without looking carefully at their contracts or asking the right questions during their job interviews.

Cogs in the Corporate Machine

The introduction ended ominously:

Ultimately, the loss of control over their own professional lives is what irks employed doctors the most if they used to be in private practice. But some doctors also get the sinking feeling that they've become cogs in the corporate machine.

'The reality is that when you work for a hospital system, you're a service line,' says Rentel. 'And because primary care reimbursement is relatively low, you're a service line that feeds more lucrative service lines.'

Oddly enough, after that striking beginning, the article peters off into a discussion of some "gripes of employed physicians," which either soft-pedaled or failed to include the issues listed above.

The specific issues, and the general response of physicians to their role as corporate wage slaves deserve further consideration.

Signing Bad Contracts

First, the notion that physicians frequently sign contracts, particularly such important contracts as their own employment agreements, without reading them, without clearly understanding them, and without obtaining competent legal counsel is very disturbing.   A physician who signs a contract without reading it, understanding it, and getting competent legal advice about it is at best naive to the point of foolishness. 

My late father, an attorney, done told me to "never sign a contract you haven't read and understood."  Contracts are - surprise - enforceable legal documents that may involve surrendering important rights.  One should never sign a contract without being satisfied that its benefits outweigh its harms.

It could be that physicians who so blithely sign contracts are exhibiting learned helplessness.  Maybe they feel somehow pressured to apparently voluntarily agree to doing something that ultimately will harm them.  I am not sure that simply declaring on a blog that we will have to unlearn our helplessness if we are ever to save medicine and health care will do much to solve what may be a fairly deep problem.  But we must do so.

In addition, contracts are valid if entered into voluntarily.  It may be that some physicians truly sign contracts under duress.  Those contracts may not be valid, and could be challenged if they were so signed (again, if physicians are willing to unlearn their helplessness enough to get the counsel of a competent attorney.)

Stopping "Leakage" Possibly Unethically, Maybe Illegally?

The physician in the example above apparently had a contract provision which was violated simply by referring patients to competing facilities.  This appears to be an extreme way for a hospital to deal with the problem of "leakage," that is, the financial problem to the hospital caused when patients are referred outside the system.  Note that we discussed (here and here) the example of a for-profit hospital system with a large number of physician employees pushed to choke off "leakage" of patient referrals outside the system.

Although leakage may pose financial problems for hospitals, fighting leakage may lead to ethical problems.  Physicians are supposed to decide how to manage patients, and specifically to decide where to refer patients in the patients' interests, not just to keep money flowing to the health care system. "Leakage reduction" may possibly threaten physicians' first commandment, to make decisions to maximize benefits and minimize harms to individual patients, before all other considerations.

Worse, in the example cited in the Medscape paper, the leakage reduction was apparently implemented not by just trying to persuade doctors to keep patients within the system, but by a contract provision that somehow forbade referrals out of the system.  That may have not only been unethical, but it could have been illegal.  

The "Stark Law" (Title 42, Chapter 7, Subchapter XVIII, Part E, Section 1395 of the US Code) generally prohibits basing referral decisions on payments.  Full-time employed physicians are exempt from some of its provisions, but only if the physicians' "amount of remuneration under employment" "is not determined in a manner that takes into account (directly or indirectly) the volume or value of any referrals by the referring physician."  Therefore, were the contract referred to above to have forbidden outside referrals on pain of termination or reduction in remuneration, it could potentially violate this law. 

There have been rumors that physicians have been pushed to sign contracts that could so violate the Stark Law, but the published example above makes this a real possibility.

Physicians ought not to sign contracts that seem to limit referrals under penalty of pay reduction or termination, which may be both unethical and illegal.  Any physician presented with or who has signed such a contract ought to consult a competent attorney.

If hospitals and hospital systems are trying to force physicians to make referrals based on the hospitals' financial advantage instead of in the best interests of patients, that is reprehensible.  If these organizations are trying to do so via contractual provisions, this deserves investigation, including investigation by the relevant law enforcement agencies. 

