Congressman Darrell Issa: FDA's email monitoring of "whistleblowers" communicating with Congress was illegal

In followup to my post of Jan. 30, 2012 "Can You Sue the Government? FDA Whistleblowers Sue Over Surveillance of Personal e-Mail" I provide a link to a probing letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform to Margaret Hamburg MD, Commissioner of the FDA.

The letter raises the issue that FDA's email monitoring of "whistleblowers" communicating with Congress was illegal ("unlawful, and will not be tolerated"), and the illegality was further compounded by harassment and retaliation against the "whistleblowers."

Many probing "who? why? when?" questions are asked of FDA.

I do not have free text of this letter, just a link to images of the letter. I cannot post the text (no access to OCR of a PDF at the moment), but the letter images are here:

http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/FDAComplaint/issaletter.fdaspying.pdf

Worth reading in its entirety.

-- SS

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Can You Sue the Government? FDA Whistleblowers Sue Over Surveillance of Personal e-Mail

From the Washington Post:

FDA staffers sue agency over surveillance of personal e-mail
Ellen Nakashima and Lisa Rein
January 29, 2012

The Food and Drug Administration secretly monitored the personal e-mail of a group of its own scientists and doctors after they [the scientists - ed.] warned Congress that the agency was approving medical devices that they believed posed unacceptable risks to patients, government documents show.

The surveillance — detailed in e-mails and memos unearthed by six of the scientists and doctors, who filed a lawsuit against the FDA in U.S. District Court in Washington last week — took place over two years as the plaintiffs accessed their personal Gmail accounts from government computers.

While accessing Gmail from government computers was not a wise idea, since all traffic over an institutional PC and network can be monitored, these Gmails were apparently to members of Congress.

Copies of the e-mails show that, starting in January 2009, the FDA intercepted communications with congressional staffers and draft versions of whistleblower complaints complete with editing notes in the margins. The agency also took electronic snapshots of the computer desktops of the FDA employees and reviewed documents they saved on the hard drives of their government computers.

See sample emails at link above.

Information garnered this way eventually contributed to the harassment or dismissal of all six of the FDA employees, the suit alleges. All had worked in an office responsible for reviewing devices for cancer screening and other purposes.

That's very unfortunate.

It will be far more unfortunate if the warnings of the six, as in this whistleblower case, went unheeded, and patients are injured or die as a result. In that case, FDA bureaucrats might have been accessories to those injuries or deaths.

“Who would have thought that they would have the nerve to be monitoring my communications to Congress?” said Robert C. Smith, one of the plaintiffs in the suit, a former radiology professor at Yale and Cornell universities who worked as a device reviewer at the FDA until his contract was not renewed in July 2010. “How dare they?”

I, on the other hand, would have expected it. It would have been far more prudent to send such emails from a private home computer and ISP.

The scientists and doctors denied sharing information improperly. The HHS inspector general’s office, which oversees FDA operations, declined to pursue an investigation, finding no evidence of criminal conduct. It also said that the doctors and scientists had a legal right to air their concerns to Congress or journalists.

FDA officials sought a second time that year to initiate action against the scientists and doctors. “We have obtained new information confirming the existence of information disclosures that undermine the integrity and mission of the FDA and, we believe, may be prohibited by law,” wrote Jeffrey Shuren, director of the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health, on June 28, 2010.

The inspector general, after consulting with federal prosecutors, declined the second request, as well.

The IG office seemed to find the behavior legal, but FDA bureaucrats apparently did not like non-team players.

The FDA scientists and doctors, all of whom worked for the agency’s Office of Device Evaluation, said they first made internal complaints beginning in 2007 that the agency had approved or was on the verge of approving at least a dozen radiological devices whose effectiveness was not proven and that posed risks to millions of patients. Frustrated, they also brought their concerns to Congress, the White House and the HHS inspector general.

Three of the devices risked missing signs of breast cancer, the scientists and doctors warned, according to documents and interviews. Another risked falsely diagnosing osteoporosis, leading to unnecessary treatments; one ultrasound device could malfunction while monitoring pregnant women in labor, risking harm to the fetus; and several devices for colon cancer screening used such heavy doses of radiation that they risked causing cancer in otherwise healthy people, the FDA scientists and doctors said.

Permit me to wonder if regulatory capture played a role in these decisions.

One might also wonder if complaints about electronic health records or other clinical IT, admitted by FDA to be a medical device "political hot potato" they elected to not regulate, were also involved.

... The first documented FDA interception was of an e-mail dated Jan. 29, 2009, shortly after the letter from Ferry. In it, device reviewer Paul T. Hardy asked a congressional aide, Joanne Royce, for assurances that “it is not a crime to provide information to the Congress about potential misconduct by another Agency employee.”

Royce replied: “[Y]ou and your colleagues have committed no crime. . . . you guys didn’t even provide confidential business information to Congress.”

The only 'crime' was apparently not being a 'team player', which on Healthcare Renewal has been defined as someone who is silent, or silenced, or a co-conspirator regarding managerial mediocrity, malfeasance, or madness.

Hardy, who is among the six employees who filed the suit, was fired in November after a negative performance review; an internal FDA letter obtained in separate litigation quoted managers saying they did not “trust” him. Of the other five scientists and doctors, the suit says two did not have their contracts renewed, two suffered harassment and werepassed over for promotions, and one was fired.

Trust him to do - what, I ask?

Read the whole WaPo article.

Plaintiff's lawyers need to be aware of this event, and I intend to make them aware.

-- SS

Feb. 13, 2012 addendum:

A link to Darrell Issa's letter to FDA Commissioner Hamburg is here.

-- SS

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FDA Recalls Draeger Health IT Device Because "This Product May Cause Serious Adverse Health Consequences, Including Death"

More health IT madness, in the form of an actual FDA recall:

FDA Recall notice

Draeger Medical Inc., Infinity Acute Care System Monitoring Solution (M540)
Recall Class: Class I [the most serious type of recall, see below - ed.]
Date Recall Initiated: October 18, 2011
Product: Infinity Acute Care System Monitoring Solution (M540), Catalog number MS25510
All serial numbers are affected by this recall.

This product was manufactured from March 1, 2011 through September 30, 2011 and distributed only to the Rush University Medical Center (Chicago, Illinois) from July 1, 2011 through September 30, 2011.

Use: This product is a networked solution system used to monitor a patient’s vital signs and therapy, control alarms, review Web-based diagnostic images, and access patient records. The number of monitored vital signs can be increased or decreased based on the patient’s needs.

Recalling Firm: Draeger Medical, Inc. 3135 Quarry Rd., Telford,
Pennsylvania 18969-1042

Manufacturer: Draeger Medical GmbH, Moislinger Allee 53-55_23558, Lubeck, Germany

Reason for Recall: The weight-based drug dosage calculation may indicate incorrect recommended values, including a drug dosage up to ten times the indicated dosage. Additionally, there may be a 5-10 second delay between the electrocardiogram and blood pressure curves (waveforms) at the Infinity Central Station.

This product may cause serious adverse health consequences, including death.

Public Contact: Draeger Medical, Inc. 3135 Quarry Road Telford, Pennsylvania 18969-1042_215-660-2349

FDA District: Philadelphia

FDA Comments: On October 17, 2011, the company sent the Rush University Medical Center a letter stating that users should enter the patient’s weight by way of the admin/demographics screen to ensure the drug dosage is calculated as intended.

