The Rise of the Corporate Physician - the End of the (Health Care) World As We Know It?

In discussing how concentration and abuse of power threatens health care professionals' values and professionalism, we have discussed how ostensibly academic institutions value faculty more for their earning power than their academic abilities.  We have discussed how financial relationships between physicians and drug, biotechnology, device and other companies risk abuse of entrusted power.  But up to now, I have been comforted by the hope that physicians in small independent practices who do not have such conflicts of interest are trying to uphold their professional values, even as they were buffeted by the perverse incentives imposed by managed care organizations/ health insurance companies and government insurance (e.g., US Medicare whose payments are controlled by the RUC).

However, a recent article in SmartMoney suggests that the end of the independent physician is nigh:

Remember the solo family doctor? In places like Springfield, it has become increasingly likely that she's collecting a paycheck from a large regional hospital—and practicing medicine according to the hospital's strict playbook. The experience in Springfield is just a needle prick compared with what's going on nationwide. At least one in six doctors—more than 150,000 nationwide—now works as an employee of a hospital system. And with about half of recent medical school graduates deciding to work for hospitals and many established doctors looking to unload their practices amid the tough economic climate, what was a trickle of change has turned into a torrent. Jim Pizzo, a Chicago-area hospital consultant, says the blistering pace of these mergers is leading some colleagues to joke that there are two types of physicians today: 'Those employed by hospitals and those about to be.'

So we are seeing physicians who practiced solo or in physician-lead, physician-run group practices becoming employees of large health care organizations. And here on Health Care Renewal, we know how most large health care organizations are run.

This appears to be an unintended consequence of our recent US health care "reform" law:

But hospital executives also believe that buying doctors' practices could yield a big payday, thanks to a different provision in the health care law. The law will encourage doctors and hospitals to share some payments when treating each patient; as collaborative teams, they could earn bonuses for holding down costs and meeting quality markers. 'The real question for everyone is how that pie—that money—is going to get split up,' Goertz says; hospitals think they'll have the upper hand if they employ the doctors that they're sharing their banana crème with. And that's touched off a flurry of mergers everywhere—from Seattle to Roanoke, Va.

The name of these supposedly collaborative organizations, which are turning out to simply be hospital systems which have purchased physicians' practices and now employ physicians, is "accountable care organizations," which now appears ironic at least.

The article detailed some of the adverse effects to be expected when accountable care organizations become hospital systems with employed physicians providing patient care.

Increased Costs with Decreased Care

Ruth Taylor, a 44-year-old woman in Bozeman, Mont., started seeing Robert Hathaway as her doctor during college, and she stuck with him through everything from routine blood tests to a kidney transplant. Taylor, a professional nurse with warm blue eyes, describes Hathaway as a 'classic small-town doctor' who knew all his patients by name and socialized with them at local basketball games; he was accessible and thorough—even catching a health problem of hers that other doctors had missed. But after Hathaway sold his practice to the local hospital, Taylor says, things began to sour. She was more likely to be assigned to see the physician assistant rather than Hathaway himself. And when she went in for a comprehensive physical (also run by the assistant) in late 2008, she was charged $360, more than double what she'd paid for a workup in previous years.

Imposition of Dysfunctional Health Care Information Technology

On this blog, Dr Scot Silverstein frequently posts about how poorly designed and implemented commercial health care information technology may have harms that outweigh any benefits, and how these systems are rarely objectively evaluated. Employed physicians are likely to be required by their new executive overlords to use commercial health care IT that benefits the managers and their strategies, but may not benefit patient care:

Last spring Hospital Sisters tried to shift all of its Springfield medical offices to electronic medical records simultaneously. But there wasn't enough tech support to deal with all the problems physicians ran into on day one, and wait times spiked at the system's walk-in locations. Nenaber, a soft-spoken 64-year-old with wire-rim glasses, sounds acquiescent about the situation. 'We're getting the hang of these things,' he says slowly, sitting at his desk overlooking a gas station and a strip-mall parking lot. But his practice is still waiting for its electronic payoff