Don't Be a Corporate Cog

This article underscores my previously expressed fears about how making physicians into corporate employees may remove the last barriers preventing patients from becoming corporate financial cannon fodder.  Physicians' most central professional value is to put patients' interests first.  Practicing physicians who practice as corporate employees are at risk of being pressured, or even threatened under the cover of contract enforcement to put their corporate employers' revenues ahead of patients' interests. 

Physicians should not let their patients, and their own values be so threatened.  Physicians who have inadvertently, foolishly, or under duress signed contracts that could threaten their professionalism and their patients' welfare need to do the right thing and challenge these contracts, or else there will soon be nothing left of the medical profession, and no one left to ethically care for patients. 

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The Rise of the Corporate Physician - the End of the (Health Care) World As We Know It?

In discussing how concentration and abuse of power threatens health care professionals' values and professionalism, we have discussed how ostensibly academic institutions value faculty more for their earning power than their academic abilities.  We have discussed how financial relationships between physicians and drug, biotechnology, device and other companies risk abuse of entrusted power.  But up to now, I have been comforted by the hope that physicians in small independent practices who do not have such conflicts of interest are trying to uphold their professional values, even as they were buffeted by the perverse incentives imposed by managed care organizations/ health insurance companies and government insurance (e.g., US Medicare whose payments are controlled by the RUC).

However, a recent article in SmartMoney suggests that the end of the independent physician is nigh:

Remember the solo family doctor? In places like Springfield, it has become increasingly likely that she's collecting a paycheck from a large regional hospital—and practicing medicine according to the hospital's strict playbook. The experience in Springfield is just a needle prick compared with what's going on nationwide. At least one in six doctors—more than 150,000 nationwide—now works as an employee of a hospital system. And with about half of recent medical school graduates deciding to work for hospitals and many established doctors looking to unload their practices amid the tough economic climate, what was a trickle of change has turned into a torrent. Jim Pizzo, a Chicago-area hospital consultant, says the blistering pace of these mergers is leading some colleagues to joke that there are two types of physicians today: 'Those employed by hospitals and those about to be.'

So we are seeing physicians who practiced solo or in physician-lead, physician-run group practices becoming employees of large health care organizations. And here on Health Care Renewal, we know how most large health care organizations are run.

This appears to be an unintended consequence of our recent US health care "reform" law:

But hospital executives also believe that buying doctors' practices could yield a big payday, thanks to a different provision in the health care law. The law will encourage doctors and hospitals to share some payments when treating each patient; as collaborative teams, they could earn bonuses for holding down costs and meeting quality markers. 'The real question for everyone is how that pie—that money—is going to get split up,' Goertz says; hospitals think they'll have the upper hand if they employ the doctors that they're sharing their banana crème with. And that's touched off a flurry of mergers everywhere—from Seattle to Roanoke, Va.

The name of these supposedly collaborative organizations, which are turning out to simply be hospital systems which have purchased physicians' practices and now employ physicians, is "accountable care organizations," which now appears ironic at least.

The article detailed some of the adverse effects to be expected when accountable care organizations become hospital systems with employed physicians providing patient care.

Increased Costs with Decreased Care

Ruth Taylor, a 44-year-old woman in Bozeman, Mont., started seeing Robert Hathaway as her doctor during college, and she stuck with him through everything from routine blood tests to a kidney transplant. Taylor, a professional nurse with warm blue eyes, describes Hathaway as a 'classic small-town doctor' who knew all his patients by name and socialized with them at local basketball games; he was accessible and thorough—even catching a health problem of hers that other doctors had missed. But after Hathaway sold his practice to the local hospital, Taylor says, things began to sour. She was more likely to be assigned to see the physician assistant rather than Hathaway himself. And when she went in for a comprehensive physical (also run by the assistant) in late 2008, she was charged $360, more than double what she'd paid for a workup in previous years.