Additionally, the company’s letter states that users should follow the instructions for Use of the Infinity Acute Care System Monitoring Solution. The Instructions for Use includes, "For primary monitoring and diagnosis of bedside patients, use the bedside monitor. Use the Infinity Central Station only for remote assessment of a patient's status." [That is, clinicians should work around the device's defects, which would seem to hold the computer's rights over the patients' rights -- rather than taking the device out of service immediately and having the vendor fix it - ed.]

Class I recalls are the most serious type of recall and involve situations in which there is a reasonable probability that use of these products will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.

Health care professionals and consumers may report adverse reactions or quality problems they experienced using these products to MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program either online, by regular mail or by FAX.

I find a software company advising clinicians to make sure to "work around" blatant IT defects in "acute care environments" the height of arrogance and contempt for patient safety. Yes, acute care environments are not unpredictable, chaotic environments often moving a mile a minute. They are precisely the environment where everyone can sit around on their butts and leisurely hold, over pizzas and cokes, a committee meeting where each and every move can be discussed, just like in a software development shop ...

I also find the statement that this medical device was "distributed only to the Rush University Medical Center" remarkable. If true, it raises a number of issues that make me very uncomfortable:

• How did the company's letter to Rush make its way to FDA? Whistle blower?

• What testing was done by the manufacturer of this medical device before release to a live-patient environment?

• Who approved this software "going live?" What due diligence was performed?

• Was this a software beta test of experimental software on live subjects?

• Did Rush University Medical Center have some sort of quid pro quo (e.g., financial arrangement) with the software company?

• Did Rush seek IRB approval of this device?

• Were patients presented with an informed consent process regarding its use in their care?

• Were any patients actually injured or did any die as a result of this software?

The answers to these questions need to be sought by FDA.

-- SS

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A Logical Fallacy Affecting Selection of Panelists on an FDA Advisory Committee

An old argument used to defend against criticisms of conflicts of interest was just employed in a disturbing context. 

Expert Removed from FDA Advisory Committee for Having an Opinion

As first reported on the PharmaLot blog, and later by the Newark Star-Ledger, a panelist was just disqualified from voting on a US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) panel for having previously expressed an opinion about the safety of the drug up for re-evaluation.  Per the Star-Ledger,

Federal drug regulators have notified Sidney Wolfe, one of the nation's leading advocates for drug safety, that he would not be permitted to join a committee of experts asked to review new dangers associated with a group of birth control pills, including Bayer Healthcare's top-selling Yaz.

The Food and Drug Administration scheduled a meeting Thursday of two advisory committees — one on drug safety and risk management and the other on reproductive health drugs — after new information emerged on the safety of oral contraceptives containing the synthetic hormone

Why Was Dr Wolf removed from the committee?

The agency recently learned that Public Citizen, a non-profit consumer advocacy organization, had placed one of the contraceptives, Bayer’s Yasmine — a predecessor to Yaz — on its list of 'Do Not Use Pills' in 2002.

'He did not volunteer this information,' said agency spokeswoman Erica Jefferson. 'It was brought to our attention.'

The FDA offered Wolfe two options: He could present information to the advisory committee like other members of the public or he could sit on the committee, participate in the discussion but refrain from voting.

Logical Fallacy: False Dilemma

We frequently post about conflicts of interest affecting health care decision-makers.  It is now clear (e.g., look here) that leading health care academics often have significant financial relationships with drug and device companies and other health care corporations which could potentially influence their clinical research, clinical teaching, health policy recommendations, or direct patient care.  These relationships are frequently defended, often with logical fallacies used by those who themselves have conflicts. 

One common argument is based on the assertion that conflicts of interest are ubiquitous and everyone is conflicted.  Therefore, if one were to ban people with conflicts from responsible positions, there would be no one left to fill these positions, so such a ban would be untenable.  This seems to be an example of the false dilemma.  It is often employed by people who themselves have conflicts of interest.

One way to make it appear that everyone has conflicts of interest is to broaden the concept of conflicts of interest to "intellectual conflicts of interest."  Doing this facilitates the assertion that everyone who has an opinion on a subject has a conflict of interest, so this argument implies that all sentient beings have important conflicts.  This argument would make equivalent a doctor who would not use a particular drug because his or her reading of the clinical research literature about this drug suggests its benefits do not outweigh its harms, and a doctor who advocates using the drug, and is paid $100,000 a year by the marketing division of the company that makes this drug as a marketing consultant. 

The decision to prevent Dr Wolfe from voting on this committee seems to be based on this logical fallacy. As Dr Wolfe said,

In his statement, Wolfe said if intellectual conflict of interest means being informed and subsequently having opinions on a drug, then 'many more members of advisory committees would have to be excluded.'

'For members of a scientific and technical advisory committee, possessing information and expert views on matters within the purview of the committee is not a conflict of interest,' Wolfe wrote. 'To the contrary, qualified experts are likely to have developed views on a variety of subjects based on their professional experience.'

As Larry Husten wrote on the CardioBrief blog,

do we really want to choose advisory committee panelists who have never expressed opinions about the topics they are reviewing? Are we reaching the point where potential FDA panelists will be required, like Supreme Court nominees, to have avoided any discussion of all important issues at every point in the past?

Thus they point out the absurdity of banning people with "intellectual conflicts of interests," that is, with relevant opinions, as if they had real conflicts of interest. (But wait for someone to argue that if Wolfe were allowed to serve, it would be unfair to ban anyone with financial conflicts of interest from serving.)

What is most distressing about this case is that the sort of fallacious arguments usually employed by the conflicted to defend conflicts of interest are now being employed by leaders of government agencies, who are supposed to not have their own conflicts, and to serve the people, and in this case, to be dedicated to improving the health and safety of the population and of individual patients.

Every fallacious argument made in support of financial conflicts of interest affecting health care decision makers suggests we need to do more to combat such conflicts.  At an absolute minimum, all such conflicts should be fully disclosed in detail in any context in which they possibly could influence medical research, medical education, clinical care, or health policy.  Furthermore, we need to work towards ending as many such conflicts as possible.  A good starting point would be the recommendations made by the Institute of Medicine committee reports on conflicts of interest, and clinical practice guidelines.

See also comments by Merrill Goozner on the GoozNews blog.

ADDENDUM (9 December, 2011) - In response to comments below, see two posts by Dr Howard Brody in the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine, and Pharma blog on the problems with the concept of "intellectual conflict of interest" - here and here.

ADDENDUM (9 December, 2011) -  See further discussion by posted by Dr Brody today here.

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Retreat Back to Regulatory Capture: US FDA, NIH, Department of Health and Human Services All Back Off

After some brave words about transparency, integrity and all that, US government officials seem to be running back to the arms of the health care corporate CEOs.

Weakening FDA Conflict of Interest Rules

As reported by Reuters,

U.S. lawmakers likely will change the criteria for advisers reviewing new medicines next year because of complaints that the rules meant to prevent conflicts of interest make it harder to find real experts.

Congressional lawmakers may require the Food and Drug Administration to relax the rules that bar advisers from reviewing a drug if they have even indirect financial ties to related manufacturers, as part of an FDA funding bill.

This was not purely an initiative of legislators, but was egged on by a top FDA administrator

The agency often must delay panel meetings while it searches for experts without conflicts, lawmakers and FDA officials say. Top doctors are usually the ones drugmakers hire as speakers or consultants.

'We have had difficulty in recruiting highly qualified people. And we've had delays in having panels because of this,' Dr. Janet Woodcock, head of the FDA's drugs center, told a House of Representatives hearing earlier this month.

The result is that 23 percent of FDA advisory panels have vacancies, more than double the agency's stated goal, according to the FDA's quarterly report at the end of May.