Increasing Prices by Providing Care in the Hospital

Now that the acquisition spree is in full swing, some experts worry that price increases could become the dominant narrative for patients. When hospitals run medical practices, federal law allows them to add substantial 'facility fees' to patients' bills to cover overhead expenses. The new bosses also often rip equipment like X-ray machines and MRIs out of the physician's office, preferring to have patients get those tests from radiologists at the hospital. That, too, can cost patients. A consumer with a high-deductible Aetna plan, for instance, would pay up to $1,400 for an MRI of her back at the University Medical Center at Princeton, N.J., according to data that the insurer makes available to its members. The same scan would cost about a third as much at nearby Radiology Affiliates of New Jersey, a nonhospital facility. Based on a review of insurance databases and state regulatory records, that's a fairly typical price gap

Increasing Prices by Market Domination

Price increases also have the potential to bleed outward—affecting not only the patients of the absorbed doctor, but also the cost of health care citywide. That's because when hospitals sit down at the bargaining table with insurers, they're almost always able to negotiate higher payment rates for their big groups of doctors than a lone physician with little bargaining power

Despite the usual spin provided by the would-be monopolists:

Fast-growing hospital systems, including Hospital Sisters and Bozeman Deaconess, say that their growth will eventually make care more efficient and bring costs back down, since they'll be able to cut back on unnecessary care and duplicate tests

I am sure that the 19th century robber barons made the same pitch about increasing efficiency. Of course, the efficiency mainly benefits the insider managers.

By the way, of course, the hospital systems own public relations machines and lobbyists are now busy attacking any restrictions on such concentrations of power, while the hospital managers figure out how to game the system to increase their market domination before the regulators notice:

As more patients face such disruptions, regulators are taking notice. In October, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Health and Human Services met with doctors, insurers and other health officials to discuss the referral and pricing problems that could arise from 'accountable-care organizations'— those new groups of hospitals and doctors that will share financial incentives. The Federal Trade Commission will offer guidelines on what's permissible by midyear. But hospitals are already lobbying for accountable-care groups to be exempt from antitrust and antifraud rules, even as they scoop up more and more medical practices. Under current regulations, officials in Washington must green-light all mergers involving companies valued at more than $63 million. But by buying up tiny medical practices one at a time, critics say, hospitals stay below the threshold and avoid getting much attention. And by the time regulators settle on more-formal legal guidelines, those mergers may be hard to undo, says Cory Capps, a Washington economist specializing in health care antitrust issues.

Excess and Unnecessary Utilization via "Leakage Control"

With big hospital systems now owning physician practices, and practicing physicians directly answering to executives, the push will be on to maximize use of the most lucrative services. Once the hospital systems have made employees out of the physicians, it is easy to pressure their own employed physicians to refer patients to the hospital units that can bill most lucratively:

By their own admission, most hospitals are eager to keep patient referrals under the same corporate umbrella, to save on costs and share medical records but also to boost revenue. The hospitals say they wouldn't force an internist, for example, to refer a patient with heart problems to their own cardiologists, but critics say there's certainly financial pressure. Under a little-noticed regulation that took effect in 2007, hospitals are allowed to pay doctors less if they don't do enough internal referrals.

Doctors in Bozeman and Springfield who granted interviews said they didn't feel pressure to be 'team players' with referrals. But some of those who've left large health systems tell a different story, including Mark Callenberger, an orthopedist in Merritt Island, Fla. Callenberger says that the hospital group where he used to work urged him to direct more patients to the MRI machine owned by the hospital. The doctor preferred a more advanced machine at a private practice that he says offered clearer pictures. But after he ignored the recommendations, Callenberger says, the hospital told his office manager to schedule patients at the hospital's MRI anyway, leaving him to perform surgery using 'crummy images.' (The hospital declined to comment on Callenberger's case but says its doctors can use whatever facilities they choose.) Patients may never know about these power struggles, because doctors aren't required to disclose how they choose specialists. And while patients who ask can always see a specialist outside the network, in practice few are likely to challenge their doctors' judgment, says Bruce A. Johnson, a Denver health care lawyer. 'Face it, when we're really sick,' says Johnson, 'if the doctor tells us to jump off a roof, we'll probably consider doing it.'

Note that we discussed (here and here) the example of a for-profit hospital system with a large number of physician employees pushed to choke off "leakage" of patient referrals outside the system.

Summary

The overarching problem is that employed physicians now must answer to managers and executives who may put financial goals, and their own enrichment, ahead of physicians' values, and specifically will choose increased revenue over providing the best possible care to individual patients:

. Executives here are also hoping to push the needle further—standardizing everything from how long patients wait on hold to the ease of parking at the doctor's office (valets, luxury-restaurant style, are one solution under consideration).