Imposition of Dysfunctional Health Care Information Technology

On this blog, Dr Scot Silverstein frequently posts about how poorly designed and implemented commercial health care information technology may have harms that outweigh any benefits, and how these systems are rarely objectively evaluated. Employed physicians are likely to be required by their new executive overlords to use commercial health care IT that benefits the managers and their strategies, but may not benefit patient care:

Last spring Hospital Sisters tried to shift all of its Springfield medical offices to electronic medical records simultaneously. But there wasn't enough tech support to deal with all the problems physicians ran into on day one, and wait times spiked at the system's walk-in locations. Nenaber, a soft-spoken 64-year-old with wire-rim glasses, sounds acquiescent about the situation. 'We're getting the hang of these things,' he says slowly, sitting at his desk overlooking a gas station and a strip-mall parking lot. But his practice is still waiting for its electronic payoff

Increasing Prices by Providing Care in the Hospital

Now that the acquisition spree is in full swing, some experts worry that price increases could become the dominant narrative for patients. When hospitals run medical practices, federal law allows them to add substantial 'facility fees' to patients' bills to cover overhead expenses. The new bosses also often rip equipment like X-ray machines and MRIs out of the physician's office, preferring to have patients get those tests from radiologists at the hospital. That, too, can cost patients. A consumer with a high-deductible Aetna plan, for instance, would pay up to $1,400 for an MRI of her back at the University Medical Center at Princeton, N.J., according to data that the insurer makes available to its members. The same scan would cost about a third as much at nearby Radiology Affiliates of New Jersey, a nonhospital facility. Based on a review of insurance databases and state regulatory records, that's a fairly typical price gap

Increasing Prices by Market Domination

Price increases also have the potential to bleed outward—affecting not only the patients of the absorbed doctor, but also the cost of health care citywide. That's because when hospitals sit down at the bargaining table with insurers, they're almost always able to negotiate higher payment rates for their big groups of doctors than a lone physician with little bargaining power

Despite the usual spin provided by the would-be monopolists:

Fast-growing hospital systems, including Hospital Sisters and Bozeman Deaconess, say that their growth will eventually make care more efficient and bring costs back down, since they'll be able to cut back on unnecessary care and duplicate tests

I am sure that the 19th century robber barons made the same pitch about increasing efficiency. Of course, the efficiency mainly benefits the insider managers.

By the way, of course, the hospital systems own public relations machines and lobbyists are now busy attacking any restrictions on such concentrations of power, while the hospital managers figure out how to game the system to increase their market domination before the regulators notice:

As more patients face such disruptions, regulators are taking notice. In October, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Health and Human Services met with doctors, insurers and other health officials to discuss the referral and pricing problems that could arise from 'accountable-care organizations'— those new groups of hospitals and doctors that will share financial incentives. The Federal Trade Commission will offer guidelines on what's permissible by midyear. But hospitals are already lobbying for accountable-care groups to be exempt from antitrust and antifraud rules, even as they scoop up more and more medical practices. Under current regulations, officials in Washington must green-light all mergers involving companies valued at more than $63 million. But by buying up tiny medical practices one at a time, critics say, hospitals stay below the threshold and avoid getting much attention. And by the time regulators settle on more-formal legal guidelines, those mergers may be hard to undo, says Cory Capps, a Washington economist specializing in health care antitrust issues.

Excess and Unnecessary Utilization via "Leakage Control"

With big hospital systems now owning physician practices, and practicing physicians directly answering to executives, the push will be on to maximize use of the most lucrative services. Once the hospital systems have made employees out of the physicians, it is easy to pressure their own employed physicians to refer patients to the hospital units that can bill most lucratively:

By their own admission, most hospitals are eager to keep patient referrals under the same corporate umbrella, to save on costs and share medical records but also to boost revenue. The hospitals say they wouldn't force an internist, for example, to refer a patient with heart problems to their own cardiologists, but critics say there's certainly financial pressure. Under a little-noticed regulation that took effect in 2007, hospitals are allowed to pay doctors less if they don't do enough internal referrals.