The rationale was that those paid by drug and device companies are the most expert:

The FDA tightened guidelines in 2007 to minimize industry ties that could sway a panelist's view, partly inspired by the scandal with Merck's pain reliever Vioxx.

Ten of the 32 panelists advising the FDA on the drug consulted for drugmakers. Nine of the 10 recommended putting the drug back on the market after it was pulled in 2004 over concerns about heart risk.

The restrictions go too far, say lawmakers who want the FDA to approve more new medicines, in part because they promote American jobs.

'No longer can we deny experts simply because they have ties to industry,' said Georgia Representative Phil Gingrey during a House of Representative hearing on FDA funding last month. The committee's chairman, Fred Upton from Michigan, called the conflict of interest rules 'rigid and unrealistic.'

Industry executives, who want the FDA to speed drug approvals, also support relaxing the rules. Biogen Idec CEO George Scangos said the guidelines 'exclude a lot of people who would be the best qualified.'

Of course, the drug and device companies have been touting their paid "key opinion leaders" as the best and the brightest for a long time. There is plenty of evidence, however, that they are mainly those whom those companies find the most compliant, and in many cases, those who are willing to be stealth marketers on those companies' payrolls. (See this post about those who recruit KOLs regarding them as salesmen, and more here.)  "Key opinion leaders" supported by commercial grant funding may seem like experts to academic medical institutions' leadership who now value outside funding more than teaching and research excellence (see this post).

Furthermore, as reported by Politco, the Project on Government Oversight, a watchdog group, chastised FDA leadership for exaggerating the difficulty of finding unconflicted experts, concluding in their letter to the FDA Commissioner, "to gain the public trust, we must ensure that the FDA relies on the best available information for its policies, rather than personal opinions and biases."

So far, government officials seem to be more worried about the opinions of corporate leaders than the public trust.

Weakening NIH Conflict of Interest

As discussed in Nature,

Francis Collins hailed it as a 'new era of clarity and transparency in the management of financial conflicts of interest' (S. J. Rockey and F. S. Collins J. Am. Med. Assoc. 303, 2400–2402; 2010). But the director of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) may have spoken too soon when he described a new rule, proposed last year, that would require universities and medical schools to publicly disclose online any financial arrangements that they believe could unduly influence the work of their NIH-funded researchers.

Nature has learned that a cornerstone of that transparency drive — a series of publicly accessible websites detailing such financial conflicts — has now been dropped.

In more detail,

The NIH's parent agency, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), proposed the new rule in May 2010, after congressional and media investigations revealed that prominent NIH grant recipients had failed to tell their universities or medical schools about lucrative payments from companies that may have influenced their government-funded research. The DHHS called the proposed websites 'an important and significant new requirement to … underscore our commitment to fostering transparency, accountability, and public trust'. Under the proposal, institutions with NIH-funded researchers would determine, grant by grant, if any financial conflicts existed for senior scientists on the grant. For example, these would include receiving consultancy fees, or holding shares in a company, 'that could directly and significantly affect the design, conduct, or reporting' of the research. The institutions would post the details online, where they would stay for at least five years.

But of course the medical schools decided that it would just be too much trouble to do all this:

'The websites don't appear out of nowhere,' says Heather Pierce, senior director of science policy at the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) in Washington DC. They would 'require employees to not only create the website but to pull the information, review it, and make sure it is up to date and accurate'.

That is not the only objection from the powerful academic lobbies. During the public comment period last summer, the Association of American Universities and the AAMC submitted a joint statement saying: 'There are serious and reasonable concerns among our members that the Web posting will be of little practical value to the public and, without context for the information, could lead to confusion rather than clarity regarding financial conflicts of interest and how they are managed.'

Given how academic medical institutions have expanded their administrations and bureaucracy, the enormous amounts they spend on management, and the huge compensation they give their executives, and further given how much of their revenues come from government sources (Medicare, Medicaid money for patient care, Veterans Administration money supporting many faculty members, Medicare money funding graduate medical education, and NIH and other government research grants), the notion that getting a few staffers to process disclosures would be administratively or financially burdensome is just laughable.

At least Iowa's Republican Senator Charles Grassley, seemingly one of the last politicians in Washington who cares about the integrity of government programs and spending, is upset. As reported again by Nature,

The US Senate's leading advocate for government transparency wrote today to the White House's budget office, demanding that it protect a proposed rule that would obligate universities to post their publicly-funded biomedical researchers' financial conflicts on a publicly accessible website.

'The public's business should be public... I urge OMB to follow through and approve a rule that includes a publicly available website,' Senator Charles Grassley, Republican of Iowa ..., wrote in in this letter to Jacob Lew, the director of the White House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

Furthermore, he wrote:

I am troubled that taxpayers cannot learn about the outside income of the researchers whom the taxpayers are funding, and this flies in the face of President Obama's call for more transparency in the government.

We will see if his protest does any good, but again it appears that government officials are more worried about the revenues of big health care organizations than the needs of the public.

Retreating from Threats to Disbar Forest Laboratories CEO

We previously posted about how the US Department of Health and Human Services threatened to disbar the CEO of Forrest Laboratories from dealings with the government after his company pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice and misbranding, and paid a $313 million fine.

Now, per Alicia Mundy writing for the Wall Street Journal, things have changed:

The U.S. government dropped efforts to force the resignation of a prominent pharmaceutical-company chief executive, reversing course after protests from the company and major business groups.

The about-face on Forest Laboratories's longtime leader, Howard Solomon, represents a significant retreat by the Department of Health and Human Services, which has said it wants to step up punishments against drug-company executives when wrongdoing happens on their watch.

Forest agreed last year to plead guilty to misdemeanors involving marketing of its drugs including the antidepressant Celexa, and it paid $313 million to resolve the matter.

Mr. Solomon wasn't personally accused of any wrongdoing. Nonetheless, the government notified him in April that it was considering excluding him from jobs at health-care companies that sell to the U.S. government. It invoked a little-used clause in the Social Security Act that allows such an action against corporate leaders of companies found guilty of criminal misconduct, even if the leaders had no knowledge of the misconduct.

The exclusion move would have effectively forced Forest to remove Mr. Solomon from office, because Forest and other drug companies rely on business from U.S. government agencies such as Medicare and the Veterans Administration.

In a letter to Mr. Solomon on Friday, the office of the inspector general of the Department of Health and Human Services said, 'Based on a review of information in our file, and consideration of the information your attorneys provided to us both in writing and in an in-person meeting, we have decided to close this case.'

We have discussed - some might say endlessly - how despite numerous publicly reported cases of wrongdoing by health care organizations, hardly any individual who authorized, directed or implemented the bad behavior has ever faced any negative consequences. There have been recent fulminations by some government officials that this is going to change. The case of the Forest Laboratories CEO appeared to be an example of such change, but no more.

The Wall Street Journal went on to discuss why the government may have changed course:

The government's retreat came after a barrage of complaints from Forest and business groups including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the drug industry's leading trade group.

In July, Forest spent $80,000 to hire former Louisiana Sen. John Breaux to lobby the government regarding exclusion, according to Senate records. Mr. Breaux didn't return a call requesting comment. Forest said earlier that it was just trying to make its case that this was a highly unusual action by the U.S. government.

Of course it was unusual. That is the whole problem.

In any case, it looked like the government was much more concerned about the coddling of corporate CEOs and their lobbyists' and cronies' opinions than about deterring bad behavior by large health care organizations.

Summary

After a bit of blustering by the current US administration about transparency and integrity it appears to be back to business as usual in the US capital. Over the last 20 years, government has increasingly answered to corporate CEOs instead of "we, the people." Protecting patients' and the public's health has given way to protecting the financial health of large health care organizations, and the compensation of rich CEOs. Federalism is giving way to corporatism. As long as this continues, expect our health care system to continue its slow collapse. Eventually, expect the CEOs to get in their private jets and escape while the rest of us picks up the pieces.