Still, Mikell acknowledges, 'doctors don't want follow-the-directions, cookbook medicine.' And for many physicians, the idea of following new rules triggers a much larger unease at giving up their independence—a feeling of loss, both for the businesses they built and for their patients. Back in Bozeman, Blair Erb, the sole cardiologist in town, is a picture of resignation as he prepares to sign a contract with Deaconess. 'I feel defeated,' Erb says, looking around at the office furniture he and his wife, Liz, chose from a catalog years ago. The weathered ranchers and bundled-up women that come through his door mostly express disbelief when they hear that this frank-talking Tennessee native will sell his practice. His staffers say they're not looking forward to the questions the hospital's medical records system will soon prompt them to ask patients. (Do you wear a bike helmet regularly? Do you have a smoke detector?) 'We'll try to retain as much professional independence as possible,' Erb says, gazing at the hospital building, whose bulk he can see through his window. 'But the fact of the matter is, we'll have a new master.'

So I for one do not welcome our new executive overlords.

We have posted about numerous examples of health care organizational leaders who put their own enrichment ahead of the mission. Now even ostensibly non-profit hospital systems are increasingly competing against for-profit systems. We have seen, as noted above, an example of a for-profit system that seems to betting everything on a business strategy to reduce "leakage" of patient referrals.  We can expect that non-profit hospital systems will have to act more like for-profit systems, and the perverse financial incentives given the managers of all hospital systems will lead to pressure on physicians to forgo their responsibilities to provide the best care to individual patients in favor of actions that will bring in the most money in the shortest time.

We seem to be witnessing the rise of the corporate physician, the rise of a physician who must first answer to managers who never committed to putting patient care first, who may have no sympathy for physicians' core values, who may receive huge incentives to maximize short-term revenue no matter what. Such a rise of corporate physicians would be unprecedented in the US, and I believe in any developed country.

The rise of the corporate physician would require patients to put their trust in corporations, rather than individual doctors, in the era of the global financial collapse, in the new gilded age.

We may be seeing the end of health care world as we know it. The upcoming brave new world of health care may be worse that we can imagine.

What is to be done? - I rarely have ventured into specific policy suggestions, but I think that the consequences of the well-intended "accountable care organization" blunder may be so severe that I must so venture now. We must derail the movement towards "accountable care organizations." Any movement to make organizations more accountable cannot do so by making most professionals into employees answering to the sorts of ill-informed, incompetent, self-interested, conflicted or even corrupt leaders that we have been writing about for more than six years on Health Care Renewal.  We need to make it impossible for for-profit companies to employ physicians to take care of patients.  Maybe we need to think about making it impossible for for-profit companies to provide patient care at all, and for for-profit companies to sell health insurance.  Meanwhile, we need to ensure the accountability, integrity, transparency, and honesty of leaders of health care organizations.

If we do not reverse the current trends, anyone who wants good health care may have to look for it somewhere other than in the US.

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ACO = Arrogant Clinical or Aggressive Care Oligopoly?

In the 1970s, it was managed care organizations.  In the 1990s, it was vertically integrated health care systems.  In the 2010s, the fashionable concept for improving health care, apparently beloved by left-wing policy wonks and right-wing health care executives is the "accountable care organization." (ACO).  Development of the ACO is funded by the recently passed US health care reform legislation.  The official definition of ACO from the US Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services is: 

An Accountable Care Organization, also called an 'ACO' for short, is an organization of health care providers that agrees to be accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of Medicare beneficiaries who are enrolled in the traditional fee-for-service program who are assigned to it.

Oddly enough, that seems like it could also describe a 1970s managed care organization, or a 1990s vertically integrated health care system. The only real difference is the idea that the ACO would be paid fees for service. All these similar concepts embody the notion that health care needs to be highly organized into big, bureaucratic organizations to improve quality and access while controlling costs.

Back in August, we warned:

There seems to be a strange and increasing alliance between politically- correct academic theorists and proponents of raw economic power. The theorists' notion of "accountable care organizations" seems to have become a great foil for would-be monopolists, yet the theorists have done nothing to show how their creation would really bring "power to the people." Meanwhile, maybe 'ACO' should stand for 'aggressive care oligopoly.' Meanwhile, be extremely skeptical of the latest health care fad, especially when it is supported both by academics and CEOs.