Doctors in Bozeman and Springfield who granted interviews said they didn't feel pressure to be 'team players' with referrals. But some of those who've left large health systems tell a different story, including Mark Callenberger, an orthopedist in Merritt Island, Fla. Callenberger says that the hospital group where he used to work urged him to direct more patients to the MRI machine owned by the hospital. The doctor preferred a more advanced machine at a private practice that he says offered clearer pictures. But after he ignored the recommendations, Callenberger says, the hospital told his office manager to schedule patients at the hospital's MRI anyway, leaving him to perform surgery using 'crummy images.' (The hospital declined to comment on Callenberger's case but says its doctors can use whatever facilities they choose.) Patients may never know about these power struggles, because doctors aren't required to disclose how they choose specialists. And while patients who ask can always see a specialist outside the network, in practice few are likely to challenge their doctors' judgment, says Bruce A. Johnson, a Denver health care lawyer. 'Face it, when we're really sick,' says Johnson, 'if the doctor tells us to jump off a roof, we'll probably consider doing it.'

Note that we discussed (here and here) the example of a for-profit hospital system with a large number of physician employees pushed to choke off "leakage" of patient referrals outside the system.

Summary

The overarching problem is that employed physicians now must answer to managers and executives who may put financial goals, and their own enrichment, ahead of physicians' values, and specifically will choose increased revenue over providing the best possible care to individual patients:

. Executives here are also hoping to push the needle further—standardizing everything from how long patients wait on hold to the ease of parking at the doctor's office (valets, luxury-restaurant style, are one solution under consideration).

Still, Mikell acknowledges, 'doctors don't want follow-the-directions, cookbook medicine.' And for many physicians, the idea of following new rules triggers a much larger unease at giving up their independence—a feeling of loss, both for the businesses they built and for their patients. Back in Bozeman, Blair Erb, the sole cardiologist in town, is a picture of resignation as he prepares to sign a contract with Deaconess. 'I feel defeated,' Erb says, looking around at the office furniture he and his wife, Liz, chose from a catalog years ago. The weathered ranchers and bundled-up women that come through his door mostly express disbelief when they hear that this frank-talking Tennessee native will sell his practice. His staffers say they're not looking forward to the questions the hospital's medical records system will soon prompt them to ask patients. (Do you wear a bike helmet regularly? Do you have a smoke detector?) 'We'll try to retain as much professional independence as possible,' Erb says, gazing at the hospital building, whose bulk he can see through his window. 'But the fact of the matter is, we'll have a new master.'

So I for one do not welcome our new executive overlords.

We have posted about numerous examples of health care organizational leaders who put their own enrichment ahead of the mission. Now even ostensibly non-profit hospital systems are increasingly competing against for-profit systems. We have seen, as noted above, an example of a for-profit system that seems to betting everything on a business strategy to reduce "leakage" of patient referrals.  We can expect that non-profit hospital systems will have to act more like for-profit systems, and the perverse financial incentives given the managers of all hospital systems will lead to pressure on physicians to forgo their responsibilities to provide the best care to individual patients in favor of actions that will bring in the most money in the shortest time.

We seem to be witnessing the rise of the corporate physician, the rise of a physician who must first answer to managers who never committed to putting patient care first, who may have no sympathy for physicians' core values, who may receive huge incentives to maximize short-term revenue no matter what. Such a rise of corporate physicians would be unprecedented in the US, and I believe in any developed country.

The rise of the corporate physician would require patients to put their trust in corporations, rather than individual doctors, in the era of the global financial collapse, in the new gilded age.

We may be seeing the end of health care world as we know it. The upcoming brave new world of health care may be worse that we can imagine.

What is to be done? - I rarely have ventured into specific policy suggestions, but I think that the consequences of the well-intended "accountable care organization" blunder may be so severe that I must so venture now. We must derail the movement towards "accountable care organizations." Any movement to make organizations more accountable cannot do so by making most professionals into employees answering to the sorts of ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted or even corrupt leaders that we have been writing about for more than six years on Health Care Renewal.  We need to make it impossible for for-profit companies to employ physicians to take care of patients.  Maybe we need to think about making it impossible for for-profit companies to provide patient care at all, and for for-profit companies to sell health insurance.  Meanwhile, we need to ensure the accountability, integrity, transparency, and honesty of leaders of health care organizations.

If we do not reverse the current trends, anyone who wants good health care may have to look for it somewhere other than in the US.

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