Until we dispel the fog of corporatism that has spread over the government that was once supposed to be of the people, by the people, and for the people, expect no real health care reform, and expect continuing rising costs, declining access, and worsening patient care. Obviously, true health care reform would start with the government and its officials putting patients' and the public's health first, way ahead of the financial comfort of corporate CEOs.

See also comments by Alison Bass.

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FDA Decides Regulating Implantable Defibrillator Medical Devices a "Political Hot Potato"; Demurs

Well, not exactly, but they have decided regulation of another medical device is a political hot potato, and demurred on enforcing regulation: 

Health IT. 

Health IT are medical devices.

FDA's Chair of the Center for Device and Radiological Health, Jeffrey Shuren, MD JD, stated this explicitly on Feb. 25, 2010 (see testimony to the HHS Health Information Technology HIT Policy Committee at this PDF) that:

... Under the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, [that regulates all drug, medical devices, etc. in the United States - ed.] HIT software is a medical device. Currently, the FDA mandates that manufacturers of other types of software devices comply with the laws and regulations that apply to more traditional medical device firms. These products include devices that contain one or more software components, parts, or accessories (such as electrocardiographic (ECG) systems used to monitor patient activity), as well as devices that are composed solely of software (such as laboratory information management systems).

That leaves no doubt that these are medical devices. However, he also stated:

To date, FDA has largely refrained from enforcing our regulatory requirements with respect to HIT devices.

In other words, this medical device receives special accommodation over all others,such as heart stents, defibrillators, spine and knee implants, etc., all of which have been in the news in recent years for major defects and malfunctions, up to and including causing patient deaths. The extent would have likely been far, far worse had these gadgets been unregulated.

One should ask: why the special accommodation for health IT medical devices? What are the underlying politics, and who is behind them? Especially when FDA is aware of potential risks that may only be the "tip of the iceberg?"

The selective reluctance to enforce the FD&C Act persists to this day. See for example this link regarding his statements just a few days ago here in Philadelphia: Will FDA Regulate EHR's? :

Speaking at the first annual PharmEHR Summit in Philadelphia on April 7, Jeffrey Shuren, M.D., J.D., director of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health at the FDA, said his agency could change its traditional hands-off approach to EHRs, but he acknowledged that the potential of FDA regulation raises serious clinical issues [the only clinical issues I can think of are in holding vendors accountable for patient injury - ed.] and is a “political hot potato.” “As of right now we’re not regulating EHRs, and it may turn out that we won’t,” he said.

A "political hot potato" as the reason for an FDA hands-off policy?  Remarkable. 

Tossing away political hot potatoes and ... patients.

Likely translation: FDA regulation of health IT will never happen.

One implication is that health IT quality, safety, efficacy, privacy, security, and other issues about these systems will remain subject to HHS and industry caprice.

While we're at it, let's deregulate knee implants too...

-- SS

Addendum April 19, 2011:

Roy Poses observes that:

Here is a great example of regulatory capture. The health care IT industry has amassed such political clout that it now has impunity to regulation. Once again, combined economic and political power trumps patients' and the public's health and safety. We will not be able to really reform health care until we can provide for honest, independent health care regulation to uphold patients' and the public's health.

-- SS

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Making a Stat Less Significant: Common Sense on "Side Effects" Lacking in Healthcare IT Sector

At my Mar. 27, 2011 post "Those Who Dismiss Healthcare (and Healthcare IT) Adverse Events Reports as Mere "Anecdotes" Have Lost - Supreme Court-Style" I wrote that the SCOTUS decided in MATRIXX INITIATIVES, INC., ET AL. v. SIRACUSANO ET AL. (link to PDF) that:

... We conclude that the materiality of adverse event reports cannot be reduced to a bright-line rule ... Because adverse reports can take many forms, assessing their materiality is a fact-specific inquiry, requiring consideration of their source, content, and context.

Wall Street Journal author and "Numbers Guy" Carl Bialik adds to that point in an article today "Making a Stat Less Significant" where he writes:

To determine whether a medical side effect is significant in an experiment requires knowing that every incidence of that side effect is being reported. Researchers can feel confident that is happening in a controlled clinical trial of a drug, but they can't be sure when a drug is being sold to the general public, as was the case with Zicam.

In other words, when one is not sure that every incident of a side effect is being reported, one should not cavalierly dismiss "anecdotal" reports of side effects, especially from reliable reporters.

The practictioners of Medical Informatics, along with the HIT Industry and its customers, appear to have failed in that regard with respect to clinical IT (electronic medical records, CPOE etc.) For years they have argued that these medical devices should not be regulated because that would "stifle innovation" and that reports of device adverse events were "anecdotal." Many in the field still make these arguments.

This view extends all the way up to the Director of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health IT, who glibly stated per the Aug. 2010 Huffington Post Investigative Fund article FDA, Obama Digital Medical Records Team at Odds over Safety Oversight that FDA's own reports of health IT related injuries and deaths were “anecdotal":

ONC director Blumenthal, the point man for the administration, has called the FDA’s injury findings “anecdotal and fragmentary.” He told the Investigative Fund that he believed nothing in the report indicated a need for regulation.

Those "injury findings" appear in an FDA Internal Memo made available by the aforementioned Huffington Post Investigative Fund and archived at the following link:

Internal FDA memorandum on HIT risks (PDF) to Jeffrey Shuren MD JD (Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health). Health Information Technology (H-IT) Safety Issues. "This is an Internal Document Not Intended for Public Use." Feb. 23, 2010.

(My description/summary of the memorandum is at my Aug. 2010 post "Internal FDA memorandum of Feb. 23, 2010 to Jeffrey Shuren on HIT risks. Smoking gun?")

That memorandum itself emphasizes how FDA's own knowledge of these events is partial due to reporting impediments and lack of knowledge of resources such as FDA's MAUDE database.

The known reports were likely "the tip of the iceberg" according to the Director of FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) Jeffrey Shuren, MD, who also happens to be a lawyer.

As at the aforementioned "tip of the iceberg" link, at an HHS meeting of the HIT Policy Committee's Adoption/Certification Workgroup on February 25, 2010, Shuren testified:

... In the past two years, we have received 260 reports of HIT-related malfunctions with the potential for patient harm – including 44 reported injuries and 6 reported deaths. Because these reports are purely voluntary, they may represent only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the HIT-related problems that exist.

Even within this limited sample, several serious safety concerns have come to light. The reported adverse events have largely fallen into four major categories: (1) errors of commission, such as accessing the wrong patient’s record or overwriting one patient’s information with another’s; (2) errors of omission or transmission, such as the loss or corruption of vital patient data; (3) errors in data analysis, including medication dosing errors of several orders of magnitude; and (4) incompatibility between multi-vendor software applications and systems, which can lead to any of the above.

The problem with ignoring testimony and reports of health IT-related difficulties and dismissing them as "anecdotal" goes back to the issue of "knowing that every incidence of that side effect is being reported."

While FDA itself admits significant doubt about completeness of reporting in its memo, what's worse is that Koppel and Kreda at University of Pennsylvania wrote a paper from which one might conclude that the healthcare and health IT industries are themselves aligned to conceal health IT adverse events reports.