I am not sure you really heard it here first, but you did hear it here early. Now, three months later, our doubts have become main-stream.

Revisiting Sutter Health

n California, National Public Radio continued to document the increasing market dominance of the Sutter Health system (which we discussed in August here) as it marches toward becoming an ACO:

Through new construction and expanding its doctors' groups, Sutter Health is enhancing its position as one of the most dominant hospital systems in California. In addition, Sutter is further ahead of many competitors in fashioning itself into a so-called accountable care organization, responsible for coordinating care between hospitals, specialists and primary doctors.

A companion article gave examples of how this emerging ACO is becoming increasingly oligoplistic:

Hospital prices in the Sacramento region are among the highest in California, driven in large part by the negotiating clout of the hospital chain Sutter Health.

Over the last decade and a half, Sutter has gradually accumulated hospitals and amassed a roster of doctors who contract exclusively with the company. Sutter is now one of the largest hospital chains in California with 24 acute care hospitals.

'In this Roseville market, which is a big suburban area, the hospital is Sutter,' says John Murray, a veteran insurance broker. 'It's a lock right now. Because Sutter dominates the market, major insurance companies, like Blue Cross and Aetna, can't sell policies that exclude Sutter hospitals and doctors. That dependence means the hospital chain can dictate high prices.'

Concerns about Sutter's market dominance are also increasing:

'As Sutter gets bigger,' says Anthony Wright, executive director of Health Access California, a nonprofit advocacy group based in Sacramento, 'it can dictate higher prices and is less accountable for ensuring good quality because it has a lock on certain markets.'

Doubts in the New York Times

In the New York Times, Robert Pear reported:

When Congress passed the health care law, it envisioned doctors and hospitals joining forces, coordinating care and holding down costs, with the prospect of earning government bonuses for controlling costs.

Now, eight months into the new law there is a growing frenzy of mergers involving hospitals, clinics and doctor groups eager to share costs and savings, and cash in on the incentives. They, in turn, have deployed a small army of lawyers and lobbyists trying to persuade the Obama administration to relax or waive a body of older laws intended to thwart health care monopolies, and to protect against shoddy care and fraudulent billing of patients or Medicare.

Consumer advocates fear that the health care law could worsen some of the very problems it was meant to solve — by reducing competition, driving up costs and creating incentives for doctors and hospitals to stint on care, in order to retain their cost-saving bonuses.

'The new law is already encouraging a wave of mergers, joint ventures and alliances in the health care industry,' said Prof. Thomas L. Greaney, an expert on health and antitrust law at St. Louis University. 'The risk that dominant providers and dominant insurers may exercise their market power, individually or jointly, has never been greater.'

Skeptical Liberals and Libertarians
Amazingly, while ACOs seem to be supported by many left-wing policy wonks and right-wing health care executives, they have also rapidly engendered skepticism from both liberals on the left and libertarians on the right, and from within government and the private sector. For example, at the end of the NY Times article we find:

Dr. Donald M. Berwick, the administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, hails the benefits of 'integrated care.' But, Dr. Berwick said, “we need to assure both patients and society at large that destructive, exploitative and costly forms of collusion and monopolistic behaviors do not emerge and thrive, disguised as cooperation.”

Dr Berwick is a well-known advocate of innovative approaches to improve the quality of care, but was tarred as a raving left-winger when he was nominated to his current position.

On the other hand, in the New York Post was an op-ed by Dr Scott Gottlieb:

I warned that the creation of 'accountable care organizations,' which put hospitals in control of all the doctors in their outlying areas, would lead to concentrated power over the provision of medical care -- turning physicians into salaried employees and reducing consumer choices.

Furthermore, he wrote:

Since the ACOs will have local monopolies, they'll also have little incentive to compete for more patients in an open marketplace. Yet this is the only incentive that would spur an ACO to truly innovate and improve its delivery of medical care and offer better services.

Private health plans vie to contract with the best doctors and hospitals, creating market prices for services and competition to improve outcomes. If the ACOs squeeze out this competition, the result will be a de facto 'single payer': Every market will be controlled by a single ACO,....

Dr Gottlieb writes frequently about health care and policy issues, and is a "resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute."