In their remarkable article Health Care Information Technology Vendors' "Hold Harmless" Clause - Implications for Patients and Clinicians, Journal of the American Medical Association, 2009;301(12):1276-1278, we learn that there is little motivation for device safety in the health IT industry:

Healthcare information technology (HIT) vendors enjoy a contractual and legal structure that renders them virtually liability-free—“held harmless” is the term-of-art—even when their proprietary products may be implicated in adverse events involving patients. This contractual and legal device shifts liability and remedial burdens to physicians, nurses, hospitals, and clinics, even when these HIT users are strictly following vendor instructions...HIT vendors are not responsible for errors their systems introduce in patient treatment because physicians, nurses, pharmacists, and healthcare technicians should be able to identify—and correct—any errors generated by software faults. [In other words, they are expected to be clairvoyant when presented with erroneous or missing data - ed.]

We additionally learn that:

The significant disparity between buyers and sellers in knowledge and resources [about healthcare IT problems] is profound and consequential. Vendors retain company confidential knowledge about designs, faults, software-operations, and glitches. Their counsel have crafted contractual terms that absolve them of liability and other punitive strictures while compelling users’ non-disclosure of their systems’ problematic, or even disastrous, software faults.

In other words, health IT customers and users have a gag order imposed on them regarding software faults and defects.

I think any reasonable person would conclude there is great doubt as to whether "every incidence of [HIT side effects] is being reported."

I also pointed out in JAMA (link) and on my Drexel website (link) how agreeing to these terms caused hospital executives to violate both their fiduciary duties to their organization's workers as well as Joint Commission safety standards obligations.

(I've personally reported health IT defects I'd observed in hospitals where my relatives were patients to FDA's MAUDE database, discovering that the institution itself, whose officials I alerted to the problems, did not. An example is here.)

The above is all common sense.

Thus, the dismissal of reports of health IT-related patient injury, deaths, and "near misses" represents a failure of common sense, as well as a massive abrogation of fiduciary responsibilities and legal and ethical obligations among the Medical Informatics, health IT vendor, healthcare delivery, and healthcare regulatory sectors.

One end result is that it permits software like this to be mandated by state governments on hundreds of hospitals. One can only imagine the public, press and legal reactions if mission-critical software issues of this magnitude were brought forth after an aviation or nuclear power plant disaster.

The cavalier dismissals of HIT mishap reports clearly fall into the "knew, or should have known" category of negligence.

Plaintiff attorneys for patients injured or killed via HIT-related mishaps should take note.

-- SS

Note: my WSJ comment on this issue appears here.

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How Academic and Government "Anecdotes Are Not Data" Ideologues Kill People

I'm already receiving comments that, regarding Prof. Jon Patrick's detailed exposé of the dangers of ill-suited-for-purpose ED EHR's, Patrick's observations are:

... not really valid because they're not peer reviewed; they're just anecdotal.

Only an egghead could pen such words.

I always get hives immediately after eating strawberries. But without a scientifically controlled experiment with all the right peer review, it's not reliable data. So I continue to eat strawberries every day, since I can't tell if they cause hives.

I'd already written about anecdotalist refrains at my Mar. 7, 2011 post "Australian ED EHR Study: Putting the Lie to the Line "Your Evidence Is Anecdotal, Thus Worthless" Used by Eggheads, Fools and Gonifs." In that essay I cite Dr. Patrick himself on "anecdotal evidence", regarding which he hit the ball out of the Southern Hemisphere in an editorial in "Applied Clinical Informatics" entitled "The Validity of Personal Experiences in Evaluating HIT."

Aside from the fact that eggheads also don't seem to care about the issues of faulty peer review, especially in profitable biomedical sectors, such as at "The Lancet Emphasizes the Threats to the Academic Medical Mission" with its embedded links, and "Has Ghostwriting Infected The Experts With Tainted Knowledge, Creating Vectors for Further Spread and Mutation of the Scientific Knowledge Base?", there's this simple fact:

Public health catastrophe warnings from responsible sources don't need peer review, they need investigation.

Yes, there were those pesky, off-narrative journalistic reports that the Japanese nuclear reactors were not entirely safe, that Bernie Madoff was a fraud, that mortgages for everyone was not a good idea, that the O-rings couldn't stand sub-freezing temperatures, that the the foam that broke off the Columbia launch tank caused a danger, and that the Titanic didn't have enough lifeboats, but they weren't peer reviewed...so we ignored them. Saved us a lot of money, too.

-- SS

Addendum:

At my post "Real" Medical Informatics: What Does a Problem List of Typical Health IT Look Like, Part 2", I opined:

If the purpose of Medical Informatics is the improvement of healthcare (as opposed to career advancement of a small number of academics through publishing obscure articles about HIT benefits while ignoring downsides in rarified, echo-chamber peer reviewed journals), then:

• Who are the "real" medical informatics specialists, and;
  

• Who are the poseurs?

... researchers like Jon Patrick who address real-world issues of great import to patients on HIT risks, and further go public on the web with their work without the full blessings of some dusty journal (and those like Ross Koppel who also directly address the downsides, and others who make available to the public material such as on blogs like this and this, papers like this and sites like this) are the former.

Those who deem only "peer reviewed" articles worthy of daylight, and everything else - especially and particularly reports of downsides - "anecdotal" (the anecdotalists) are the latter.

I stand by this assertion.

Finally, I ask: at what point does ignoring work such as Prof. Patrick's, if patient harm is caused by the system he reviewed, constitute reckless endangerment and perhaps criminal negligence by hospital and government officials?

-- SS

Addendum Mar. 23:

As if on cue, this story appeared in the WSJ:

March 23, 2011

Japan Ignored Warning of Nuclear Vulnerability

TOKYO—Japanese regulators discussed in recent months the use of new cooling technologies at nuclear plants that could have lessened or prevented the disaster that struck this month when a tsunami wiped out the electricity at the stricken Fukushima Daiichi power facility.

However, they chose to ignore the vulnerability at existing reactors and instead focused on fixing the issue in future ones, government and corporate documents show. There was no serious discussion of retrofitting older plants with the alternative technology

I guess the "vulnerability reports" just weren't peer reviewed, therefore meaningless - or not reviewed by the "right" peers.

This sounds like our own FDA, ONC office and Institute of Medicine (via the Committee on Patient Safety and Health Information Technology), "choosing to ignore" health IT "vulnerabilities" (such as the aforementioned) and focusing on future issues such as comparative effectiveness research, "the common good", etc. instead.

I call this attitude "reckless endangerment" and hope plaintiff attorneys are paying close attention.

-- SS

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Former NIH Director Spins Through Revolving Door, Ends Up at Sanofi-Aventis

A bit of news that got little attention this month was a new job for the former head of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH).  Dr Elias Zerhouni had left the NIH in October, 2008.  Here is the Reuters version of the story of his hew career:

French drugmaker Sanofi-Aventis (SASY.PA) replaced its head of research and development with a leading academic and former top U.S. health official on Tuesday to raise its game in medical innovations.

The company said Elias Zerhouni would lead R&D of drugs and bring R&D for vaccines under his control too as Sanofi reshapes its portfolio and looks to vaccines as one area for growth to offset sales losses from mounting generic competition.

The appointment of Zerhouni, a professor of radiology and biomedical engineering, comes as Sanofi battles to buy U.S. rare disease specialist Genzyme.

Chief executive Chris Viehbacher brought in Zerhouni in February 2009 as his scientific adviser, shortly after taking charge of the group which he has been transforming to include the development of drugs based on biotechnology.

Zerhouni's Embrace of Corporate Health Care

Although Zerhouni ostensibly left the NIH to return to academia at Johns Hopkins University, note that by February, 2009, four months after his resignation was announced, Zerhouni was already advising the Sanofi CEO. 