Missing the Main Point: Doctors vs Business Executives as Leaders
At least it did not take long this time for the fundamental flaws in the latest fashionable health care reform effort to get attention. It is really striking that this time around, skepticism is coming from both liberals and libertarians.  Maybe we all have learned something from the failures of managed care and of vertically integrated hospital systems.

A Washington Post op-ed by Steven Pearlstein hinted at one fundamental problem with the ACO concept.

Most reformers believe ...that the best way to deliver affordable quality care is through organizations such as the Mayo Clinic, which coordinate physician and hospital services under one roof and are paid not on the basis of how many procedures they do but on the quality of the care they provide. These organizations tend to rely on salaried doctors, make extensive use of electronic medical records and evidence-based 'best practices,' and, in effect, take on much of the risk traditionally borne by insurers. Several provisions of the new health-care reform law encourage the formation of such 'accountable care organizations.'

Somehow, however, the supposed health care reformers seemed to have overlooked a crucial fact about the Mayo Clinic they are using as a model. The Mayo Clinic traditionally was basically a large physician group practice. It was run by physicians. Even now, the Mayo Clinic's CEO is a physician (Dr John H. Noseworthy) who had a substantial clinical and academic career. The CAO is a nurse, and the three top Vice Presidents are physicians.  I submit the fact that the organization was run by physicians, physicians who once swore to put their patients' clinical care ahead of all other considerations, was crucial to the Clinic's success in taking care of patients as well as maintaining its finances.

However, nearly all of the would-be ACOs we hear about now are centered on big hospital systems, run by business executives who have never taken care of patients, and never swore to put patient care ahead of anything. For example, the most advanced degree possessed by the CEO of Sutter Health is a Master's in Health Administration (see here). Sutter Health does not make biographical information about its top executives particularly easy to find, but according to the most recent (2008) 990 form posted on Guidestar, of its 19 top executives, only 2 had MD degrees. As we have seen time and again on Health Care Renewal, such executives have become extremely good at becoming rich in their jobs. (For example, according to the 2008 990 form, of those 19 executives, all had total compensation greater than $200,000, 16 had compensation greater than $500,000, and 9 had compensation greater than $1 million.) When things go wrong, these royally paid executives may take their golden parachutes and open the exit door, and jump on the slide.

The advent of ACOs reminds me of the advent of managed care. The original managed care organizations, exemplified by Kaiser - Permanante, were also not-for-profit large group practices run by physicians. However, the "managed care organizations" that evolved out of the 1970s law, favored by our glorious former President Nixon, were for-profit corporations run by business executives. Somehow, when legislators seek to promote better health care, the legislation they right often get the crucial details wrong.

The one good thing about ACOs seems to be that they have galvanized liberals and libertarians alike to worry about big, collective, bureaucratic health care organizations run by executives with no clear commitment to putting care of individual patients first.

ADDENDUM (26 November, 2010) - See also comments by David Williams on the Health Business Blog.

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How Oligopolists Rationalize Their Market Domination: the Examples of Sutter Health and the Carilion Clinic

Advocates of laissez faire commercialized health care often trumpet the advantages of competitive markets as a rationale for deregulation.  While there are theoretic, and possibly empiric reasons to think that competitive markets are the optimal way to distribute goods and services, we recently discussed aspects of health care that make it extremely hard for health care markets to be ideally competitive. 

Meanwhile, two news articles gave some case-based evidence about how current health care markets are hardly competitive.  

Sutter Health

A Bloomberg article focused on Sutter Health in northern and central California. Sutter Health commands a substantial part of a very large market:

Sutter Health Co., the nonprofit that owns Sutter Davis, has market power that commands prices 40 to 70 percent higher than its rivals per typical procedure -- and pacts with insurers that keep those prices secret.

Sutter can charge these prices because it has acquired more than a third of the market in the San Francisco-to-Sacramento region through more than 20 hospital takeovers in the last 30 years, according to executives of Aetna Inc., Health Net Inc. and Blue Shield of California, who asked not to be named because their agreements with Sutter ban disclosure of prices.

Also,

Operating as a nonprofit, it has $8.8 billion in revenues, 24 hospitals, 17 outpatient surgery clinics and a 3,500-doctor network, making it the largest health-care provider in an 11- county region -- from San Francisco Bay to the Sierra Nevada mountains -- where 10 million people live.

Sutter has 35 percent of the revenue and 36 percent of beds that compete for patients in the region, according to a state hospital database, including 100 percent of beds the state tracks in Placer and Amador counties east of Sacramento.

Sutter care seems to cost a lot more than care from other doctors and hospitals:

After Mark Logsdon tore a ligament in his knee skiing at Lake Tahoe in March, he returned home to suburban Sacramento and had an MRI scan at Sutter Davis Hospital.

Sutter’s price for the knee scan was $1,271, payable by Logsdon and his insurer. Exactly the same MRI at one of the local imaging centers owned by Radiological Associates of Sacramento would have cost $696 -- 45 percent less.

A few other examples of Sutter's prices compared to others;

'Instead of leveraging its system to be more cost- effective, we’ve seen Sutter leveraging its system for monopoly pricing,' said Peter V. Lee, who in June became director of health-care delivery system reform for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Lee was interviewed while he worked at the Pacific Business Group on Health, a coalition that includes Chevron Corp., Walt Disney Co., General Electric Co., and Wells Fargo & Co.

In San Francisco, Aetna pays Sutter’s California Pacific Medical Center in a range with a midpoint of $4,700 for an abdominal CT scan, compared to $3,200 at St. Francis Memorial Hospital, owned by Catholic Health Care West. For colonoscopies, Aetna’s midpoint price is $3,200 at Sutter’s flagship CPMC and $2,800 at St. Francis Memorial.

In Palo Alto, Aetna pays Sutter $349 per visit for new patients to see Manju Deshpande, a family doctor in Sutter’s Palo Alto Medical Foundation clinic. Three miles away, Paul Ford’s Stanford Medical Group receives $222. If the patient needs an immunization, Aetna pays Palo Alto Medical $85, and Stanford Medical, $16. Deshpande removes wax from the ear for $175. Ford scoops it out for $104.

Down the road in Silicon Valley, when obstetrician Sarah Azad, a solo practitioner, delivers a baby for a patient covered by Aetna, the insurer pays her $2,052. When Nicole Wilcox of Sutter’s Palo Alto Medical Foundation does the same job, Aetna pays Sutter $5,890.

The doctors practice blocks apart in Mountain View, California. Performance isn’t an issue -- Azad has Aetna’s top rating for quality of care and trained Wilcox during residency.

The Sutter CEO, of course, denies there is a problem:

Sutter operates in a competitive market, Chief Executive Officer Patrick Fry, 53, said in an interview. 'I don’t see Sutter Health as having market power, given the choices that employers can make,' Fry said. 'The market has a lot of room to make a lot of decisions.'

The people who most praise competitive markets often seem to be those who have done the most to reduce the competitiveness of these markets.  The CEO also trotted out another old saw, that his organization has grown not to charge more, but to be more efficient.

While Sutter may have higher 'unit' prices than its competitors, Fry said, it is not the most costly for patients over the long run because its integration of hospitals and doctor groups allows it to provide more efficient care, cutting down on the number of procedures.

'Our mission isn’t to maximize profits,' Fry added. 'Our mission, to the extent we can, is to optimize services.' Insurers and patients have many alternatives to Sutter, according to Fry.

That is a tune would-be monopolists have been singing at least since the days of the "robber barons" and their monopolies such as Standard Oil.

Of course, he is likely to defend a system that makes so much money and pays him and his buddies in top management so much, (and, contrary to his statement above, seems to have maximized profits):

Sutter, with 48,000 employees, was among the most profitable hospital groups in the U.S. in 2009, with income of $697 million, up more than three-fold from 2008 due to large investment gains, on revenue that grew 6 percent to $8.8 billion.

Its 5.2 percent operating margin -- or operating income as a percentage of revenue -- was 73 percent higher than the median for all nonprofit hospital systems in 2009, according to Standard & Poor’s.

As of Dec. 31, Sutter had a $2.63 billion investment portfolio. Sutter paid Fry $2.8 million in 2008, according to its latest Internal Revenue Service filing. His top 14 lieutenants made between $830,000 and $1.8 million each.

The article on Sutter emphasized how the strategic use of secrecy has helped Sutter maintain its remunerative ways:

Sutter doesn’t allow its prices to be disclosed on insurers’ websites because it believes the information is often misleading and doesn’t reflect the variables of each patient’s case, [Sutter spokesman William] Gleeson said.