Soon after he joined the corporate health care world in earnest.  In April, 2009, he was proposed for membership on the board of directors of Actelion Ltd, a Swiss biotechnology company.  On December 8, 2009, he was elected to the board of Danaher Corp, a diversified technology corporation which makes medical devices.  At some time he had become President of the Zerhouni Group, which advertised itself as a resource to "pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, trade organizations, sovereign wealth funds, government agencies, and research entities around the globe."

Zerhouni at the NIH: His Response to the Conflict of Interest Scandal

There is more than a little irony inspired by Zerhouni's quick circuit through the revolving door.

Zerhouni became director of the NIH in 2002, and announced his departure in October, 2008. In December, 2003, David Willman published his landmark article in the Los Angeles Times on severe conflicts of interest affecting NIH scientists and leaders.  It revealed that formerly stringent conflict of interest policies at the Institutes were rescinded by then director Dr Harold Varmus in 1995, during the Clinton administration, and increasingly since 1998, disclosure of NIH personnel's conflicts of interest had been reduced.  Thus, in 2002, Zerhouni had taken charge of an agency already deeply affected by conflicts of interest affecting many of its leaders, even though that was not yet public.  He initially did nothing about the situation. 

Willman published another series of articles revealing even more breathtaking conflicts of interest in December, 2004.  (See our post here.)   By then, a Los Angeles Times editorial said there was the "appearance of corruption" at the NIH, and called for Dr Zerhouni's resignation. 

Only after the second series of articles did Dr Zerhouni swing into action (see post here).  In February, 2005, he announced that he would now hold the NIH to a "higher standard."  Yet new conflict of interest stories kept surfacing and their handling kept provoking concern (e.g., see this post from 2007, and this post from 2008), and concerns about how NIH deals with conflicts of interest affecting the extramural researchers it funds persist to this day (e.g., see this post). 

By the late 1990s, the NIH, like many other government agencies, seemed to have become extremely cozy with the world of big corporations.  Dr Zerhouni did nothing to obvious to reduce the local version of this coziness until it had become a public scandal.  His actions let questions about the relationships of the NIH, once a pristine example of a government run biomedical research agency, with big health care business persist to this day. 

So it should perhaps be no surprise that he so quickly transitioned from the government that is supposed to be"of the people, by the people, for the people" to top leadership positions in corporate health care.

Other US Government Health Care Agency Leaders Transit the Revolving Door

Meanwhile, the previous commissioner of the US Food and Drug Administration, Dr Andrew von Eschenbach, is Senior Director for Strategic Initiatives at the Center for Health Transformation, a group whose membership includes some of the biggest health care organizations, many of which have had their own moments in the sun on Health Care Renewal.  For example, see Charter Members, AstraZeneca, Sutter Health, and Wellpoint; and Platinum Members, GlaxoSmithKline and Merck.  Dr Eschenbach is also on the board of directors of Histosonics Inc. 

Also, the previous director of the Centers for Disease Control, Dr Julie Geberding, became President of Merck Vaccines in late 2009. 

Conclusions

So the revolving door just keeps spinning, its revolutions suggesting how closely tied together big government and big corporations have become in what is now the health care business.  Whatever the motivations of Doctors Zerhouni, von Eschenbach, and Geberding were, the message to every person in a leadership position in health care in the US government has to still be: you too can earn big corporate compensation soon after you leave here.  Who knows how much that siren song will lead current government leaders to avoid antagonizing the leaders of big health care corporations during their government "service."  That is, of course, not what we want them to be thinking about if government agencies ae to serve the people, not the CEOs of big corporations. 

I am sure that the career transitions of Doctors Zerhouni, von Eschenbach, and Geberding were perfectly legal.  If we want government health care agencies to put the peoples' interests ahead of those of the CEOs of big health care corporations, should not, however, the law be changed to at least slow down the revolving door?

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"Unreasonably Dangerous" Heparin

It is time for an update on the case of the deadly contaminated heparin sold by Baxter International, which has received much less attention than seems warranted given its human costs (81 lives).  How the heparin was contaminated, and how the contaminated heparin ended up being sold as a US Food and Drug Administration approved American product are still unknown.  Despite the fact that the outcome of this case were so bad, it received disproportionately little attention when it was first made public, and now seems to have become nearly anechoic.

Case Summary 

Baxter International imported the "active pharmaceutical ingredient" (API) of heparin, that is, in plainer language, the drug itself, from China. That API was then sold, with some minor processing, as a Baxter International product with a Baxter International label. The drug came from a sketchy supply chain that Baxter did not directly supervise, apparently originating in small "workshops" operating under primitive and unsanitary conditions without any meaningful inspection or supervision by the company, the Chinese government, or the FDA. The heparin proved to have been adulterated with over-sulfated chondroitin sulfate (OSCS), and many patients who received got seriously ill or died. While there have been investigations of how the adulteration adversely affected patients, to date, there have been no publicly reported investigations of how the OSCS got into the heparin, and who should have been responsible for overseeing the purity and safety of the product. Despite the facts that clearly patients died from receiving this adulterated drug, no individual has yet suffered any negative consequence for what amounted to poisoning of patients with a brand-name but adulterated pharmaceutical product.  (For a more detailed summary of the case, look here, and for all our posts on this topic, look here.)

Civil Cases Plod Forward
If there is any ongoing official investigation of this case, it has not been made public.  Civil cases filed by patients allegedly injured by the heparin, or by relatives of patients who died allegedly from the heparin, seem to be proceeding at a glacial pace.  However, there is one development in one set of civil cases worthy of note.  As reported two weeks ago by Alicia Mundy in the Wall Street Journal:

A state court in Illinois has granted a partial summary judgment to two plaintiffs suing Baxter International Inc. over contaminated blood thinner, saying that some of the company's heparin was 'unreasonably dangerous.'

The suit involves tainted imported heparin ingredients from China that caused a public health crisis in 2008, and were linked to more than 80 deaths in the U.S. and many other serious allergic reactions.

Some 300 cases nationwide against Baxter and its main ingredient supplier, Wisconsin-based Scientific Protein Laboratories LLC, were consolidated in Chicago in Cook County Circuit Court.

Both companies have said that they weren't negligent and weren't responsible for the deadly reactions among patients.

The Illinois judge's ruling, dated Wednesday, involved a motion for partial summary judgment that named only Baxter. The motion was filed on behalf of two plaintiffs in the consolidated cases, one of whom died.

The ruling cites statements by Baxter's corporate quality vice president and the president of the company's medication delivery division that the heparin was defective.

Baxter argued in its defense that a jury should address the question of whether a product is 'unreasonably dangerous.' The company noted that the two Baxter executives who agreed in depositions that the heparin was defective aren't doctors or scientists. However, Judge Jennifer Duncan-Brice wrote that the issue before her wasn't whether heparin actually caused the death or injury to the plaintiffs, but just whether the product was, as a matter of fact, contaminated.

The most basic responsibility of a pharmaceutical company is to produce pure, unadulterated product.  As the current director of the US Food and Drug Administration wrote in this week's New England Journal of Medicine, the agency's "modern regulatory functions began with the passage of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act, a law, more than a quarter of a century in the making, that prohibited interstate commerce in adulterated and misbranded food and drugs."  However, in the 21st century, drug companies are increasingly failing to produce unadulterated products, and the FDA is having increasing difficulty assuring patients that the drugs they take meet even the most basic safety standards. 

I submit that corporate cultures increasingly influenced by the arrogant, greedy, amoral leadership of the financial services industry that lead us to the brink of another depression are also leading us to the brink of a poisonous era in health care.  Corporate leaders intent on cutting costs, and paying themselves as much of the resulting proceeds as possible, may see quality and safety as just another cost cutting target.  Corporate leaders brought up in the culture of finance, but untrained and inexperienced in engineering, science, and medicine find it all too easy to ignore quality and safety and focus on the bottom line.  (It is ironic that in the quote above, Baxter International's attorneys made light of the judgments of the company's own executives because they are not physicians or scientists.)

Meanwhile, society seems to have been so mesmerized by the mantra that laissez faire capitalism will lead to miraculous "innovation" that we do not even attend to instances in which it lead instead to death.

As we have said until being blue in the face, as long as the leaders of health care organizations are not held accountable for the results of their decisions on health care quality, cost, and access (even in such extreme quality violations as those resulting in multiple patient deaths), we can expect continuing decisions that sacrifice quality, increase costs, and worsen access, but that are in the self-interest of the people making them.


To really reform health care, we must hold health care organizations and their leaders accountable (and not blame all the problems on doctors, other health care professionals, patients, and society at large).

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EHRevent.org CEO Edward Fotsch MD: The Real Challenge with EHRs is -- User Error?

Additional detailed answers to the questions I raised here and here about a new site EHRevent.org, for reporting of healthcare IT-related medical errors, can now be found at a HIStalk interview entitled "HIStalk Interviews Edward Fotsch MD, CEO, PDR Network (EHR Event)" at this link.

It is an interesting interview. I certainly find the recognition of need for an EHR/clinical IT problems reporting service a major cultural advancement in healthcare.

It's still unclear to me how -- and why -- this organization originated with little to no public knowledge and involvement, especially considering the organization types mentioned below that participated, and how it will function in interactions with myriad healthcare IT stakeholders.

Here's an explanation by Dr. Fotsch:

... We work with a not-for-profit board called the iHealth Alliance. They Alliance is made up of medical society executives, professional liability carriers, and liaison representatives from the FDA. They govern some of the networks that we run, and in exchange for that, help us recruit physicians. Professional liability carriers, for example, promote our services that send drug alerts to doctors because that’s good and protective from a liability standpoint.

In the course of our conversations with them roughly a year ago, when we were talking about adding some drug safety information into electronic health records, we came across the fact that there were concerns from the liability carriers that there was no central place for reporting adverse EHR events or near misses or potential problems or issues with electronic health records.

[Translation: the carriers saw their losses potentially increasing as a result of litigation arising from EHR-related lawsuits, and decided to do something proactive- ed.]

They were interested in creating a single place where they could promote to their insured physicians that they could report adverse EHR events. Then it turned out that medical societies had similar concerns.

[That must have been one of the best-kept secrets on Earth considering the promotion EHR's have received as a miracle-working technology, and the lack of expression of concerns from those societies - ed.]

Rather than have each of them create a system, the Alliance took on a role of orchestrating all of the interests, including some interest from the FDA and ONC in creating an electronic health record problem reporting system. That’s how it came into play.

Our role in it, in addition to having a seat on the iHealth Alliance board, was really in network operations — in running the servers, if you will, which didn’t seem like a very complicated task. Since business partners we rely on for our core business were interested in it, it was easy to say yes. It frankly turned out to be somewhat more complicated than we originally thought [I predict they haven't seen anything yet; wait until they get knee deep into real world EHR issues - ed.], but now it’s up and available.

While I find the recognition of need for an EHR/clinical IT reporting service a major advancement, I am nonetheless troubled by certain statements made by Dr. Fotsch. They seem at odds with the theoretic and empirical findings of medical informatics, social informatics, human-computer interaction and other fields relevant for health IT evaluation, and/or seem to demonstrate biases about HIT. My comments are in red italics:

Fotsch:

… Probably what we’re seeing more often than not, the real challenge with EHRs like any technology, turns out to be some form of user error.

[What about contributory or causative designer error? – ed.]

“I didn’t know it would do that"

[Why did the user not know? Lack of training, poor manuals, or overly complex information systems lacking informative messages and consistency of control-action relationships, as an example? -ed]

... or “I didn’t know that it pre-populated that"

[Why did it pre-populate? Was that inappropriate for the clinical context, such as in this example?]

... or “I didn’t know I shouldn’t cut and paste"

[Then why did the software designers enable cut and paste, without some informative message on overuse, such as length of text cut and pasted?– ed.]

... or “I wasn’t paying attention to this"

[Perhaps due to distractions from mission hostile user interfaces? -ed]

... or maybe the user interface was a little confusing

[What is "a little confusing?" (Is that like "A little pregnant?) And why was it confusing? User intellectual inadequacy, or software design issues leading to cognitive overload? - ed.]

Actual software errors appear to be the exception rather than the rule as it relates to EHR events.

["Actual software errors" are defined as, what, exactly--? Loss of database relational integrity as a result of a programming error, as apparently recently happened at Trinity Health, a large Catholic hospital chain as reported in HIStalk? Memory leaks from poor code? Buffer overflows? What?]

That’s at least as I understand it.

[Understand it from whom? Hopefully not from me or my extensive website on the issues - ed.]

In summary, a "blame the user" attitude seems apparent. There appears to be little acknowledgment of the concept of IT "errorgenicity" - the capacity of a badly designed or poorly implemented information system to facilitate error, and of the systemic nature of errors in complex organizations to which ill-done IT can contribute.

These are concepts understood long ago in mission critical settings, as in this mid 1980's piece from the Air Force cited in my previously-linked eight part series on mission hostile health IT:

From "GUIDELINES FOR DESIGNING USER INTERFACE SOFTWARE"
ESD-TR-86-278
August 1986
Sidney L. Smith and Jane N. Mosier
The MITRE Corporation
Prepared for Deputy Commander for Development Plans and Support Systems, Electronic Systems Division, AFSC, United States Air Force, Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts.

... SIGNIFICANCE OF THE USER INTERFACE

The design of user interface software is not only expensive and time-consuming, but it is also critical for effective system performance. To be sure, users can sometimes compensate for poor design with extra effort. Probably no single user interface design flaw, in itself, will cause system failure. But there is a limit to how well users can adapt to a poorly designed interface. As one deficiency is added to another, the cumulative negative effects may eventually result in system failure, poor performance, and/or user complaints.

Outright system failure can be seen in systems that are underused, where use is optional, or are abandoned entirely. There may be retention of (or reversion to) manual data handling procedures, with little use of automated capabilities. When a system fails in this way, the result is disrupted operation, wasted time, effort and money, and failure to achieve the potential benefits of automated information handling.

In a constrained environment, such as that of many military and commercial information systems, users may have little choice but to make do with whatever interface design is provided. There the symptoms of poor user interface design may appear in degraded performance. Frequent and/or serious errors in data handling may result from confusing user interface design [in medicine, this often translates to reduced safety and reduced care quality - ed.] Tedious user procedures may slow data processing, resulting in longer queues at the checkout counter, the teller's window, the visa office, the truck dock, [the hospital floor or doctor's office - ed.] or any other workplace where the potential benefits of computer support are outweighed by an unintended increase in human effort.

In situations where degradation in system performance is not so easily measured, symptoms of poor user interface design may appear as user complaints. The system may be described as hard to learn, or clumsy, tiring and slow to use [often heard in medicine, but too often blamed on "physician resistance" - ed.] The users' view of a system is conditioned chiefly by experience with its interface. If the user interface is unsatisfactory, the users' view of the system will be negative regardless of any niceties of internal computer processing.

I am not entirely happy when the CEO of an organization taking on the responsibility of being a central focus for EHR error reporting makes statements that are consistent with unfamiliarity with important HIT-relevant domains, as well as a possible pro-IT, anti-user biases.