Of course, keeping prices secret just makes the market even less like an ideally competitive one:

As Sutter’s confidentiality terms show, the actual prices that hospitals receive are often kept secret by insurers. Patients in need of hospital care, especially in emergencies, often can’t travel very far, restricting competition. And if they have health insurance, they have little incentive to price shop.

Finally, the article reminds us that the latest fad from health policy and health management circles (which seem increasingly to overlap), "accountable care organizations," may just be a pretext for even more market consolidation:

The federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is looking for $500 billion in savings over the next decade to help pay for extending coverage to 32 million uninsured Americans. Yet it doesn’t address the problem of market concentration -- and may make it worse, said Robert Berenson, a physician and policy analyst at the Urban Institute in Washington D.C.

The 'unchecked' clout of hospital and physician groups in California is a 'cautionary tale for national health reform,' Berenson said in a February article in the journal Health Affairs. He warned that incentives in the new legislation to improve treatment by promoting doctor-hospital alliances -- called 'accountable care organizations' -- could backfire by strengthening providers’ bargaining leverage.

Carilion Clinic
A Washington Post article discussed the example of Carilion Clinic in Virginia, whose increasing market power we had blogged about in 2008:

Railroads put this city on the map, but the king of the domain is now health care -- or rather, the Carilion Clinic.

Carilion owns the two hospitals in town and six others in the region, employs 550 doctors and has set off a bitter local debate: Is its dominance a new model for health care or a blatant attempt to corner the market?

The Carilion story emphasized again how the "accountable care organization" meme is being used to justify market consolidation, allowing health care oligopolies to appear politically correct:

Carilion says it represents an ideal envisioned by the nation's new health-care law: a network that increases efficiency by bringing more doctors and hospitals onto one team, integrating care from the doctor's office to the operating room. The name for such networks, which the new law strongly promotes with pilot programs, is accountable care organizations, or ACOs -- providers joining together to be 'accountable' for the total care of patients, with incentives from insurers to keep people healthy and costs down.

Note that this political correctness is also used to justify further consolidation of power by limiting outside referrals:

Independent doctors say Carilion is urging its employees to refer patients only to providers within the Carilion network, cloaking its expansion in the lingo of health-care reform.

Of course, the Carilion CEO also denies anything but the most altruistic intent, but he too is making a lot of money from the current system:

[Edward] Murphy, Carilion's chief executive who earned $2.3 million in 2008, acknowledges that providers holding excessive leverage over insurers is cause for concern but argues that ACOs can be a corrective.

Summary

We noted earlier this week that multiple kinds of uncertainty (e.g., about diagnosis, prognosis, and the effects of treatment), and information asymmetry make it theoretically difficult for the health care market to be truly competitive. Meanwhile, there is increasing evidence that the market is actually uncompetitive. Although there are many hospitals and health insurers across the US, in many areas there are very few insurers and very few hospitals or hospital systems from which to choose. We have previously blogged about how market dominant hospital systems seem to be able to charge more than any others.

In the 1960s, it became recognized that physicians' professionalism, hospitals' devotion to their missions, and sometimes even (gasp) government regulation might partially compensate for distortions in the health care market. However, as supposed free market advocates became more powerful, they pushed for the commercialization of medicine and hospitals, reducing professionalism and mission support, and the hollowing out government regulation. (However, why did the people who attacked medical societies' codes of ethics as monopolistic have no interest in attacking market domination by insurers or hospital systems?  Inquiring minds want to know.)

As we said last time, true health care reform would help physicians and other health care professionals uphold their traditional values, including, as the AMA once stated, "the practice of medicine should not be commercialized, nor treated as a commodity in trade." True health care reform would put health care "delivery" back in the hands of mission-focused, not-for-profit organizations, which put patients' health, safety and welfare first.

Meanwhile, these latest stories about market dominating hospital systems suggest some additional lessons.

Secrecy is the would-be monopolist's best friend. However, it is hard to think of very many kinds of information that hospitals really ought to be able to keep as proprietary secrets. As usual, sunshine is the best disinfectant.

There seems to be a strange and increasing alliance between politically- correct academic theorists and proponents of raw economic power. The theorists' notion of "accountable care organizations" seems to have become a great foil for would-be monopolists, yet the theorists have done nothing to show how their creation would really bring "power to the people." Meanwhile, maybe "ACO" should stand for "aggressive care oligopoly." Meanwhile, be extremely skeptical of the latest health care fad, especially when it is supported both by academics and CEOs.

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