For that reason as well as the other questions raised at my prior posts (such as the onerous legal contract and apparent lack of ability of the public to easily view the actual report texts themselves), I cannot recommend use of their site for EHR problems reporting.

I recommend the continued use of the FDA facilities until such time as a compelling argument exists to do otherwise.

-- SS

Addendum 11/28/10:

This passage ends the main essay at my site "Contemporary Issues in Medical Informatics: Common Examples of Healthcare Information Technology Difficulties" and is quite relevant here:

... An article worth reviewing is "Human error: models and management", James Reason (a fitting name!), BMJ 2000;320:768-770 (18 March), http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/320/7237/768:

Summary points:

• Two approaches to the problem of human fallibility exist: the person and the system approaches
  

• The person approach focuses on the errors of individuals, blaming them for forgetfulness, inattention, or moral weakness

• The system approach concentrates on the conditions under which individuals work and tries to build defenses to avert errors or mitigate their effects

• High reliability organizations---which have less than their fair share of accidents---recognize that human variability is a force to harness in averting errors, but they work hard to focus that variability and are constantly preoccupied with the possibility of failure.

-- SS

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There You Go Again: Richard Epstein Says "Conflict-of-Interest Rules Thwart Medical Progress"

Richard Epstein, a professor at the New York University and University of Chicago law schools, just authored a report on the perils of conflict of interest rules.  In his blog, "The Libertarian," he summarized his beliefs that strict conflict of interest (COI) rules and restrictions on pharmaceutical marketing "spell lower rates of innovation and slower dissemination of new products." 

Prof Epstein is extremely prominent.  The Manhattan Institute, of which he is a fellow, claimed, "Professor Epstein's influence is profound: he is one of the three most cited law professors in the United States and the most cited professor writing largely in private law." Thus, it is disturbing that it appears that his objections are based on a series of logical fallacies.  (Note that we critiqued a defense of certain conflicts of interest he made in 2007 here on similar grounds.)

Ad Hominem: Enemies of Capitalism

Prof Epstein implied that the people who advocate strong conflict of interest rules are enemies of capitalism and free markets.  For example, he wrote, "most of the modern critics of the drug and medical device industries start with the assumption that the profit-motive alone is sufficient to distort the behavior of all scientists and researchers."  Later, "the people who line up most strongly against drug and device companies often treat the phrase 'market forces' as though it embodies the worst things in life."  How he was able to read the minds of those who disagree with him is unclear.  Attacking proponents of strict COI regulation as anti-capitalists (and by implication, socialists or communists) appears to be an ad hominem fallacy.

Burden of Proof: Ignoring Evidence of Harms of COI, Asserting Evidence of Benefits

Prof Epstein argued that COIs rarely if ever leads to bad effects: "the number of instances of serious abuses of power in the drug and device industry, like in medical research itself, is small, relative to the huge number of interactions that have taken place." Thus, he ignored evidence that commercially funded research may be biased in favor of the sponsors' products.(1-4) On the other hand, he implied that financial relationships  among physicians and researchers and commercial firms that sell health care products and services are necessary for "rapid development and deployment of new pharmaceuticals and medical devices," and for "innovation" in the field, but provided no evidence for these points.  Thus, while ignoring evidence of the possible harms of COIs, he failed to provide evidence for their benefits.  By placing the burden of proof on those who disagree with him, while avoiding it himself, he invoked the burden of proof (or appeal to ignorance) fallacy.

Appeal to Common Practice: Scientists Wearing Multiple Hats

Prof Epstein asserted that strict COI rules would disturb what is now common practice.  They would threaten how "the best research scientists in universities ... wear multiple hats.  In addition to researching within the academy, they also offer consulting services to drug companies, or start businesses of  their own."  Academics may currently behave in this way, but that does not mean this behavior is optimal in any sense.  Thus, Epstein employed the fallacy of the appeal to common practice. 

Slippery Slope: Silencing Communication and Collaboration

Prof Epstein asserted that strict rules on COI would "prohibit the collaborative efforts that have long characterized standard practices [in research]."  Specifically, he asserted the rules could stipulate that "no scientist who sits on any Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) review committee, or any hospital conflict of interest committee, should be allowed to have connections with the pharmaceutical industry."  Also, "collaborations between government and industry scientists on research projects of common interests should either be totally eliminated or heavily regulated."  Finally, he asserted, "free interchange of information within and across firm boundaries is best calculated to allow the sharing and coordination of vital information," but "strong conflict of interest regulation poses real threats to these dynamic interactions."

Yet rules about conflicts of interest generally refer to those generated by financial relationships, most often payments by commercial firms to academics, researchers or physicians.  Payments are not necessary for collaboration.  Researchers can communicate, share information, even work together without one party paying the other.  Warning of such dire consequences of regulations that have nothing directly to do with communication or collaboration amount to the slippery slope fallacy.

Appeal to Authority: the "Most Gifted Members of the Academy"


Prof Epstein noted above that it was the best researchers who consult for commercial firms or start their own firms.  Later, he stated, "the ablest scientists often have the most extensive outside practices."  In complaining about rules that limit the pay of faculty members for services on boards of directors of for-profit health care companies, he asked, "why crimp the behavior of the most gifted members of the academy who can also make major contributions to industry?"  Thus he seemed to agree with the arguments made by representatives of pharmaceutical and device companies that the doctors who they pay to speak, consult, or do research are the best and the brightest.  However, there is considerable evidence (e.g., see posts here and here), that such "key opinion leaders" or "thought leaders" are chosen because of their sympathy to the companies and their products, and their malleability.  In addition, there is evidence that medical schools now put more emphasis on ability to attract external funding than any other faculty characteristic in decisions about payment, promotion, and retention (see post here).  Prof Epstein's invocation of the need to honor the best and the brightest appears to be a variant on the appeal to authority fallacy. 

Summary

So here we have another example, by " one of the nation's most prolific legal thinkers, (according to the Manhattan Institute) of a defense of the prevalent conflicts of interest that affect academic physicians and clinical researchers.  Like many previous such defenses, it seemed to be mainly based on logical fallacies. 

Also, like many previous such defenses, it was made by someone with a history of his own financial relationships with health care corporations.  To his credit, Prof Epstein did disclose, "over the years, I have worked extensively with various groups in the pharmaceutical industry, but have done no such work in the past few years."  On the other hand, he did not disclose his previous relationships with eSapience, a company which once claimed it "shapes the debate on issues that intersect law, economics, and policy."  (See post here.)

The currently prevalent relationships with health care corporations among academic physicians, researchers, and other decision makers and influencers in health care have been lucrative for them.  I have yet to see a coherent, logical argument that these relationships are good for patients, medical education, biomedical or clinical science, or public health made by anyone who does not have such relationships.

By the way, Prof Epstein also complained about overly rigorous regulation of pharmaceutical marketing in the same blog post, but since this really seems to be a distinct topic, I will not discuss his arguments here. 

References

1.  Bekelman JE et al. Scope and impact of financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research: a systematic review.  JAMA 2003; 289: 454-465.  Link here.
2.  Lexchin J et al.  Pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and research outcome and quality: systematic review.  Brit Med J 2003; 326:  1167.  Link here.
3.  Jorgenson AW et al. Cochrane reviews compared with industry supported meta-analyses and other meta-analyses of the same drugs: systematic review. Brit Med J 2006; 333: 782.  Link here.
4.  McGauran N et al. Reporting bias in medical research - a narrative review.  Trials 2010; 11: 37.  Link here. 

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